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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is in the field of public finance and taxation, with a specialization in
state and local taxation in the United States. In the first chapter, it is sought to understand
how business taxation at the state level affects the rate of entry and exits of businesses—or
business dynamism. In the second and third chapters, The topic is approached from a
different angle, and the following question is asked ”how do economic shocks affect lo-
cal taxation?” with a specific focus on property taxes. In the second chapter, jointly with
Chiara Ferrero, it is analyzed at how the Great Recession and the precipitous decline in
home prices across the country affected local property tax bases—or the assessed value of
property—and local property tax rates. In the third chapter, it is analyzed how a different
type of shock, robotization, and more generally structural shocks may impact local public
finance, not only on the revenue side but also in terms of expenditures and public goods
provision.
Business dynamism has been linked to innovation and employment creation, yet there
is little empirical research on the relationship between business taxation and business
operations’ births and deaths. My contribution with this work would be to fill that gap and
provide empirical evidence regarding the role of state taxation on establishments’ entry
and exit. Several identification strategies were exploited to answer that question. The
paper starts with an event study and a distributed lag model to provide graphical evidence
on large tax changes. In the main estimation strategy, the impact of states corporate
taxation was identified using a difference-in-difference model. A negative effect of the
state corporate tax on the entry of establishments and firms was documented: an increase
in the top state corporate tax rate of one percentage point leads to a decline in the entry
rate of about -1.5% to -3.5%. The effect on exits is positive but smaller (0.5%–1.5%) and
usually not statistically significant.
Given the potential risk for endogeneity—tax changes may be correlated with unobserv-
able local shocks, or policymakers may implement tax reforms correlated with local eco-
nomic conditions—a border discontinuity identification strategy was used as well, where
counties in a state experiencing a tax change were compared to counties across the state
xi
border. Identifying the presence of spillovers is critical with that identification strategy
but important overall from an empirical estimation and policy perspective as well. It was
evaluated whether there were significant spillovers across state borders at the county and
census tract level, no evidence was found that they were significant or that they drive the
main findings. However, it was found that spillovers can be large in areas in close proxim-
ity to the border—within three to five miles. The findings are robust to changes in other
state level policies, sample restrictions, and different identification strategies.
The second chapter, which is a joint work with Chiara Ferrero, begins with an ambitious
data collection on historical local property tax revenues, where values and tax rates in the
entire United States are assessed. Data were collected for 44 states, with some starting
in 1990 until 2018—all but two states were fully covered between 2002 and 2015. This
novel data set was leveraged to study the effect of falling home prices associated with
the Great Recession on local property tax revenues. Accordingly, the mechanical channel
through which home values affected assessed values and the policy channel through which
policymakers responded to changes in the tax base were teased out.
It was found that the resilience of property tax revenues could be attributed to two
main factors: a small correlation between home price changes and assessed values after
2007 as well as large increases in property tax rates in areas facing a negative shock in
their tax base. Contrary to the mainstream perception, it was found that the recession had
a small but negative and lasting impact on the tax base. Negative shocks were offset by as
much as 80%–85% in the long run, implying that a 10% decrease in the tax base led to only
a 1.5% decline in property tax revenues. Additionally, a large variation in responses was
documented, and the role of property tax rate and levy limits during and post-recession
was analyzed. It was perceived that rate limits seem to reduce the ability of policymakers
to offset negative shocks in the tax base and lead to a bigger decline in revenues. While
most jurisdictions seek to smooth out both positive and negative shocks, it was found that
this is especially true in areas facing levy limits, consistent with the theory that policymak-
ers want to avoid large downfalls.
In the last chapter, the role of a different shock is investigated, namely exposure to
robotization, as well as its impact on local revenues and public goods provision. It is
shown that exposure to robots leads to a decline in total revenues, driven by a large fall
in tax revenues, specifically property taxes. Spending was found to be similarly affected,
with expenditures on transport, capital outlays, and insurance and trust being primarily
hit. The role of local autonomy, as defined by areas with functional home rule, as well as
xii
the role of property tax limits were investigated. It was found that the decline in taxes was
less pronounced in areas with higher autonomy and more pronounced in areas with strict
property tax limits. Using a dataset on local property tax rates, it is shown that robotization
leads to an increase in the average rate, driven largely by high autonomy areas. It is shown
that these results are consistent with a model of optimal local policy, which depends on
transfers and local income. Further, the importance of accounting for policy changes when




In or Out? The Impact of State Business Taxation on
Business Dynamism
Abstract
Business dynamism has been linked to innovation and employment creation, yet there is
little empirical research on the relationship between business taxation and business oper-
ations births and deaths. Using several identification strategies that consider the potential
endogeneity between tax changes and local economic conditions, a negative effect of the
state corporate tax on the entry of establishments and firms is documented: an increase
in the top state corporate tax rate of one percentage point leads to a decline in the entry
rate of about -1.5% to -3.5%. The effect on exits is positive but smaller (0.5%–1.5%) and
usually not statistically significant. Further, the presence of spillovers across state borders
at the county and census tract level was evaluated, and no evidence was found that they
were significant or drove the main findings. However, it was found that spillovers can be
large in areas in close proximity to the border—within three to five miles. These find-
ings are robust to changes in other state level policies, sample restrictions, and different
identification strategies.
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1.1 Introduction
The secular decline in business dynamism and entrepreneurship since the 1980s in
the United States has been well documented and has brought the issue of business cre-
ation and destruction back into the spotlight. Since Schumpeter’s seminal work, business
dynamism and “creative destruction” have been seen as essential elements of innovation
and creation of growth-spurring goods and services. Despite large firms being innovators
and representing a large share of patents, the notion remains that major changes in tech-
nology and consumption are brought by small, young, and job-creating firms, and it is
empirically supported as well.1 In this paper, the impact of business taxation at the state
level on establishments and firms’ entry and exit is studied. The number of empirical and
structural studies using variation in state tax systems is growing; however, little is known
regarding the impact of state taxes on business dynamism. Shedding light on this rela-
tionship is important to paint a clearer picture of the role of taxation an policy. Two years
after the introduction of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), the effect of corporate taxa-
tion on economic activity, employment, and growth remains a fundamental question. A
usual argument used in policy circles in favor of lower taxation is that higher taxes limit
entrepreneurship and risk-taking and hence threatens some fundamental and necessary
characteristics that foster growth. This study provides some empirical results adding to
the understanding of state tax policy in particular and corporate taxation in general.
The large variation in state tax systems, both across space and time, provides a unique
setting to identify the impact of tax reforms. Evidence suggests that state corporate taxes
have a negative effect on employment and income (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2018))
as well as the number of establishments owned by multi-state firms (Giroud and Rauh
(2019)). A related question emerges: where are jobs gained and lost? Whether state tax
changes affect businesses’ entry and exit will guide the understanding of this question.
The theoretical predictions on how corporate taxation affects firm creation, employment,
and investment are clear. However, the endogeneity of tax systems and tax reforms and
the difficulty in finding a setting with clear identification for empirical analysis has led
to mixed results and debates. In this paper, several identification strategies were used to
evaluate the question at hand. An event study analysis of large tax reforms was conducted
first, and a difference-in-difference strategy exploiting the variation within states over time
was implemented. Results from a border discontinuity design are presented as well, where
1E.g. Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) showed that one of the major determinants of job creation
is firm age.
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identification comes from comparing outcomes in“treated” border counties experiencing a
tax change and using adjacent counties across the state border as controls. This designs
alleviates the threat of tax reforms being correlated with unobservable shocks. It was con-
sistently found that corporate tax hikes reduce the entry rate of establishments, where a
one percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate leads to a decline in entry of about
-1.5% to -3.5% depending on the specification. The estimates from the border discontinu-
ity design were found to be on the higher end of the spectrum in magnitude, indicating
that tax hikes may be more likely to be implemented in times of rising entry and vice versa
for tax cuts. Some weaker evidence was found that tax hikes lead to a small rise in exits,
with a short-lived effect, which is consistent with theoretical predictions. Tax cuts were
found to have a smaller and typically significant effect, leading to a small increase in en-
tries and decrease in exits. However, evidence suggests that tax cuts may be more likely
endogenous as well.
An important underlying question, which was amplified in the border discontinuity
analysis, is the extent to which firm migration drives the outcome as opposed to actual
births and deaths. Specifically, we may be concerned with the presence of spillovers when
comparing counties across borders, which would lead to a different interpretation of the
estimated effects. Although firm migration is clearly not limited to border areas, without
establishment level data tracking individual units over time, such movement cannot be
detected easily. In this paper, state borders were focused on to shed some additional light
on spillovers and validate the understanding of tax changes in border areas. The decision
to shift a firm’s location across areas is the first type of spillovers—the direct effects of a
tax change on a firm’s optimal decision. However, there can also be indirect spillovers. An
example of this would be lower economic activity from a tax hike impacting adjacent areas
negatively as well. When testing for spillovers, it was attempted to tease apart these two
effects and shed some light on both direct and indirect effects. Some results highlighting
that a hike in the personal tax rate also leads to a decline in firm entry are presented, which
is somewhat not too surprising as a large number of companies are not incorporated and
face the personal income tax.
This paper contributes to the literature in different ways. First, new evidence is pro-
vided on the effect of state corporate taxation on business dynamism, specifically on estab-
lishments and firms’ entry and exit, exploiting several identification strategies to allow for
causal interpretation. It is shown that the findings are robust to sample restrictions and
various specifications as well. Second, light is shed on whether tax reforms have spillovers
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across state borders. In addition to performing a county level analysis, finer grain data
was exploited at the census tract level. An analysis was performed evaluating the impact
of a tax change on firms’ entry and exit as a function of the distance to the border. This
would capture localized effects that are too small to be precisely estimated in the aggregate
analysis.
It is worth mentioning that the bulk of the analysis focuses on establishments’ birth and
death rates rather than firms. First, the goal was to evaluate how business taxation affects
business activity, and it is believed that the number of business operations is the relevant
metric as such. Second, the growth of existing firms, by opening and closing plants, is
critical for employment, investment, and research and development. Finally, a majority
of firms are single-establishment firms.2 However, we also estimated how business taxes
affect single-establishment firms, as it is important to understand the role of taxes on new
businesses beyond overall economic activity.
Extensive and rich literature exists on business location decision and on the role that
state and local taxes play since the pioneering work by Bartik (1985) and Carlton (1983).
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the literature on the effect of state
taxes in the United States. The literature has typically taken two main approaches in ex-
ploiting the large variation in state level taxes both over time and across jurisdictions.
Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) used a structural approach to look at the effect of state corporate
tax cuts on firm location decisions and its welfare consequences for firm owners, work-
ers, and landowners. The second strand uses reduced form estimations using a range of
methods to overcome the endogeneity of tax systems and economic outcomes. Ljungqvist
and Smolyansky (2018) evaluated the effect of corporate tax cuts and hikes on employ-
ment and income between 1970 and 2010 using a border discontinuity methodology. They
found that a one percentage point increase in the corporate income tax rate led to a de-
cline of roughly 0.24% in employment and 0.36% in income. These results held for tax
increases, but the evidence was weaker on the effect of tax cuts, a result consistent with the
current paper’s analysis.3 Also using a border county approach, Curtis and Decker (2018)
focused on employment in young (0–1 year old) firms between 2000 and 2014. They
found a large and negative effect of the corporate tax rate, with a decrease in employment
of roughly 4% following a 1 p.p. increase, but small and statistically insignificant effects
of the top marginal personal income tax and sales tax.
2In 2000, there were 6261576 firms and 7070048 establishments. In 2017, there were 6747135 firms
and 7860671 establishments.
3They found that while tax cuts had little effect on either employment or income over, they mattered
when implemented during a recession, where a one percentage point increase led to an increase of 0.64%
in employment.
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Giroud and Rauh (2019) used multi-state firms and found that changes in the corporate
tax rate was associated with both extensive (establishment) and intensive (employment)
margins of adjustment.4 By using large individual firm data, they were able to control
for endogenous selection of firms and control for time invariant characteristics. They
found the number of establishments to decrease by about 0.52% when states increased
the corporate tax rate for C-corporations and a smaller (0.4%) but significant effect of the
state personal income tax on pass-through firms. Finally, regarding dynamism specifically,
Kneller and McGowan (2012) looked at the effect of taxation on firm entry and exit rates in
OECD countries between 1998 and 2005 using a difference-in-difference approach. They
found results similar to that of the current paper: corporate income taxation has a negative
effect on entry but no consistent effect on exit. Djankov et al. (2010) found in a 2004 cross-
sectional analysis that corporate tax rates were negatively correlated with investment and
entrepreneurial activity, while Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011) found that lower
corporate tax rates lowered firm entry.
In the next section, the conceptual framework is presented, a simple model of general
equilibrium with taxation and firm entry and exit is introduced, and how businesses are
taxed at the state level as well as the data used in the analysis are discussed. The third
section presents the different identification strategies implemented and discusses the main
results. Section 4 shows some robustness checks and a discussion of the results. The last
section presents the conclusion.
1.2 Conceptual Framework, Background and Data
In this section, the theoretical underpinnings between taxation and business dynamism
are discussed. The decision to enter or exit a market for a firm is a dynamic one and will
inherently depend on the decisions of other firms, as they compete for customers and re-
sources. A simple dynamic general equilibrium model of firms’ entry and exit is presented
first to better understand the mechanism through which taxes affect firms’ decisions. As
discussed earlier, however, taxes will also affect the location decision of a firm, conditional
on entering. Similarly, changes in taxation may push firms to reallocate to a different lo-
cation. Beyond the model which focuses on dynamism, and does not include migration of
firms, it is discussed how state taxes may affect location decisions and how it would impact
theoretical predictions on dynamism.
4They found that roughly half of the results were driven by reallocation, while the other half constituted
net creation (destruction) of jobs and establishments.
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1.2.1 Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
The model is based on Sedlacek and Sterk (2019), who evaluated the effect of the TCJA
on businesses, which itself is based on Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993). The average state corporate tax was included, and the model was re-calibrated
to look at the effect of a small change in corporate taxation on firm entry and exit. The
key feature of the model is that it allows for endogenous firm entry and exit, allowing for
the comparison of equlibria with different tax rates and how firm entry and exit rates are
affected.
Here, the key aspects of the model as well as qualitative and quantitative predictions on
firm entry and exit are discussed. The appendix section provides more detailed information
on the construction of the model and the calibration exercise. Firms are heterogeneous in
their productivity, and the market is perfectly competitive. Firms produce a homogeneous
good using capital, labor and technology. At the beginning of each period, firms decide
whether to continue operating or exit the market and discover their current productivity z.
They choose labor l and capital k to maximize after-tax profit. Firms pay a capital income
tax τ on profits. Firms also face a cost of capital adjustment specified as φ(k, k−1); capital
depreciates at rate δ, and labor can be adjusted without any costs.5. Entry in the market is
free; however, firms must pay an entry cost of ce. Entrants know their lagged productivity
z−1 and decide whether to enter or not based on their expected value function, behaving
as incumbents.
The profit of continuing firms is π = y − wn − i − cf − φ(k, k−1). If a firm exits,
they sell their remaining capital and make a profit of π = (1 − δ)k−1 − φ(0, k−1). Firms
can deduct labor costs as well as fixed costs of production and adjustment costs. Capital
investment can be expensed gradually according to the rate of depreciation. The tax bill is
then Tc = τ(πc + i− δk) for continuing firms and Tx = τ(πx + i) = −τφ(0, k−1) for exiting
firms. Importantly, it is assumed that firms can carry back their operating loss when they
exit, hence making the tax bill negative for exiting firms.6
The value function of an existing firm is given by the following equation:




πc − Tc +
1
1 + r
V (z, k)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation value
, πx − Tx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit value
}
5It is assumed that economic depreciation equals depreciation allowed for tax purposes
6Firms could carry back losses up two years until 2017 federally. Several states allow carry backs between
two and three years (e.g. California, Idaho, Missouri, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Georgia, West Virginia, Vir-
ginia, Delaware and Maryland had a two-year carry back provision, while Montana, Wyoming, Utah, South
Dakota and New York had a three-year provision in 2017.) In the simulation, the effect of tax reform on
entry and exit without carry back rules is looked at as well.
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There is a productivity cutoff z∗−1 at which the firm is indifferent between continuing and
exiting. The cutoff increases in input prices (namely the wage rate) and production costs
as they lower the present value of the firm and drive out lower productivity firms. It is
assumed that there is a positive mass of entrants in equilibrium, which implies that the
cost of entry is equal the the expected value of entrants, ce = E[Ve(z−1)]. The value for
new firms also declines in the wage rate and production cost cf .
Qualitative predictions
What happens when there is a reduction in the corporate income tax rate? We can first
separate direct effects of tax rates which affect the present value of future profits and
the indirect effects—the wage adjustment to changes in labor demand, which also affect
optimal firm decisions. While the model does not consider transitions, the short-run effects
on exit are potentially best captured by the partial equilibrium direct effects, while the
short-run effects on entrants can be derived based on the entry condition as they behave
like incumbents upon deciding to enter.
The direct effects—holding wages constant—comes from a change in the present value
for incumbents. Following a decrease in the corporate income tax rate, the continuation
value increases, implying fewer exits. The free entry condition implies that the number of
entrants is constant in partial equilibrium; but as the number of firms increases, the entry
rate declines. Looking at the entry condition, the continuation value increases, implying
that there will be an increase in firm births.
The indirect effect comes from the wage adjustment. In addition to the rise in entry
and the decrease in exits, existing firms increase their labor demand. This puts upward
pressure on wages. As the wage rate increases, the continuation value of firms decreases,
leading to an increase in the exit rate and a decrease in the firm size. The number of
entrants initially increases but declines as the wage rate rises. In the equilibrium, there is
an increase in the number of firms as well as the entry rate.
Note that from the optimal capital condition, it can also be shown that the optimal
firm size will be smaller, allowing the number of firms to grow faster than the size of
the economy. Because the expensing rate λ < 1 is below one, an increase in taxes leads
to a higher marginal product of capital. Assuming capital and labor are complements,
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the optimal labor force per firm will be smaller as well.7,8 We can see that the marginal
product of capital increases with the tax rate, implying lower capital. It follows that the
optimal labor choice will be lower as well, assuming labor-capital complementarity.
So far it has been assumed that exiting firms are able to carry back the cost of selling
their remaining capital on previous tax liabilities. However, many states do not have car-
ryback options, and it is limited in others. Additionally, carryback is usually only allowed
for the previous two to three years. Firms that exit may be more likely to have little or no
profits before exiting, making carryback less valuable. The current model was evaluated
assuming that the tax bill for the exiting firm is zero. The results are qualitatively similar;
however, the effects of a tax change on exit and entry rates are qualitatively lower, as it
reduces the expected value of continuing firms and new entrants.
Quantitative predictions
The quantitative long-run analysis of corporate tax reforms is taken up here, and Sedlacek
and Sterk (2019) is followed in their original setup.9 The production function is y =
z(kαl1−α)θ, with the share of capital income α = 0.35, and the span of control θ = 0.9.10,11
The model was calibrated with a starting tax rate of 41.6%, which is equivalent to the sum
of the statutory federal tax rate of 35% between 1993 and 2017 and the average state
corporate income tax between 1997 and 2017 (6.6%).
We can now evaluate the effect of tax reforms on firm entry and exit, total number of
firms, and firm size. Figure A.4 in the appendix displays the general equilibrium effects
of a change in the corporate income tax rate, with and without carryback. It is seen that
a decline of around two percentage points (from 41.66 to 39.66) leads to an entry rate








∂k (1− τ), where the marginal benefit of an additional
unit of capital is on the left-hand side and the marginal cost on the right-hand side. λ represents the present




∂k (1−τ) represents the present value
of capital adjustment costs.
8λ = δ
∑T
s=0(1− δ)s + (1− δ)T−1. Remember that the present value of selling capital in the final period
is equal to the investment which is (1− δ)k−1.
9A fixed operational cost cf was included following a logistic distribution with mean µf and standard
deviation σf . This implies that all firms have a positive probability of continuing, regardless of their produc-
tivity draw.
10These values are standard in the macroeconomics literature, and the span of control is in the range
documented by Basu and Fernald (1997)
11The capital depreciation rate was set to δ = 0.08. Productivity follows a log normal distribution log z =
µz + ρz log z−1 + ε, with ε ∼ N(0, σ2z). The remaining parameters (mean of TFP shocks - µ, dispersion of TFP
shocks - , auto correlation of TFP shocks - ρz, mean of cost shocks - µf , and the adjustment costs parameters
ζ0 and ζ1) were set such that the model matches specific statistics from the data. Note that the disutility of
labor v was set so that the wage rate is normalized to one, and the entry cost ce was set to normalize the
mass of new firms to one.
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roughly 10% higher in the equilibrium. The effect on the exit rate is similar. The aver-
age size of new firms declines by around 5%, and there is an increase of about 10%–15%
in the total number of firms. These results should be interpreted carefully, as there are
several factors that could lead to lower magnitudes. First, it was assumed that firms pay
the statutory tax rate; however, the effective tax rate is typically much lower, and a lower
statutory tax rate may not affect all businesses alike. Second, this is a closed economy set-
ting with perfect competition. In an open economy with market concentration, the existing
firms may exploit tax cuts to invest and grow, limiting the potential of new entrants; firm
migration and spillovers across regions may also affect the distribution of entry and exit
following tax reforms. Finally, this is a long-run equilibrium that assumes flexible wages
and inelastic labor supply. If the change in wages is slow, transition paths may be long
before reaching the new equilibrium. The following table summarizes the predictions of
the model on entry, exit, and the total number of firms.
Predictions - 1 p.p. tax cut Short-run Long-run LR effect
Birth rate ↑ ↑ 4̃− 5%
Death rate ↓ ↑ 4̃− 5%
Table 1.1: Summary of model predictions
1.2.2 Firm location decisions
While the general equilibrium model provides useful predictions and intuition on the
role of taxes on business dynamism, it has some drawbacks. First, it is a closed economy
model and does not capture the role of taxes on the firms’ location decision. Second, it
does not make a distinction between establishments and firms. It is important to address
both these issues.
How would the inclusion of location decision for new firms and entrepreneurs affect
the estimates? Assuming firm owners choose location i that maximizes profit πi, they
would choose the location with the lowest tax burden—or the highest present value of
income—all else equal. For exposition, assume there are two states: A and B. Following
a tax cut in state A, there will be more potential owners at the margin who will start a
business in state A relative to state B. Similarly, firms at the margin of moving from state A
to state B will be less likely to switch locations. Arguably, the cost of choosing a different
location will be higher for existing businesses compared to potential ones, such that the
effect on firm births should be of higher magnitude. In essence, the short-run effects are
similar to the closed economy model. As the magnitudes in the short run increase, we
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may see faster long-run adjustment allowing for location decision compared to the closed
economy model.
The second caveat in the model is the lack of distinction between establishments and
firms. However, large firms operating in several states will also be sensitive to state tax
rates when expanding their establishments. As noted by Devereux and Griffith (1998,
2003), the extensive margin of adjustment for existing firms depends on the average costs
of production in the new location. As such, the top marginal statutory rate is typically
closest to the average tax rate and the relevant parameter. Giroud and Rauh (2019) found
statistically significant elasticities in the extensive margin of adjustment using states’ top
corporate marginal income tax rates. The data tracks establishments rather than firms,
which implies that the estimates will capture effects on new operations and the external
margin of adjustment of large firms. It is important for the interpretation of the coefficient
regarding whether we can distinguish the two. While the elasticity of establishments with
respect to the tax rate carries important implications in terms of employment and invest-
ment and is an important parameter, innovation and the idea of dynamism is a firm-level
concept. This is discussed further in the data and estimation section, and the results on
firms and establishments are presented separately.
1.2.3 Connecting theory and empirical estimations
According to the model’s predictions, following a tax cut, a short-run increase in firm
births and decrease in firms death should be observed, while the long run effect will be
positive for both. The speed of adjustment cannot be predicted, which will depend on
several local characteristics such as the rigidity in the labor market, the speed at which
factor prices adjust (e.g., only labor was considered in the model, which can be extended
to capture other factors such as land), the mobility of existing, and potential firms. This
carries important implications: we may be able to capture the effect of tax changes on
births more precisely as they face similar qualitative predictions in the short and long run,
while the effect on deaths should be harder to identify, especially depending on the speed
of adjustment.12
Another important missing piece from the theoretical framework is the legal form of
organization (LFO) that firms choose. In the model, it was assume that the legal form of
organization is exogenous and given for any firm. In reality, firms have different forms of
12Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2018a) looked at the impact of changes in local business taxation on wages
in Germany. They found that wages respond quickly after the change up to roughly 3–4 years after the tax
change takes place. Results in the United States on adjustment in employment and income were found to
occur quickly, within one or two years following the tax change (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2018), Giroud
and Rauh (2019), Curtis and Decker (2018)
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organization and face different business income taxes. Firms electing to be C-corporations
will be subject to the federal and state corporate income tax. Pass-through firms (e.g.
partnerships, LLC, or S-corporations) face the personal income tax on most of their income.
However, the taxation of such firms is less straightforward. First, owners are taxed, which
implies that if an LLC is located in Illinois and owned by Michigan residents, the firm will
not pay income tax in Illinois, and the owners will face the Michigan personal income
tax on their earnings from the company. However, some states require owners to have a
residence in the state where the establishment is located for it to be taxed as pass-through.
Otherwise, even legal pass-through firms may be treated as C-corporations.13 In some
states, owners can also elect for the firm to be at the entity level (rather than as a pass-
through firm). The rules on the taxation of pass-through businesses vary by states and
across time, and determining the tax rate faced by such entities can be difficult.
In the 1970s and 1980s, C-corporations generated a vast majority of income and em-
ployment, and represented a majority of firms (excluding sole-proprietorship). Following
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the number and importance of pass-through firms increased
steadily. In 2010, they represented a majority of businesses and a sizeable fraction of in-
come and employment (around 40%). However, corporations remain a sizeable portion
of businesses as well as new establishments and firms. In 2010, the average number of
establishments listed as C-corps in each state was between 20% and 45%. Under these
assumptions, the direct effect of a change in the corporate tax rate will be lower as it will
only impact corporations. However, the indirect effects can also affect pass-through firms.
Additionally, an increase in the corporate income tax could lower the rate of exit and entry
of corporations, leading to a rise in the entry of pass-through firms in the equilibrium.
However, the short-run implications are less clear. Pass-through firms selling intermediary
goods to corporations may also experience a rise in exit and a decrease in entry as the
size of their market decreases. As the empirical section evaluates an average effect of tax
reforms in the short and medium run, it is important to keep in mind that tax changes may
have different implications in long-run equilibrium.14
13E.g., Georgia requires all owners to be in the state or for them to file a consent form that the income
generated by the firm located in Georgia will be taxed in the state.
14Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2018) used an effective tax rate based on the relative number of establish-
ments that are single-state C-corporations, multi-state C-corporations, and pass-through entities. However,
such a methodology would not readily apply in this context. First, publicly available data on LFO by state
and counties only starts in 2010, and the current study’s data starts in 1978. Second, the number of firms by
LFO is likely endogenous to the tax system itself.
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1.2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
A. Business taxation at the state level.
The data on the top corporate income tax and the top marginal income tax at the state level
between 1978 and 2017 were used. The data were obtained from a variety of sources.
First, the University of Michigan Tax database was used to get data on sales and corporate
income tax between 1978 and 2002. After 2002, data from the Tax Policy Center and code
corporate tax rate and brackets were used. In the main analysis, the top marginal income
tax was focused on. Some states have a flat income tax, and while some states have pro-
gressive corporate income taxes, the top marginal rate usually has a pretty low threshold.
The data on the top marginal personal income tax rate obtained from NBER Taxsim were
employed here. Taxsim uses the effective marginal tax rate faced by household after de-
ductions and which as such can be different than the official top marginal tax rate. To
ensure accuracy, the data on the top marginal income tax rate in each state between 1978
and 2017 were obtained from the Tax Policy Center and the Tax Foundation as well.
There is a large variation in corporate and personal income tax rates in the United
States. Several states impose no corporate tax rates on income (Texas, Washington, Nevada,
Wyoming, South Dakota), while others have top marginal tax rates around 10% (New
York, Minnesota, Iowa).15 Other states such as Washington and Michigan had gross re-
ceipts tax until 2012. Similarly, several states have no personal income taxes, while the
top marginal tax rate is around 11% in California.16
There has also been substantial variation in tax reforms. Figure A.3 shows corpo-
rate and personal income tax changes by state and year between 1978 and 2017. Table
1.3 shows the average magnitude of corporate and personal tax changes. The average is
roughly similar, around 0.9 percentage point. Corporate tax hikes are larger, 1.3 p.p. on
average, compared to 0.67 p.p. for cuts. There were 84 hikes and 136 cuts throughout the
40 years observed in our analysis. Changes in the personal income tax were found to be
more frequent and equal, with the 178 increases and 199 decreases hovering around 0.9
p.p. on average.
In most specifications, state-level tax incentives in the form of financial assistance for
15While Texas does not have a corporate income tax, it has a franchise tax, which in 2019 was 0.575% on
10 million or less in annual revenue. In 2020, there were 20 states with a franchise tax, although the rate is
small in a majority of states with some exceptions such as Texas and Delaware.
16Figure A.3 in the appendix shows the average tax rates and total change over the sample period,
1978–2017.
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industry or general tax incentives were included, which were obtained from Giroud and
Rauh (2019). In some specifications, it was controlled for other state-level tax policies,
such as the sales tax rate, apportionment factors for multi-state firms, R&D and investment
tax credits, and whether states have carry-back provisions.17,18 Tax credits, provisions, and
apportionment and throwback rules were obtained from Serrato and Zidar (2016) until
2014 and from the Commerce Clearing House’s State Tax Handbooks for the following
years. The sales tax data between 1978 and 2002 were obtained from the University of
Michigan tax database and from Tax Foundation after 2002.
B. Establishment data and business dynamics
Two sources of business dynamics data were used in the analysis. The first main source
data comes from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), a data set provided by the Cen-
sus Bureau based on administrative data. It provides county-level statistics on the number
of establishment entries and exits, total firms and firm deaths, the number of establish-
ment expansions, and contractions between 1978 and 2018.19 The data was computed
from micro-data collected for the County Business Pattern (CBP) and the Business Regis-
ter. Previous versions of the BDS were based on the CBP only, which looks at the number
of establishment, payroll, and employment on the week of March 12 each year. With the
redesign of the program, this version of the data covers changes in business dynamism
taking place in a calendar year. It is worth mentioning that the aggregate data does not
distinguish between a new establishment and an establishment that migrated from another
location. Entries are sometimes referred to as birth/death throughout the paper, by which
it means birth/death at the county level.
Table 1.2 displays summary statistics at the county level for all counties as well as bor-
der and interior counties. Given the importance of spillovers, specifically in the border
discontinuity analysis, it is important to compare border and interior counties. The last
column of the table computes the differences in means between interior counties and bor-
der counties as well as a t-test for whether they are statistically significant. It can be seen
that the entry and exit rates of establishments are slightly lower in border areas as well
as the per capita births and deaths of establishments As it was controlled for local fixed
17States apportion the corporate tax liability based on a weighted formula of sales, payroll, and property
in each state. Because states have different ways to assess tax liability and different apportionment formula,
it is possible for firms to have some non taxed income. Some states (currently 25) have implemented a
throwback rule, which states that non-taxed income can be attributed to the state where the sale originates.




effects, it was important that border and interior counties did not have differential trends
over time. T-tests were performed to see whether the changes in birth and death rates were
statistically different. While the hypothesis that the levels are equal could be rejected, the
one that changes (log ∆Entryrate and log ∆Exitrate ) are equal could not be rejected.
This assures us that differential trends in border counties did not bias the results.
The second source of data comes from Infogroup USA for 1997–2017, which consists
of the near universe of establishments in the United States. Infogroup compiled a list of
US businesses using a variety of sources, including the Yellow and White Page directories,
public records on business registrations, utility connects and disconnects, etc.20. The in-
formation includes the business name, address, geocoded location, number of employees,
and industry codes. When a new business is identified with a utility connect, they are
then confirmed via telephone calls within 2–3 months. This process is important because
it insures us that most businesses will appear on the data set shortly after its creation.
Each business is attributed a identification number, allowing us to map the number of
entries and follow businesses over time. However, it was found that 5%–10% of establish-
ments have a different identification number over time, the majority of it being attributed
to a change of address. By matching over names and addresses, these firms were recoded
as existing firms. The data on longitude and latitude were used to find the census tract
in which each establishment was located as well as the distance of the establishment from
the border.21 Firm entry was characterized as any firm that is observed in year t but not
t−1. Firm exit in period t−1 was characterized as a firm that was last seen in period t−1.
For each year, the number of firms, firm births and firm deaths, as well as employment in
new firms at the county and at the census tract level were aggregated.22
Table A.1 in the appendix displays similar statistics for census tracts. All the data comes
from Infogroup. It was observed that the entry and exit rate is higher at the census tract
level, which is not surprising as it is possible that some firms changing location within the
same county but to a new tract would be counted as an entry and exit, while they would
not show in the county level data.
The second panel displays statistics by distance to the border. It is seen that the entry
and exit rate is slightly higher closer to the border but not the total number of firms
20More information on the data is available in the appendix
21Specific and detailed explanations of the cleaning and geocoding is provided in the appendix.
22Given the process of identifying new firms, I am fairly confident most firms born during a year will be
captured in the data (the exceptions might be firms that start near the end of the year). However, identifying
firm exits is more difficult. A firm that goes out of business may still have an address, phone number, and
utility connection for a while after exiting. As such, it is likely that I underestimated the true number of exits
or that firms were classified as exits with a lag.
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and employment in new firms. That may reflect higher business dynamism in areas near
borders.
C. Other policies and controls
Some additional data were used as controls from various sources. Accordingly, data on
local population from the Census were employed. The state minimum wage as well as
unemployment compensation rules were obtained from the US Department of Labor. Un-
employment compensation is based on the maximum base allowed multiplied by the top
tax rate of replacement.23 The data on Medicaid expansion were obtained from the Kauf-
mann foundation.24 The data on per capita property taxes were obtained from the Census
of Governments. Because it is only available every five year with years ending in ’2 and ’7,
the data between 1982 and 2017 were obtained, and linear extrapolations were carried
out for the remaining years. The data from the Census on shares of population by age and
race were employed at the county level, and data on total population were employed at
the census tract level. A linear extrapolation was done between 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010,
and until 2017.25 Data were also obtained from NHGIS, which is based on the Census and
the American Community Survey on the share of population with a college degree at the
county level and demographic shares at the county and census tract level. The data on
which counties border state lines were obtained from Holmes et al. (1998), and data on
the distance between counties’ centroids and census tracts were obtained from the NBER
County and Census Tract Distance Database.
1.3 Empirical Strategy and Main Results
State tax rates are not randomly assigned, neither are state tax reforms. The first
source of endogeneity comes from unobservable local characteristics correlated with both
the tax rate and local economies. Here, I mean unobservable characteristics which are
relatively constant in the short and medium run. This could include geography, access to
infrastructure, and local networks of firms. For example, states such as California or New
York have higher than average corporate and personal income tax as well as high business
and economic growth. A positive relationship between the tax rate and the number of




25For years 1979 and 1978, the extrapolation was carried out backwards using the average yearly change
between 1980 and 1990.
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new firms would capture unobservable characteristics of the local economy, and it can be
posited that most businesses start in California in spite of the high taxation, rather than
because of it.26
The second source of endogeneity, related to the first one, is reverse causality stemming
from dynamic selection by policymakers. That is, if changes in tax rates are systematically
correlated with local economic conditions and unobserved local shocks—including firms’
location decisions and the number of new firms—the coefficient will be biased. The sign of
the bias depends on the reaction of policymakers. If states increase taxes when the econ-
omy grows and decrease taxes when faced with negative shocks, there will be a positive
bias on the birth rate coefficient. While it may seem more likely for the federal govern-
ment to do so, states face significant budget constraints, and we could expect states facing
declining revenues following an economic crisis to increase taxes. The endogeneity of
tax responses to local economic shocks is an empirical question. A related concern is the
contemporaneous changes of several policies that potentially affect business dynamics.27
Finally, we may worry about potential confounders being correlated with both changes
in taxation and with business dynamics. For example, exogenous tax changes in states
that have different secular trends in establishment entry and exit rates will lead to biased
estimates. Different identification strategies were implemented to deal with these specific
issues. Throughout this study, the outcomes of interest are the log entry and exit rate of
establishments at the county level. The rate was chosen not only to take into account the
size of local economies but also present some results using total establishment entry and
exits per capita. The main explanatory variable is the corporate tax rate, which implies
that a semi-elasticity is estimated. Typically, point estimates can be interpreted as the
percent change in the rate of establishment entry/exit following a 1 percentage point change
in the business tax rate. When results on tax hikes and cuts are presented separately, the
magnitude of tax changes is used.
1.3.1 Main analysis
A. Event-study analysis
26The sign of the bias is unclear and depends on the correlation between tax systems and unobservable
local factors. If places deemed as more desirable by firms also have higher tax burdens, such as California,
the bias will be positive.
27Romer and Romer (2010) used textual analysis to categorize tax changes into 1. endogenous
changes—stemming from economic shocks—and 2. exogenous changes—stemming from stemming from
overall tax reforms and political changes. The accuracy of this methodology still needs to be tested empir-
ically in different contexts. Giroud and Rauh (2019) used the textual method in their analysis and found
highly similar effects when controlling for other characteristics. Their data set has been used here as well,
which is described in the main findings.
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The analysis begins by presenting some graphical evidence in the form of an event






i,t + ΓXi,t + λi + µt + εi,t (1.1)
where Dji,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a specific change occurs at
time t, which in this case is an increase or decrease in the corporate tax rate. Following
Fuest, Peichl and Siegloch (2018b) and Simon (2016), this specification was estimated
for tax hikes and tax cuts as well as large increases and decreases. Large increases and
decreases are specified as the 75th percentile for hikes and cuts respectively. In the current
sample this comes to increases equal to or larger than 1.5 p.p. and tax decreases equal
to or larger than 1 p.p. in magnitude. Given the large number of changes in the sample,
the analysis was restricted to areas only experiencing one large tax change in the estima-
tion window. To choose the estimation window, it was required to balance the need for a
large enough window to observe how quickly tax changes impact entry and exit, poten-
tially restricting/biasing our estimates.28 A window with three leads and four lags were
chosen, and observations where there was more than one large tax change in the estima-
tion window were removed—effectively, any tax change for which another tax change of
at least 1 p.p. occurred in a four-year lead window was removed. The focus was laid
on large changes since they were most likely to bias estimates for another large change
happening shortly after. The same procedure was followed with all tax changes, removing
all observations for which a tax changes happened in the lead window.29
This model provides some insight on potential trends or confounding factors that would
impact the analysis. The presence of pre-trends or correlation prior to a tax change
would indicate some potential endogeneity and threaten the interpretation of the results.
Borusyak and Jaravel (2021) showed that fixed effects in event studies can fail to detect
endogeneity in pre-trends and proposed that researchers use random effects instead. This
finding was implemented in the current analysis and estimate equation (1.1) with random
effects. Additionally, year fixed effects as well as demographic and policy control variables
were included as well.30 Additionally, dummy variables were included for Ohio, Michigan,
28Additionally, having sufficient lags is important to observe whether changes are temporary or not.
29For example, Pennsylvania experienced a 3.75 p.p. tax hike in 1991, a 0.26p.p. tax cut in 1994, and
a 2p.p. tax cut in 1995. Only the 1991 tax hike was retained for the analysis. Further, the model was
estimated without removing any tax changes and removing only observations with a large tax change in the
lead window. The results for the full sample are available in the appendix.
30Policy controls at the state level include the personal and sales tax rate, the minimum wage, unemploy-
ment insurance compensation, and tax incentive and financial assistance. At the county level, the fraction
of local revenues coming from local taxation as well as the log property tax share per capita were included.
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and Texas in years following a their tax reform, as well as a dummy interacted with the
tax rate for states which collect a gross receipt tax (Ohio before the tax reform, Texas,
and Washington). Standard errors were denoted by εi,t and clustered at the state level to
consider the correlation from units experiencing the same treatment at the state level.
B. Analytical framework
In the event study analysis, identification was achieved from within counties experi-
encing corporate tax reform over time. In the main specification, the same strategy was
followed using a first-difference estimation around the tax change. Essentially, the follow-
ing model was estimated:
∆ log yi,t = β∆τ
c
s + Γ∆Xi,t + ψd + µt + εi,t (1.2)
where ∆ log yi,t is the yearly first difference outcome of interest—either the establishment
entry or exit rate—∆τ cs is the change in the state corporate income tax, µt are period
fixed effects that capture national changes in dynamism, and ∆ΓXi,t includes state- and
county-level policy and demographic controls. Additionally, ψd was included, which refers
to census division fixed effects that capture more localized trends in business dynamism.31
Unless otherwise specified, the same controls as stated were used for the event study
framework. Standard errors εi,t were also clustered at the state level.
This estimation method was chosen for several reasons. First, it allows flexible specifi-
cations such as region- and state-specific time trends as well as testing for asymmetric tax
changes. Second, the number of tax changes happening in each unit varies wildly. Some
states may only modify the tax rate once or twice, while others experience a lot more. In
addition, other state-level policies potentially affecting dynamism may change during the
same period. The flexibility of this specification also allows us to conduct heterogeneous
sample analysis by removing certain observations.32,33
Demographic variables include the log population, the share of population between 20 and 59, the share
of white and Black residents, the share of people with college education, and the share of people living in
urban areas.
31There are nine census divisions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central,
South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific. Some results are shown
without division trends as well as using state trends.
32E.g. New York implemented 10 tax cuts and one hike between 1987 and 2017. Additionally, since the
standard errors were expected to be serially correlated, a fixed effects model would not be more efficient.
Some results are presented using a fixed effects model in the robustness check section and the appendix.
33A recent and rising literature has shown potential identification problems related to models with two-way
fixed effects as well as identifying assumptions in DiD models with heterogeneous and staggered treatment
effects. This has been touched on in the robustness check and discussion section of the paper.
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As this identification strategy is akin to a difference-in-difference strategy with multi-
ple treatments (the corporate tax change), the estimation window needs to be specified.
To correctly identify the effect of a tax change, only one treatment was allowed for each
estimation window. This implies that observations where more than one corporate tax
change happened within the estimation period had to be removed. A three-year estima-
tion window starting two years before the tax change was chosen. Additionally, results
extending or shortening the estimation window are presented to confirm that the results
are not sensitive to the window choice.
C. Distributed lag model
The fundamental assumption to identify estimates using a difference-in-difference strat-
egy is the lack of pre-trends or parallel trends assumption between treated and control
units. Essentially, this implies that the treatment should not be correlated with the out-
come prior to the change. A distributed lag specification was estimated to test this as-
sumption as well as to further investigate dynamic effects, such as delayed responses and
reversal effects:





s,t + Γ∆Xi,t + ψd + µt + ∆εi,t (1.3)
where βk captures the effect of a tax change happening at time t on the outcome before
and after its implementation. The included controls are the same as described in the
difference-in-difference framework. Similar to the event study, the observations for which
a tax change happened in the lead window were removed.
D. Border discontinuity framework
One of the endogeneity threats discussed is the presence of correlations between unob-
served time-varying shocks and tax changes. To circumvent this issue, a number of papers
have used a border discontinuity design (Holmes et al. (1998), Dube, Lester and Reich
(2010), Dube, Lester and Reich (2016), Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2018), Curtis and
Decker (2018)). Under the assumption that counties in close proximity experience similar
shocks, one can compare jurisdictions across the border, using counties in a state without
a tax change as controls for the ”treated” units experiencing a corporate tax hike or cut.
A second advantage is that economic conditions in specific border counties may be more
likely to be orthogonal to state-level policy making. In this context, identification comes
from differences across treated and control border counties. The following model was
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estimated:
∆ log yi,t = β∆τ
c
s + ∆ΓXi,t + ψd + γgt + εi,t (1.4)
where γgt is group-by-year fixed effects, absorbed yearly within pair shocks. A group is
defined as a county experiencing a tax change and all its bordering counties. Because
counties typically share a border with more than one other county, control units can appear
more than once. Treated units, however, only appear once. The estimation began with
the sample and treatment window as in the baseline estimation strategy, and bordering
controls’ counties were added to the sample. Any pairs where the control units experienced
a tax change in the three years prior to the treated areas were removed. 34 Standard errors
should also be treated differently. First, as noted by Dube, Lester and Reich (2010), we
should assume serial correlation at the county level in outcomes over time. Second, the
treatment is perfectly correlated for counties in the same state. In the main analysis,
standard errors were clustered at the state level. In this framework, certain counties can
be present in more than one pair, which signifies correlation between pairs. The residuals
will not be orthogonal for counties in the same state or for pairs sharing the same border.
To deal with this issue, two-way clustering was used at the state and the border segment
level.35
The main advantage of this identification strategy is the ability to control for area-
specific shocks that may bias the estimates. The drawback is that border counties may be
more likely to be subject to spillover effects, which would bias the coefficients. Moreover,
state borders may not be representative of a state’s economy and may react differently to
tax cuts or hikes. While the estimates would still be unbiased, as we seek to know more
about the overall effect of business taxation, the external validity of the findings would be
compromised.36 The results are presented in the next section.
34The requirement that control units are untreated beyond the estimation window was extended to be
conservative. Further, an approach was attempted with extending the window to two and four years be-
fore the change. Shrinking the window to two years produced coefficients of similar magnitude—about
10–20 percent smaller with similar precision. Extending the window to four years produced almost identical
coefficients with slightly higher standard errors but still statistically significant at the 5% threshold.
35Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011) derived this approach showing that a large enough number of
clusters (40) leads to reliable inference. In all specifications, the stata command regfdhe that allows us to
use two-way clustering was used. In addition, this command takes into account singleton groups, which may
bias standard errors.
36Counties in New York and New Jersey across the Hudson River likely face similar economic shocks while




Figure 1.3 plots coefficients obtained from the event study estimation. Starting with the
establishment entry rate as the outcome (in the top panel), it is noticed that large hikes
have a large negative effect, occurring mostly in the two year following the tax change.
The overall impact stays constant and statistically significant until some reversal occurs
four years after the change. The effects of all hikes are much smaller, although they follow
a somewhat similar pattern. In the lead window, we cannot observe clear pre-trends, and
estimates for both large and all hikes are close to zero.
Turning to the impact of tax cuts, the establishment entry rate was found to increase
by about 2.5% the following year and was statistically significant two years after the tax
change, after which there was a reversal effect. No effect of tax cuts were found at the
time of the change, but a small rise in entry was observed two years after, likely driven by
large cuts. Unlike large cuts, there was no reversal using the sample for all cuts, and the
entry rate stayed about 2% larger four years after the change. The pre-trends look flat for
large cuts, but the small cuts sample potentially shows some upward trend throughout the
analysis period.
Panel (b) of the figures plots the exit rates. Large hikes do not seem to impact exit rates
until two to three years after, when we see a large jump, equivalent to a 3%–4% increase,
followed by a reversal. This is potentially consistent with establishments changing location
rather than exiting the market. While a tax hike may discourage the entry of new business
operations right away, firms wishing to move to a location with lower taxes would need
time to adjust. Exit rates slowly were found to increase in the first two years following
a tax hike using the full sample—although none of the estimates are statistically signifi-
cant—after which the pattern is comparable to large increases. No significant pre-trends
were detected, although the large and all sample changes were found to move in opposing
directions. Large tax cuts were found to have a negative impact on exit rates the year
following the change, but an immediate reversal occurred. On the other hand, the exit
rate was found to steadily decline until three years after the change before reversing and
was statistically significant in periods two and three. Pre-trends were quite flat, although
we may again worry about a negative trend looking at the tax cuts sample.
Taking stock of the graphical evidence, it is seen that tax hikes have a large and im-
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mediate negative impact on establishments’ entry rates, while the effect on cuts is smaller
and more delayed. The evidence of the impact of cuts and hikes on exit rates is more
mixed, with a large but delayed response following a large hike. Both entry and exit show
signs of reversal three to four years following the change, but overall, the impact is more
consistent, and the reversal effect is smaller for establishment entry.
B. Main findings
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 plots the coefficients obtained from the distributed lag model. The
impact of a tax change on the establishment entry rate is immediate and large (around 2%
for a 1 p.p. change in tax). It then slowly declines until three years after the tax change and
experiences a reversal, similar to the observation made with the event study. Pre-trends
appear flat as well, validating the identifying assumption for the main estimation strategy.
The impact on exit rate is more mixed, with an initial small negative effect following a
tax change—a finding opposite to theoretical implications—followed by an increase and
subsequent small decreases. The reversal and small decreases are consistent with the
theory and the strong impact on entry—fewer firms in previous periods imply fewer exits.
However, the presence of a negative relationship, in addition to the contemporaneous
negative effect prior to the change, is concerning, even if not statistically significant. When
evaluating the tax cuts and hikes separately, it was seen that the tax hikes drive the findings
on the entry rate. An increase in entry following a tax cut was observed as well; however,
a small decrease prior to the tax change may indicate that some cuts are more likely to
be endogenous. It was also found that tax hikes were associated with higher exit the two
years following the change. However, there was a small potential trend prior to the change
here as well. Finally, the impact of tax cuts on exits was found to be highly volatile, and
statistically significant pre-trends were detected, which constitute another potential sign
of endogeneity.
Overall, these results indicate that the identifying assumption is more likely to be vio-
lated for tax cuts, especially when the outcome of interest are firm exits.
Table 1.4 presents the results for the main findings. A tax change of one percentage point
in magnitude is associated with a decline in the establishment entry rate of about -1.4%.
The effect is driven by tax hikes, with a precisely estimated coefficient of -1.71, while the
coefficient associated with a tax cut is 0.8. As discussed earlier, personal tax rate may
be important given the number of unincorporated firms, and column (7) shows a small
and imprecisely estimated effect of -0.43 associated with a 1 p.p. increase in the tax rate.
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However, this average hides a strong negative impact of tax hikes, with a coefficient of
about -1.48. A personal tax cut is associated with a non statistically significant decrease in
firm entry, likely stemming from endogenous tax cuts.
Turning to exit rates, a positive but small and imprecisely estimated effect was found.
A 1 p.p. increase in the corporate tax rate is associated with a rise of 0.7% in the exit rate.
Corporate tax hikes and cuts display an asymmetric effect of about 0.7. Similar results
were detected looking at the personal tax rate, with a 1 p.p tax increase associated with
a rise of 1% in the exit rate.37 The results were found to be consistent with or without
using division fixed effects, removing state policy controls, or dropping Ohio, Michigan
and Texas.38
It is worth discussing the role of pass-through entities and how they may change the
interpretation of the results. First, if pass-through firms are not affected through indirect
effects, then the estimated coefficients represent a lower bound of the true impact of a tax
change on the establishment entry rate of C-corporations. If an increase in the corporate
tax rate leads to a change in the entry rate of the non-corporate sector, then the true ef-
fect on corporations will depend on whether there are more or less pass-through entities
following the tax change. Given the rise such businesses, it is possible that contemporane-
ous tax changes would have a smaller effect on entry and exit. One potential explanation
on why stronger and more precise coefficients are estimated for tax hikes is that a large
number of hikes took place before 1993, a time when C-corporations represented a larger
share of businesses.
Table 1.5 estimates the first column of table 2 using different estimation windows. The
results are consistent with shrinking the window (column 1) or extending it (columns 2-
4). Consistent results were found with all windows. In columns (6) to (10), observations
were dropped where a corporate tax change occurred at the same time as 1) a personal
tax change of at least 0.1 p.p., 2) changes in state level tax incentives, and 3) changes in
the RD or investment tax credit. The qualitative impact of a corporate tax hike on entry
is similar, but with higher magnitudes, ranging from -1.8 to -3, while the evidence on tax
cuts remains mixed, with a positive but small and typically not statistically significant ef-
fect. The results were found to be consistent for exits, with most coefficients indicating a
small and positive increase in exit rates following a tax tax change, with the exception of
37While both personal and corporate tax changes were included in estimations using policy controls, only
the relevant coefficient based on the estimation window of either two years prior to a corporate or personal
tax change has been reported.
38Note that the signficantly large tax changes associated with these three states were dummied out as
described earlier. On the other hand, the smaller tax changes were included.
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columns (7) and (8), a large and significant increase was found for tax hikes of about 3.
It was also seen that a tax cut is associated with more exits, a potential indication of the
endogeneity of tax cuts with establishment exits.
States use an array of tax policies to incentive businesses to locate and invest. In ad-
dition, some states allow firms to carry back losses on previous tax payments. Multi-state
firms are taxed at the state level according to a formula which includes where sales, prop-
erty, and payroll are located. In table 1.6, the interaction between these tax variables and
changes in the tax rate are analyzed. A tax change in states without carry-back provision
has a comparable but slightly smaller effect in magnitude on entry (-0.91) and a stronger
and significant effect on exit (1.6) with strong but not significant interactions (-1.6 and
-2.6), respectively. The sales apportionment factor had little effect on entry rate but a
strong interaction with exit rates. Note that the smallest fraction apportioned to sales is
33.3% and the largest 100%, which implies that the effect of on exit is more positive with
a smaller weight put on sales. This is consistent with the theory: multi-state firms would
pay the same amount of taxes regardless of where they are producing if taxation is based
on where sales are located only.
A significantly strong interaction was found between the effect of a tax change on
entry and both the size of R&D and investment tax credit, which range from 0% to 20%
and 0% to 15% in our sample period respectively. The average R&D tax credit is 2.6%,
and the average investment credit is 1.3%. A larger tax credit overall lowers the impact
of a tax change on entry rates. Mixed evidence was found regarding the exit rate as
the outcome variable, where an R&D tax credit increased the impact of a tax change,
while investment tax credit reduced it; however, none of the estimated coefficients were
statistically significant.
C. Endogenous tax changes?
To identify which tax changes are endogenous to local economic conditions, Romer
and Romer (2010) implemented a narrative analysis, classifying cuts and hikes as either
endogenous or exogenous based on the reasoning behind the change as explained by jour-
nalists and policymakers. Endogenous tax reforms occur when a government offsets a
change in spending or offsets a factor related to output, while changes are classified as
exogenous when policymakers deal with an inherited budget deficit or achieve a long-run
goal. In table 1.7, the effect associated with exogenous versus endogenous cuts and hikes
on the entry and exit rate is shown. It is worth mentioning that the changes classified
by Romer and Romer (2010) are typically larger in magnitude. In the current sample, 58
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changes are exogenous and 12 endogenous.
In column (1), a strong negative response of a tax change was found on entry for both
types. The impact of a 1 p.p. exogenous increase was a lower entry rate by about 3.4%
The coefficient associated with exogenous changes was large and quite implausible (-8).
Notably, a strong and positive impact was found associated with exogenous tax changes
on establishments exits, where a 1 p.p. hike was associated with a 2% increase in the exit
rate. Endogenous changes had an opposite negative but not statistically significant effect.
In columns (3) and (4), the 12 endogenous tax changes were removed from the sam-
ple, and the findings are identical to the baseline estimates. Finally, in columns (5)-(8),
the interaction between local political variables was analyzed, namely whether a state’s
governor is Democratic or Republican. The effects were found to be consistent on the en-
try rate. However, it was found that tax changes had a strong and statistically significant
effect in states with a Republican governor, while the interaction term—although not sig-
nificant—essentially implied no impact on exit rates in Democratically led states.
In conclusion, large and exogenously defined tax changes were found to be associated
with a large negative effect on entry and a large positive effect on exit. This suggests
that tax reforms endogenous to local economic conditions are likely to bias the estimated
impact on exit rates negatively, while the impact of tax hikes on entry is typically more
robust and consistently negative and significant.
D. Border discontinuity
The border discontinuity analysis is discussed now, which was designed to deal with
the bias arising from unobserved local shocks correlated with tax reforms. The top panel in
table 1.8 looks at the entry rate as the outcome variable. A large and statistically negative
effect (β = −3.8) was found, which confirmed our main findings. While the coefficient
was found to be 2—3 times as large as our main estimates, it cannot be reject that they
are similar. Controlling for group-by-year fixed effects yielded more negative estimates,
although column (4) shows a relatively similar coefficient when only including year fixed
effects—an indication that the border sample used in the analysis may result in larger
estimated coefficients. Weighting the sample by population yielded an estimated impact
similar to our baseline findings (-1.2).
In column (5), counties with center points further apart than 50 miles (roughly the 90th
percentile of distance between counties centroids) were removed, which yielded compara-
ble outcomes.
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The coefficients associated with a tax hike on exit rate were found to be similar to
our baseline findings as well, with the exception of column (5), where removing far away
counties yielded a larger and somewhat statistically significant coefficient (β = 1.47)).
Overall, with this identification strategy, it was confirmed that tax hikes have a large and
negative effect on firm entry and a small and harder-to-detect impact on exit.
1.3.3 The role of spillovers
This section evaluates the presence of spillovers. Assessing spillovers is critical for the
validity of the border discontinuity design. However, it is also important for the main
estimation strategy as a number of states have a majority or a sizeable portion of their
economic activity at or near border areas. Assessing spillover effects is also valuable for
policymakers to have a more complete understanding of the impact of business taxes on
firms.
How could spillovers bias the coefficients? The answer depends on the type of spillover
taking place. This is illustrated in figure A.5 in the appendix, which shows how entry
is affected following a tax cut in state A in the presence of either negative or positive
spillovers. By negative spillovers, I refer to firm shifting but also to general locational
effects near borders. Under the assumption that it is less costly for a prospective firm
to choose different locations as opposed to existing firms to exit and relocate, a stronger
response would be found in entry compared to exit. More generally, if areas across borders
share the same labor and consumer market, there may be overall aggregate effects higher
near the border in the state experiencing a tax change. Overall, we may be worried about
spillover effects across the border biasing the estimates. As the first half of the figure
shows, there is a negative bias coming both from higher activity in the state experiencing
the tax cut, and lower activity in the bordering state. On the other hand, there may be
positive spillovers. Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2018) found that corporate tax increases
lower income. If households and businesses affected by the tax change spend and invest
less on both sides of the border (or spend more following a tax cut), then there will be a
positive bias in the coefficient.
A. Spillover across border counties
To identify the presence of spillovers, first, the outcomes in border counties were com-
pared with non-border counties in the same state. The following equation was estimated:
∆ log yi,t −∆ log yint,t = β∆τ cs + Γ(∆Xi,t −∆X̄int,t) + Φ∆Ps,t + ψd + µt + εi,t (1.5)
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where ∆ log yint,t represents the average outcome of interest in interior counties. The
estimation began by focusing on counties one degree removed from the border, that is,
interior counties adjacent to border counties. The dependent variable is then the difference
between a border county and the average outcome of its adjacent interior counties. If
counties are small, spillovers could affect a state’s neighboring counties beyond the border.
In a second estimation, the outcome of border counties was compared to the average of
all interior counties in the state. The same way was adopted for county-level controls.
Further, state-level policies were included in some estimations in case they affected border
counties differently than interior counties.39
As an indirect test for spillovers, the effect of a change in tax policy in a specific state,
∆τ cs , on border versus non-border areas was analyzed. This involved asking the following
question: Are different exit and entry rates seen between borders and non-border areas
in e.g. Michigan, when Michigan changes its tax rate? As a direct test, the effect of a
change in a neighboring state ∆τ csb was considered. This involved asking whether different
exit and entry rates are seen between borders and non border areas in e.g. Michigan,
when Ohio changes its tax rate. Under the assumption that border and adjacent interior
counties face similar shocks, the indirect test was more likely to detect negative spillovers,
i.e., shifting of firms. The direct test, however, would capture both negative spillovers and
positive ones, i.e. consumption spillovers.
Note that with this strategy, group-by-year fixed effects were not included. By taking
the differences in outcomes between counties, the average impact of common time-varying
shocks was controlled for.40 Similar to our previous estimations, units where another
corporate tax change occurred two years prior to the current hike or cut were removed.
For the indirect estimation, an estimation window based on the tax change happening
in the bordering county was used instead. Additionally, all observations where a state
changed its corporate tax in the two years prior to the bordering state were removed.
County spillover analysis: findings
Results from equation (1.5) are presented in table 1.9. Starting with the indirect test,
little evidence of spillovers was found for either hikes or cuts when comparing border
counties and adjacent interior counties. Comparing border counties to all interior counties,
39E.g., counties could respond differently depending on the type of industry mix, the share of corporations,
etc.
40When comparing border counties to interior counties one degree removed, an estimation strategy similar
to the border discontinuity design could be followed, grouping counties within the same state instead. The
results from this methodology are similar to taking the average outcome of one degree removed interior
counties.
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some evidence was found that that tax cuts lead to an entry rate larger in border areas.
However, this result goes away weighting the sample, an indication that spillovers may
take place in a few treated areas with less population.
The indirect test also found significant weak evidence of spillover for entry. A tax hike
in a bordering state appeared to lead to more entry in border areas compared to all inte-
rior areas as well as to adjacent interior areas, although the estimated coefficients were
not statistically significant. Tax cuts were also found to be associated with more activity,
but they were also rather imprecisely estimated and more likely subject to endogeneity
concerns.
Regarding exits, none of the coefficients were found to be statistically significant. They
are positive, which means a tax hike leads to more exits in border areas, consistent with
negative spillovers. The weighted coefficient in column (8) is basically zero, consistent
with spillovers happening only in certain areas, as discussed for entry. Looking at the
impact of a change in a neighboring state, some evidence of positive spillovers was found,
where a tax increase leads to more exits compared to interior counties. However, this
finding becomes insignificant when weighting the sample.
To summarize, clear spillover effects were not detected on either entries or exits. Some
very weak evidence was found that tax hikes lead to shifting spillovers for establishment
entry. For exits, evidence of both negative and positive spillovers was found. These obser-
vations are not too surprising. Firms that decide to move following a tax change may need
time, while economically linked areas more subject to shifting-type spillovers may also be
subject to more consumption-type spillovers.
B. Census tract analysis
County-level estimations have some drawbacks. First, some counties are small, and some
are large. If spillovers are concentrated in an area of the border county, they may not be
detected in the analysis. To shed additional light on the role of spillovers, census tract level
data were used. This allows us to look more closely at the entry and exit rate near borders.
There are theoretical reasons why spillovers may be larger near borders. Assuming moving
costs partially increase with distance, existing firms near borders may be more likely to
move to a new state.41 Potential entrepreneurs who may be attached to specific areas for
economic or personal reasons could relocate much more easily if they live close to the
border. Another way to indirectly evaluate spillovers is to look at areas near the border
following the tax change.
41Moving costs for existing firms can include finding new customers and new workers.
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The analysis began by obtaining some graphical evidence on the effect of changes in
the corporate tax rate near the border by running the following estimation strategy:
yit = βτs(i)t × f(DISTi) + ΓXs(i)t + ΘXit + λi + γgt + εit (1.6)
where the tax rate was made to interact with the distance of tract i to the nearest bor-
der. Effectively, the estimation strategy used was similar to the main border discontinuity
estimation. Census tract level demographic controls (population, share of black, white,
college educated, and 20–59 year old inhabitants) were included as well as the share of
property tax at the county level, and other policies were included at the state level.
Second, the baseline equation A.1 was estimated, and tracts were made to interact
based on distance bins (e.g. 0–3 miles from the border). For example, the following was
estimated:
yit = βτs(i)t + γ1τs(i)t × dist ∈ (0, 3] + γ2τs(i)t × dist ∈ (3, 10] + ΘXit + λi + γgt + εit (1.7)
as such we can see whether the baseline coefficient β is consistent and whether there are
specific spillovers close to the border. Importantly, the county group-by-year fixed effects
were continued to be included under the assumption that census tracts in border counties
would face similar shocks.
One potential downside of using tract level analysis is that there would be increased
noise coming from businesses moving between different tracts within the same county.
While most businesses that move within a metropolitan area are tracked, it is still likely
that some firms will be coded as a start-up at their new location. Second, while compre-
hensive and consistent over time, the census tract dataset is not based on administrative
data. As long as the rate of location changes within the state is not systematically corre-
lated with changes in taxation, the coefficients could be potentially less precisely estimated
and biased toward zero, as would be expect with standard measurement error.42
Census tract analysis: findings
Turning to graphical evidence first, it is seen in figure 1.8 based on equation 1.6 that
the effect of a change in the top corporate tax rate has a more negative effect close to
42An example would be as follows: if California increases its corporate income tax rate, businesses in Los
Angeles county are more likely to move to another tract within the same county. Theoretically, this could be
true if the changes in state-level taxation affects tracts within the same county differently, through changes
in real estate prices or local competition. I am not aware of any theoretical or empirical work predicting
such heterogeneous changes; as such, it is reasonable to assume no systematic correlation exists between
state-level taxation and within county migration.
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the border. However, the polynomial fit gets very close to the average effect around 4–5
miles away from the border. A stronger effect was not seen near the border for exits.
In the bottom half of the figure, the sample was restricted to counties that are not in
border-dominated states (defined as states having at least 50% of its population in border
counties). The effects were found to be highly similar on entry, but at this point a negative
but small effect was observed on exit, which was higher near the border. Overall, the
results are not statistically significant, and standard errors are large, especially for the exit
rate.
Turning to the estimation of model 1.6,the results are shown in table 1.10. Columns
(1–5) look at differential effects of the corporate tax rate by binned distance to the border.
It can be seen that the baseline effect in column (1) is very similar to the county-level
result, although a bit lower and less precisely estimated. A change in the corporate tax
rate was found to have an almost twice as large effect on entry in tracts within 1.5 miles
of the border (β0−1.5 = −2.19 vs. β = −1.5). The results are very similar with other binned
distances (columns 2–4). Overall, the main impacts are typically close to the baseline
results but also imprecisely estimated. The coefficient on exit rate was found to be positive
but small (β = 0.46) and comparable to the county level results. Overall, the estimated
exits are slightly higher near the border (β0−1.5 = 0.67) and also about twice as large as
the baseline.
Both entry and exit results indicate the presence of negative spillovers in the state
experiencing the tax change. However, given the high concentration in areas close to the
border, and county level results, I am fairly confident the main results are unlikely to be
highly biased and driven by spillovers.43
1.4 Robustness Checks and Discussion
A. Firms or establishments
An important question that remains is regarding what type of establishments drive the
current findings. Is it establishments belonging to large multi-state firms, or larger single-
state firms, or to single-establishment operations? In table 1.11, some evidence on the
impact of tax changes on single-establishment firms and establishments belonging to large
firms is presented.
In column (1) and (2), both corporate and personal tax hikes have strong negative
43It is also worth pointing out that the exercise presented here at the census tract level looks at differential
effects by distance to the border experiencing the tax change, which is also an indirect test for spillovers,
under the assumption that different effects near the border are driven by spillovers.
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impacts on the entry rate of firms. Note that this is not necessarily the creation of a firm,
and this coefficient could still capture the migration of existing firms. This indicates that
although many businesses are not incorporated, the corporate tax rate still has a strong
effect on firm entry. A large number of tax hikes took place in the 1980s, a time when a
majority of businesses were C-corporations. A 1 p.p. corporate tax hike is associated with
a decline in firms birth rates by 2.5%, while a 1 p.p. increase in the personal tax rate yields
a birth rate lower by 3.3%.
Turning to entry and exits of establishments which belong to firms with more than one
plant, it was found that the impact of a tax hike was smaller, about -1.1, which is similar
to the baseline estimates, but was somewhat imprecisely estimated. Personal tax changes
were found to have very little impact on the entry of these establishments, which is con-
sistent with the fact that larger firms are more likely to be incorporated.
Turning to firms deaths, little evidence was found that tax changes had an impact. Tax
cuts are associated with fewer firm deaths; however, we should be cautious about this
finding, given the larger probability that tax cuts were found to be endogenous from our
previous discussions. To answer the question asked at the beginning of this section, it is
clear that our findings are not driven by large firms closing and opening operations and
also affect single-establishment and small firms.
B. Weighted results
One may wonder about the relative weight of some counties in the estimation. In
the baseline estimation strategy, each county represents one potential treated or control
unit, regardless of the size of the county. Yet some counties are much more populated than
others. A second issue is that some states have more counties than others. This can be seen
largely as random and rooted in the county’s history. However, the implications is that tax
changes in states with few counties will have fewer treated units for identification than
changes in a state with a large number of counties. To see whether it has an influence on
the results, the baseline estimation strategy weighting each county was estimated by the
inverse probability of each state being chosen (border counties/border counties in state s).
In table A.2 in the appendix, results from our baseline estimation strategy are pre-
sented, using both population and relative county numbers’ weighting methods. The out-
comes for border and interior counties are shown as well. The main takeaway of our
analysis is unchanged, with similar coefficients associated with both tax hikes and cuts on
entry rate.
With exit rates as the outcome variable, weighting by population doubles the coefficient
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to about 1.3, which is also statistically significant. This seems to be driven by interior
counties, which shows a strong and significant rise on exit rates following a tax hike. Table
A.3 in the appendix also presents weighted results for the interaction with state specific
tax policies. The negative impact of tax changes on entry was found to be consistent across
estimations, a statistically significant increase on exits was found as well.
C. Fixed Effects Model
Finally, the results from a fixed effects model are presented in table A.4 in the appendix.
Essentially, this is identical to 1.2 before taking the first difference.44 Both the full samples
and an estimation including cross county pairs’ fixed effects were included. The negative
relationship between the corporate tax was found to be negative and between -.9 and -1.4,
while the border pair fixed effects model yielded larger and more precisely estimated coef-
ficients, between -2 and -3.5. No clear impact was found on exit, which is also consistent
with our previous findings, especially to the extent that the fixed effect methodology is
more likely to capture the reversal documented for exits.
D. Discussion
How do the estimates compare to other results in the literature? Kneller and McGowan
(2012) used variation in firm taxation among OECD countries and found a negative effect
of the corporate tax rate on entry and no effect on exit. Djankov et al. (2010) found that
a 10 p.p. decrease in the corporate tax rate led to a 1.4 p.p. higher entry rate. Da Rin,
Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011) found a non-linear and varying effect roughly ranging
from 0.8 to 3.5 p.p. for a 10 p.p. lower corporate rate. A semi-elasticity of about -1.5 to -2
that is document with an entry rate of about 10 percent implies that a 1 p.p. decline in the
corporate rate leads to a lower entry rate of about 0.15 to 0.2 p.p., which is comparable to
the findings described above.
It is valuable to put the results in context with findings on the effects of state corporate
taxation on employment, income, and establishments in the United States. Ljungqvist and
Smolyansky (2018) found an elasticity for income and employment with respect to the net
of tax rate of about 0.3 and 0.5, while Curtis and Decker (2018) found that an increase in
the corporate tax rate of one percentage point led to a decrease in employment in young
(0–1 year old) firms between 3% and 5%. Their results highlighted the potentially high
sensitivity of new firms to changes in business taxation, which is confirmed in this paper.
44We estimate yit = βτs(i)t + ΓXst + ΘXit + λi + κt + εit, where y is the log entry or exit rate, λi
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Giroud and Rauh (2019) found that corporations have short-run corporate tax elasticities
around -0.5. Note that their results were regarding the net effect on establishments. Given
the coefficients on entry and exit rates, the implied net effects would be a corporate tax
semi elasticity between -1.5 and -4. We cannot readily compare the results, however, as
the data used include small and single-establishment firms as well. In addition, all estab-
lishments were focused on in this paper, not just corporations, which in essence combines
the direct effects on C-corporations and the indirect general equilibrium effect on pass-
through firms. Serrato and Zidar (2016) found a long-run business taxation elasticity for
establishments around 4. However, their results focused on long-run effects and used an
effective tax rate based on the corporate and the personal income tax rate.
It is worth mentioning that there is a rising literature on the use of difference-in-
difference methods with panel fixed effects, specifically with two-way fixed effects (e.g.
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultffoeuille (2020), Imai and Kim (2019)). One concern pointed
out by these authors is that heterogeneous treatments with two-way fixed effects may
erroneously give negative weights to some observations and lead to a wrong estimated co-
efficient. The estimator proposed by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultffoeuille (2020) on the
baseline estimation strategy (1.2) was used. A similarly negative coefficient (β = −1.62)
was found, although with much larger standard errors.45
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, the role of state-level business taxation on establishments and firms’ entry
and exit rates was evaluated. Accordingly, a strong and significant effect of tax hikes on
entry was documented. Following the tax increase, there is an immediate decline which
is mostly stabilized afterward. Overall, tax hikes were found to lead to an entry rate
which was lower by about 1.5% to 3.5%. It was found that exits increased following
a tax hike as well, although the effect is smaller and shorter lived. Graphical evidence
points to a faster and stronger reversal, consistent with the theory that the decline in entry
and general equilibrium effects following a hike will eventually lower the exit rate. Tax
cuts were found to have qualitatively similar impacts, with a higher entry rate and lower
exit rate following the change. However, the estimated coefficients were not statistically
significant, and pre-trends point to a higher threat of endogeneity for cuts, specifically with
exits. Using a subset of tax changes classified as exogenous or endogenous, consistent and
strong impacts on entry and exit for exogenous tax changes were found. The results are
45Stata command did multiplegt with same covariates was used on all counties based on equation 1.2.
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comparable looking at establishments versus firms only, indicating that the findings are
not only driven by large corporations and affect small firms as well.
To answer the specific question what the impact of the state corporate tax is on business
dynamism, the main findings suggest that a hike in the tax rate leads to a decrease in
dynamism and economic activity, driven by decrease in the entry rate. The impact of
corporate tax cuts is less clear, with some evidence found that they may lead to higher
economic activity and dynamism. It is also important to keep in mind that these findings
are based on a short-run analysis, and long-run predictions on dynamism, especially for
exits, would be different. Medium- and long-run identification on the effect of tax changes
remains challenging and a great territory for future research.
Using census tracts and a border distance analysis, it was shown that there are poten-
tially large spillovers across state borders. A 1 p.p. increase in the corporate tax rate leads
to an additional 0.5% to 1% decline in firm entry near borders and a small (0.3%) but pos-
itive effect on exits. However, the effects are highly concentrated, roughly between three
and five miles. The aggregate analysis at the county level failed to detect big or precise
spillovers, although some evidence of allocation/shifting types of spillovers was found on
establishment entry and both shifting and indirect spillover with exits.
I view my contribution to the understanding of the relationship between state business
taxation and firm entry and exit in the United States as a first stab. The slow and steady
shift from corporations to pass-trough entities that started after the 1986 federal tax reform
may have different implications for future tax changes. New research could shed more
light on this issue by exploiting more precise data on firms’ legal form of organization.
Migration may play an important role as well, and the ability to track small and growing
firms over time would be substantial. Beyond entry and exit, to what extent do state taxes
influence growth, investment, and job creation are critical questions. These and many




Table 1.2: Summary Statistics - County level data
All counties Border counties Non-border counties Diff means
Mean S.d Mean S.d Mean S.d (t-test)
Firm dynamics
Entry rate 11.11 3.85 10.96 3.73 11.19 3.92 -0.18c
Estab. entry/cap 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.11 -0.015c
100×∆ Log entry rate -1.83 28.13 -1.79 28.03 -1.85 28.20 0.37
Exit rate 9.68 2.96 9.65 2.91 9.70 3.00 -0.011c
Estab. exit/cap 0.20 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.015
100×∆ Log exit rate -1.07 29.20 -1.04 29.17 -1.08 29.22 0.37
Total establishments 1,901 6,408 1,913 5,744 1,894 6,778 91
Demographic shares
Share white 84.24 18.38 85.25 17.62 83.63 18.80
Share black 8.83 14.47 8.50 14.52 9.03 14.44
Share age 20-59 51.02 4.27 50.91 4.09 51.09 4.37
Share college 10.98 6.56 10.95 6.52 11.00 6.59
Share urban 39.30 32.40 38.59 32.38 39.72 32.40
Population (1000s) 87.6 286.4 88.9 252.8 86.9 304.9
Other controls
Property tax share 79.50 40.64 79.63 44.34 79.43 38.22
Sales tax rate 4.75 1.49.
Minimum wage 5.07 1.68
Observations 129,519 48,503 81,016
Counties 3,131 1,183 1,948
These summary statistics are calculated over the period 1978-2017. I drop counties for which some data is
missing for all years. Data on firm dynamics come from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS). The share of
white, black and 20-59 y.o. in the population comes from the Census Bureau. The share with a college degree
and in urban area comes from NHGIS. Other controls come from the Department of labor (UI replacement
rate, minimum wage), the Census of Governments (property tax share) and the sales tax rate comes from
various sources - see text and appendix for more detail. Per capita data is calculated as per 1000 inhabitants.
The last column shows the difference in means between non-border and border counties and the superscript
shows whether a t-test can reject the null hypothesis that the mean is the same for border and non-border
counties.
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Table 1.3: State corporate and personal income tax changes 1978-2017
Mean Standard Deviation Count
∆c Corporate tax rate (magnitude) 0.92 1.09 220
∆c > 0 1.31 1.45 84
∆c < 0 -0.67 0.70 136
∆ Personal tax rate (magnitude) 0.89 1.08 377
∆p > 0 0.90 0.81 178
∆p < 0 -0.87 1.28 199
The top panel of this table displays the average, standard deviation, and total number of corporate tax
change, as well as separately for hikes and cuts. The bottom panel shows the same information for changes
in the personal income tax rate. Changes cover years 1978 to 2017. See text for data sources.
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Table 1.4: County level panel regression - baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Log Entry rate Log Entry ∆Log Entry rate
∆ Corp. tax rate -1.39c -1.33c -1.38c -1.52c
(0.46) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49)
Magnitude τc hike -1.71b -1.72b
(0.73) (0.73)
Magnitude τc cut 0.79 0.03
(0.74) (0.44)
∆ Pers. tax rate -0.43
(0.39)
Magnitude τp hike -1.48c
(0.39)
Magnitude τp cut -1.08
(0.75)
Demographic controls X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X
Drop OH MI TX X
State policy controls X X X X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04
Observations 20,860 20,860 16,978 20,928 20,860 23,739 19,751 19,751
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
Continued on next page
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Table 1.4 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Log Exit rate Log Exit ∆Log Exit rate
∆ Corp. tax rate 0.70 0.66 0.38 0.66
(0.45) (0.62) (0.64) (0.62)
Magnitude τc hike 0.66 1.06
(1.07) (1.03)
Magnitude τc cut -0.69 -0.74
(0.88) (0.95)
∆ Pers. tax rate 0.66
(0.45)
Magnitude τp hike 1.00
(0.61)
Magnitude τp cut -0.22
(0.83)
Demographic controls X X X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X
Drop OH MI TX X
State policy controls X X X X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Observations 20,854 20,854 16,977 20,854 20,854 20,800 19,717 19,717
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table features outcomes from model 1.2. The top panel shows coefficients with log establishment entry
rate (or log establishment entry per capita in column 6) as the outcome variable, and the bottom panel log
exit rate. The estimation window consists in the year of the change and two years prior. Only observations
with a single tax change for the corporate income tax rate in columns 1-6 are kept, while only a single
personal tax change for columns 7-8 are kept. Demographic controls include demographic shares, share of
property taxes at the county level and population. State policy controls include the corporate, personal and
sales tax rate, the minimum wage, and unemployment compensation. It also includes tax incentives and
financial assistance to industries at the state level. Because they experienced major tax reforms, I drop Ohio,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.8: Border discontinuity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log Entry rate
Magnitude tax hike -3.79b -3.92b -3.26b -3.42c -3.76a -1.21a
(1.62) (1.59) (1.58) (1.07) (1.91) (0.71)
Magnitude tax cut -0.40 0.12 0.46 1.00 -0.99 -0.35
(1.34) (1.60) (1.52) (1.08) (1.86) (1.00)
Demographic county controls X X X X X X
Group×Year FE X X X X X
State policy controls X X X X X
Division trend X X X X
No far counties (center> 50m) X
Pop. Weighted X
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.09 0.41 0.52
Observations 4,380 4,380 4,414 2,997 3,489 4,380
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log Exit rate
Magnitude tax hike 0.64 0.82 0.32 0.31 1.47a 0.38
(1.22) (0.86) (1.42) (1.37) (0.75) (1.67)
Magnitude tax cut 0.53 2.17a 1.38 1.31 0.38 0.45
(3.27) (1.13) (3.36) (2.93) (1.95) (3.34)
Demographic county controls X X X X X X
Group×Year FE X X X X X
State policy controls X X X X X
Division trend X X X X
No far counties (center> 50m) X
Pop. Weighted X
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.59 0.42 0.09 0.11 0.43
Observations 4,368 4,368 4,368 2,967 2,990 3,478
State and border clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table features outcomes from the border discontinuity model 1.4. The main difference is the inclusion
of adjacent counties across the state border acting as control variables. Groups are defined as the treated
county and all adjacent border counties. Some border counties may appear twice or more as control units if
they border more than one county. In column 5, we remove county pairs that are more than 50 miles apart
based on the centroid of both counties respectively. Population weighs use the national share of a county’s
population. We remove control counties where a tax change occurred in the three years prior to the change
in the treated unit. Standard errors are clustered at the state and border segment (state A and state B form



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.1: Trends in business dynamism and state taxation
State population weighted average entry and exit rate of establishments
The top panel depicts the average entry and exit rate from state level data between 1978 and 2017, weighted
by the average state population in that time period. The grey regions depicts year in which the U.S economy
was in a recession. The bottom panel depicts the median, 25th, and 75th percentile in state corporate income
tax rates.
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Figure 1.2: Changes in state taxes: 1978-2017
The first two figures show the distribution of corporate and personal income tax changes between 1978 and
2017. Personal income tax changes smaller than .05 percentage points are excluded. The second figure
shows the number of positive and negative changes by year. Ohio, Michigan, and Texas are excluded panels.
See text and appendix for additional information on state taxation.
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Figure 1.3: Event study analysis - establishments entry rate
50
Figure 1.4: Event study analysis - establishments exit rate
This figure plots the coefficients from the event study described in the estimation strategy section. Large
changes are the 75th percentile of hikes and cuts respectively. We restrict the large hike/cuts sample to
large changes for which no other large change occurred in the lead window. For the all hikes/cuts sample,
we similarly restrict the sample for which another change occurs in the three years prior to the change. W
remove Michigan, Ohio and Texas tax changes. We include county and year fixed effects. We include the
same controls as in the main estimation strategy: county demographic shares, population local property tax
share and amount per capita, state policies (personal, sales tax rates, minimum wage, tax incentives and
financial assistance programs, unemployment insurance compensation.)
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Figure 1.5: Dynamic effect of corporate tax change on establishment entry and exit rate
Effect of a tax change on log establishment entry rate
Effect of a tax change on log establishment exit rate
These figures plot the linear combination of the coefficients estimated from the distributed lag model from
the dynamic analysis section, as well as the 95% confidence intervals. We plot both the linear combination
of both leads and lags, as well as the linear combination of lags only. Only looking at lags is akin to an
impact response function starting from the tax change. We restrict the sample to tax changes for which
no other large change occurs in the lead window. We include the same controls as in the main estimation
strategy: changes in county demographic shares, population local property tax share and amount per capita,
state policies (personal, sales tax rates, minimum wage, tax incentives and financial assistance programs,
unemployment insurance compensation.) We also include a year fixed effect, and a census division fixed
effect which captures yearly shocks and regional trends in dynamism.
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Figure 1.6: Dynamic effect of tax hikes/cuts on establishment entry and exit rate
Tax hike on entry rate Tax cut on entry rate
Tax hike on exit rate Tax cut on exit rate
In this figure, we focus on tax cuts and hikes separately. See previous figure for details.
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Figure 1.7: Treated and control border counties
This graph depicts which controls are part of the border discontinuity design model, as well as which is
either treated, control, or both - for different tax changes and estimation windows. We remove counties with
lake borders, as well as treated counties where the control county experienced a tax change during the same
period or during the three years prior. We also keep treated counties which experience a unique tax change
in our estimation window of two years before hte tax change
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Figure 1.8: Effect of corporate tax based on border distance
Polynomial (n=4) interaction - 25 miles from border
Entry rate Exit rate
Without border dominated states
Entry rate Exit rate
These graphs are based on equation 1.6, focusing on tracts within 25 miles from the border. the red line
depicts the baseline effect without any distance interaction, while the orange line computes the effect by
distance from the border by adding the coefficients on the distance interacted with the tax rate polynomial.
Blue lines represent the 95% confidence interval. The bottom panel is the same estimation, but focuses on
state that are not border dominated.
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CHAPTER II
What Happened to Property Taxes after the Great
Recession?
From a work with Chiara Ferrero
Abstract
Newly collected data on property tax rates, assessment values, and property tax levies
were used to study the effect of falling home prices associated with the Great Recession on
local property tax revenues. The mechanical channel through which home values affected
assessed values as well as the policy channel through which policymakers responded to
changes in the tax base were teased out. It was found that the resilience of property
tax revenues can be attributed to two main factors: a small correlation between home
price changes and assessed values after 2007 and large increases in property tax rates in
areas facing a negative shock in their tax base. Contrary to the mainstream perception,
it was found that the recession had a small but negative and lasting impact on the tax
base. Negative shocks were offset by as much as 80%–85% in the long run, implying that
a 10% decrease in the tax base led to only a 1.5% decline in property tax revenues. A
large variation in responses are documented, and the role of property tax rate and levy
limits during and post-recession are analyzed. Rate limits seem to reduce the ability of
policymakers to offset negative shocks in the tax base and lead to a bigger decline in
revenues. Jurisdictions with a levy limit are much more likely to smooth out negative and
positive shocks.
JEL Codes: H12, H20, H71, R31, R51
Keywords: State and Local Taxation, Property Taxes, Great Recession, Property Tax Limits
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2.1 Introduction
Property taxes are one of the main sources of financing for local governments, which
rely on tax revenues and state transfers to provide services such as education and fire pro-
tection. In 2012, property taxes constituted about 1% of state revenues, 27% of county
revenues, and 20% of municipalities’ revenues. There is also a lot of variance in the re-
liance on property taxes. Property tax collections make up about 31% of all state and
local tax revenues in New Hampshire and only about 7% in Alabama. They are usually
administered locally, with rules varying widely across the nation. This is perhaps one of
the reasons why there is still little evidence of how property rates and revenues changed
after the Great Recession. As the crisis unfolded and home values dropped precipitously,
many feared disastrous consequences for local budgets. However, while the consensus is
that the shock caused by the Great Recession had a negative impact on the finances of local
and state governments, the most dire predictions were mostly avoided. It is true that on
average property taxes did not fall as much as expected during and after the crisis, yet this
story potentially hides important heterogeneity across jurisdictions and locations.
In this paper, a novel dataset that allows us to shed more light on the effects of the Great
Recession on assessed values—the property tax base—and tax collections is exploited, and
a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms is provided. Data on property tax
rates, assessment values and levies for local governments in 44 states between 2000 and
2018 were collected, which is in our knowledge the most extensive collection of this kind
so far. The time period covered by our data moreover allowed us to study the effects of
the recession on property tax policy in the short and medium run. The data was leveraged
to disentangle the mechanical and policy effects behind aggregate changes in property tax
revenues. The mechanical effect refers to the change in the tax base following a decline in
property values. The policy effect refers to the change in the tax rate by policymakers to
potentially offset changes in the base. The property tax levy is generally obtained by mul-
tiplying the net assessed value of a property with the applicable tax rate (often described
as millage, or mill rate). The net assessed value of property depends on the underlying
property value and on the assessment ratio and deductions that apply. Therefore, a change
in property values changes the levy mechanically through a change in the assessed value.
As most local governments face balanced budget requirements, a decline in the tax base
implies either an increase in the tax rate applied—which is referred to as offsetting—or
cuts in spending.
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An important feature of local property taxation in the United States is the array of rules
and limitations that restrain local policymakers. The limits are widespread and have been
adopted in some form by the large majority of states. They are usually applied to rates,
assessed values, or levies and may differ substantially in how binding they are. Property
tax limitations are seen as a way to constrain policy makers and increase their account-
ability. Limits have always garnered attention from economists and policymakers, who
seek to understand the extent to which they are binding and how much they distort local
decisions. In this study, additionally data were collected on different types of property tax
limits, and light is shed on their role and impact on observed tax rates and levies after the
recession. In particular, the focus is placed on whether the presence of limits hinders the
ability of jurisdictions to recover from the shock.
In a preview of the findings, it is shown that changes in home values had a lagged effect
on assessed values. The lagged effect is likely due to several factors, such as for example
the length of the reappraisal cycles. On average, a 1% increase/decrease in home prices
was associated with a 0.2–0.5% increase/decrease in assessed values. This relationship
became weaker after the Great Recession, due to the slowness of adjustment in the tax
base and the volatility of home prices. A first-difference model was used to study the policy
channel by looking at the impact of changes in the tax base on the mill rate. It was found
that on average, positive and negative changes in the tax base were offset by an opposite
change in the mill rate: a 10% increase in the tax base was associated with a 5.6% decrease
in the mill rate. Evidence was found that the amount of offsetting depends on the intensity
of the shock, with negative shocks resulting in higher offsetting. Additionally, while small
negative shocks are offset almost fully, small positive increases in the tax base are typically
not offset by policymakers. This is consistent with policymakers taking advantage of small
expansions in the tax base to increase tax revenue.
Turning to the role of limits, it was found that localities with rate limits are able to
offset changes in the tax base less and are on average less likely to recover to pre-crisis
levels of per capita property tax revenues. These findings hold in the short and medium
run, although the limits seem to be most binding when looking at yearly changes. The role
of levy limits was studied as well and it was found that, in presence of levy limits, localities’
property tax revenues change less in response to a change in the tax base, which holds true
for both for negative and positive changes. Overall, it is shown that policymakers seek to
smooth shocks and avoid abrupt increases or declines in revenues.
The decrease in property values in the Great Recession had a small but lasting effect
on the property tax base and property tax revenues. Although many localities were able
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to maintain relatively stable tax bases and revenues, about a quarter of localities had not
recovered to 2007 levels of levy per capita in 2015. It was found that declines in the
tax base after 2007 were offset by changes in the tax rates by 80–85% on average in the
medium run: a 10% decrease in property values between 2007 and 2015 was associated
with a 1.5% decrease in property tax revenues.
The current paper contributes to the broad literature on property tax. In particular,
new light is shed on the relationship between property prices and the tax base and new
evidence is provided on the reaction of local policymakers during and after the Great
Recession. Additionally, we add to the literature on the role of property tax limits and
their impact on tax rates and revenues. While the literature on property tax is broadly well
developed, still little is known on how local governments responded to the Great Recession.
An important reason is the lack of aggregate data on all three fundamental aspects of
property tax systems: the tax base, the tax rates, and revenues. We believe this data
collection is a significant contribution as well and can help us deepen our understanding
of local property tax systems overall.
Several studies have sought to shed light on the relationship between home prices and
local tax revenues. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt (2011) found an asymmetric effect, where a
rise in home prices led to higher revenues but a decline in market values had little ef-
fect on tax collections. Lutz (2008) and Lutz, Molloy and Shan (2011) provided evidence
on how assessed values responded to changes in property values and how tax revenues
responded to changes in house prices. Lutz (2008) found that there was a lag between
changes in property values and changes in assessed values and that the long run elasticity
of tax levies and market value of properties was about 0.4. Lutz, Molloy and Shan (2011)
also found a small elasticity of property tax revenue with a house price index. They ar-
gued that the lag between market and assessed values and millage offset can explain this
result. Alm, Buschman and Sjoquist (2011) instead analyzed the impact of declining prop-
erty values on local government revenues and found that, notwithstanding large variation
across localities, overall, local governments had responded differently to the Great Reces-
sion than state governments to avoid pitfalls in revenue. Using school districts in Georgia,
they showed that policymakers offset declining home values by increasing the millage rate.
Other studies have focused specifically on the role of policy makers’ reactions to the
Great Recession. The National League of Cities conducted multiples surveys after the Great
Recession to gather more evidence on how local policy makers react to negative revenue
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shocks1. The first course of action was drawing reserves, followed by cuts in non-essential
expenditures, and increases in fees and other utilities. Notably, millage rate offset was
rarely used in the survey’s responses. An older study by Wolman (1983) argued that the
optimal response depended on the timing and view of policy by citizens. As in the survey,
reserves are drawn first, but then higher taxes are preferred, while cuts in non-essential
expenditures take third place.2
Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) focused on Michigan and studied how localities changed
expenditures due to fiscal stress, not focusing instead on other mechanisms such as changes
in tax rates. They found that localities experiencing fiscal stress between 2005 and 2009
were more likely to cut non-essential expenditures. Dye and Reschovsky (2008) instead
analyzed changes in state aid and whether local governments responded by raising tax
rates, finding that school districts increased tax rates by $0.23 for a dollar decrease in state
aid on average. In the current paper, focus is placed on the extent to which policy makers
change mill rates in response to a change in tax base, and it was possible to study this in
the short and medium term in the majority of states.
The study closest to the current one is by Cromwell and Ihlanfeldt (2015), who fo-
cused on Florida and looked at millage rate and expenditure adjustments following lower
transfers and a decline in property tax base during the crisis. They found that local policy-
makers both cut expenditures and offset the decline in the tax base by raising millage rates
and that the response varied in part due to the monopoly power of local governments or
the degree of competition with other neighboring localities. In this paper, it is studied how
assessed values, levies, and mill rates change in response to a change in property values,
and the role of limits is highlighted.
Property tax limits and their effectiveness have been extensively studied. Examples
of efforts to categorize and study property tax limitations include Paquin (2015), Mullins
(1995), Sapotichne et al. (2015), and Maher and Deller (2013). Amongst others, Dye and
McGuire (1997) and Preston and Ichniowski (1991) studied the effectiveness of property
tax limitations. At the state level, Poterba (1994b) evaluated the role of tax and expen-
diture limitations and fiscal institutions. He found that states with higher restraint were
typically correlated with faster fiscal adjustment using data from the late 1980s. He also
demonstrated the importance of political factors: states with full party control have a
1See for example Hoene and Pagano (2010)
2While surprising, the structure of local taxes may explain this results these seemingly opposite results.
In many jurisdictions the tax rate reflects changes in local expenditures and is not a policy choice per se.
The mechanical effect on rates will be to offset cuts in other revenues, although many policymakers may not
interpret it that way.
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slower adjustment, and spending cuts and tax increases are smaller during gubernatorial
election years. The current paper exploits data gathered from Paquin (2015) and Lin-
coln Institute and of Public Policy (2021b) to evaluate how the presence of rate limits and
levy limits, in particular at the jurisdiction level, has impacted the change in property tax
revenues after the Great Recession. Increasing attention is being devoted in the literature
to the effect that tax limitations have on the erosion of the tax base overall and on the dis-
tortionary effects that limits and rules related to reappraisal may produce. Berry (2021)
and Avenancio-León and Howard (2019) are two examples of recent research focusing on
assessment and reappraisal values and shedding light on limitations of the methods used
in assessment. More work is needed to fully appreciate the role that limits and assessment
rules have on property tax collection. This paper contributes in particular to the role of
limits in a time of property values and tax base decrease.
Note that throughout the paper, the term of tax levy is commonly used when referring
to the amount of revenue generated, as it is common terminology in property taxation.
Moreover, assessed value is sometimes referred to as NAV, or net assessed value. The word
net implies that NAV captures the actual tax base after taking into account exemptions and
reductions in assessment.3 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides
more details on property tax systems in the United States and describes the data collection
process as well as other data used in the analysis. Section 3 details the mechanism behind
the relationship between home values and local tax revenues and provides theoretical pre-
dictions. In section 4, the methodology and empirical findings are presented, and section
6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Property taxes and data
Property taxes are critical for local revenues and a major source of funding for not only
services such as schools but also fire or police departments. All states rely on property
taxes to some extent, and while they may be levied by all levels of jurisdictions in some
states, they are most commonly used as a tool by municipalities and school districts. Coun-
ties often impose a property tax as well, however with the exception of some states where
most of the levy occurs at the county level and is then redistributed to lower jurisdictions
counties’ collections are typically small. State governments may also levy a state-level
3In some states, it was not possible to distinguish between both. For the majority of tax collected, the
assessed values clearly described as the net taxable amount were collected, or when gross and net values
were available, net amounts were used in the analysis.
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property tax (e.g. Georgia); however, they often largely rely on other sources of income
such as sales taxes and income taxes.4
The tax base for the property tax is broadly determined by the value of taxable property
in a state. The largest share of taxable property is residential real estate, however, differ-
ent classes of properties may be taxed, including for example commercial and agricultural
property. The importance of commercial property taxes as a fraction of local revenue varies
considerably. Colorado is notable as its laws require that a certain percentage of ad val-
orem taxes come from commercial property, which leads to a large discrepancy between
the taxation of residential and commercial property. Some states impose different tax rates
on property types, while others have a uniform rate. When collecting data, some states
only report the total assessed value of taxable property at the jurisdiction level, while oth-
ers report it by categories. Throughout the analysis, when assessed value is referred to,
real estate value is typically implied, which combines commercial and residential proper-
ties. This excludes public utilities, agricultural land, or the value of natural resources in
certain areas. Although a residential property index was used, it is reasonable to expect
residential and commercial values to be correlated over time.
States in general use market value to assess the taxable value of property but may differ
in the fraction of market value they tax or in the exemptions available. Typical exemptions
include primary residences, or homestead, buildings of historical values, business incen-
tives, or special treatment of older property owners. While market and assessed values
are strongly correlated, there are several factors that can weaken that correlation. First,
several states implement limits on how much the assessed value of a property can change
on a yearly basis.5 Second, some properties may not be reappraised every year, and there
is typically a lag between actual change in market value and appraisal. Appraisal is done
by individuals, and the methods vary across time and jurisdictions. Most states imple-
ment ways to limit the variability of taxes paid across areas and use equalization methods
to optimize horizontal equity for homeowners.6 Third, and related to the specification
4Another fundamental source of revenue for both state and local jurisdictions is transfers. When revenue
is discussed, own source of revenue is typically implied; however, transfers are important for policymakers
and will affect their decisions about spending and taxation.
5The most well-known example of this is Prop 13 in California which limits the yearly change in assessed
value for residential property of 2% a year and allows full reappraisals to happen only when the property is
sold. This leads to a large discrepancy between assessed and market values in areas with large increases in
housing values over time. Additionally, the maximum tax levy on a property cannot exceed 1% of its real
market value.
6In this context, horizontal equity implies that for a given tax rate and market value, taxes paid will be
the same regardless of location. In other words, the same relationship exists between market and assessed
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of our estimation strategy, if residential and commercial values are not highly correlated,
the coefficient associated with the home price index will be biased downward because of
measurement error. In areas where commercial property makes up a sizeable portion of
the tax base, the estimated correlation was expected to be a lower bound of the true re-
lationship. These issues are discussed in more detail in the mechanism section of the paper.
Once the taxable value of property is determined, the actual tax collected depends on
the rate imposed. The property tax works differently than other main taxes, such as the
sales or income tax, as in combination with the tax base, the tax rate is the main fea-
ture chosen by state policymakers when implementing tax reform. In the example of the
sales tax, typically few changes in the tax base happen over time. On the other hand, the
property tax rate is typically never chosen directly and depends on the amount of revenue
needed in a jurisdiction and the tax base—in this case the value of assessed property. For
example, in New York, school boards and municipal policymakers decide a budget in May,
and using the value of assessed property in March that year, they set the tax rate equal to
the total levy needed divided by the net taxable value of property. This mechanism is what
stands behind the view of property tax as a “residual” tax or a tax that is determined once
all other variables in the budget are set.
The tax rate for property taxes is often referred to as the mill rate, because it is usually
expressed as the amount of dollars paid per $1000 worth of assessed property. Multiplying
the mill by 10 effectively gives the amount of taxes to be paid as a percentage of assessed
value. Depending on the state, different taxing jurisdictions may impose different mill
rates, so that the overall property tax paid by a homeowner will depend on the combined
rate of all the applicable jurisdictions. Local politicians can also face significant restrictions
in managing property tax revenues. The majority of states impose some rate limits, levy
limits, assessment limits, or a combination of the three which may require that changes go
through a vote and need to be approved by residents of the jurisdiction. This is discussed
in more detail later.
The next section describes the data collection process for property tax revenues, mill
rates, assessment values, and property tax limits.
value on all jurisdictions of the state.
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2.2.1 Local property tax data
Data were collected on local property tax rates, assessment, and levy in 45 states in
the United States between 1990 and 2018.7 The mill rate for only a handful of states was
obtained (Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West
Virginia). Further, the data on tax revenues in Kentucky were not found either. All remain-
ing states have data for at least two of the three variables mentioned.8 To our knowledge,
there is no current database that aggregates local property tax data. The Census of Gov-
ernment collects data on spending and revenue from all levels of government every five
years as well as yearly for states, and large counties and municipalities. However, it does
not contain information on tax rates and assessment values.
The current data were gathered from three main sources: state annual reports, state tax
administration—through their website or direct contact—and the Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy collects data on the features of local tax sys-
tems and raw property tax rate data from states9. The data obtained from the three sources
above were transcribed and restructured to have consistent series over time for each state
and across areas.
This paper focuses on total net taxable assessed values, property tax levies, and mill
rates by county. Table 2.1 lists the data available for all states as well as the years covered.
The majority of states reports aggregate data at the county level. However, states may vary
with some reporting data at the taxing jurisdiction level (e.g. school district, municipality,
etc.). In those cases, the available data were aggregated at the county level. The column
“Aggregated” denotes states for which the mill rate was calculated based on the average of
mill rates from all taxing jurisdictions at the county level. This method can lead to slightly
skewed averages in either directions depending on whether smaller jurisdictions have a
lower or higher tax rates.
Additionally, states may differ in how information on property tax is delivered. In some
cases, only the the tax base (assessed values) and total levy are provided, while in others
more details on the source of levy by jurisdiction, the type of property assessed and taxed
(e.g. residential or commercial property), or the use of the levy are available. More de-
tailed information on the data cleaning and gathering process and state-specific details on
sources and available information and variables are provided in the appendix.
7No data was available for the state of Alaska, Hawaii, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Washington D.C.
8We typically have full panels between the start and end date of data available at a state, with the
exception of three states (NH, ID, KY) which have some missing years.
9Lincoln Institute and of Public Policy (2021a), Lincoln Institute and of Public Policy (2021b)
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Note that in the paper, tax levies, tax revenues, or tax collections are interchangeably
referred to. It is important to note that the data collected in this paper were on taxes
levied. In other words, it is based on the local government’s budget and represents what
the constituents owe. This is not the same as tax collections if there is some level of tax
delinquency. Unfortunately, data on both the taxes levied and the taxes actually collected
is not always available for every state, and thus, the current results should be interpreted
only regarding taxes levied. There is a potential concern as to whether the taxes collected
deviate substantially from the taxes levied and how this might potentially affect our results.
One factor that might ease this concern is that local governments often set property tax
levies in a residual manner, meaning that the mill rates are chosen so that the resulting
levy covers the portion of the budget that is not funded after other sources of revenue
are taken into account. Thus, one might think that local governments would not set levies
that are considerably different from the amount of taxes they are able to collect. Anecdotal
evidence suggests delinquency rates are overall small and below 1% or between 1% and
3% in most states.10
2.2.2 Property Tax Limitations
Property tax limitations have been adopted by all states with the exception of Hawaii,
New Hampshire, Tennessee11, and Vermont. Limits are usually applied to increases in
assessed values, levies, or rates with the aim to regulate property tax revenue. Tax rate
limits may be applied at the jurisdiction level, or there could also be an overall limit on
the tax rate that any property owner pays on their property. Similarly, levy limits may be
formulated as a limit on the growth rate of the aggregate levy at the jurisdiction level or
as a limit on the growth rate of individual property owners’ tax obligations. Limitations
regarding assessments tend to put constraints on how fast assessments can rise. This is
helpful in avoiding increases in tax burden which are not determined by policy but instead
by a rise in market values.
The formulation of limits varies widely across states and even jurisdictions and can
include a possibility for local governments to override the limit with a pre-determined ma-
jority vote. In other cases, limits are determined through formulas and depend on other
quantities such as inflation.
The share of states with some limits has not changed significantly in the last few years,
10See https://www.corelogic.com/intelligence/buy-stories/property-tax-delinquency-varies-across-states/
11Tennessee has a truth in taxation requirement
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as fewer new limits have been established. Data gathered by Paquin (2015) revealed that
74% of states have some limits on rates, 34% of states have some limits on assessments,
and 72% of states have some limits on levies. Only 14% have a combination of some rate,
assessment and levy limits. The presence of limits by itself is not indicative of how binding
they might be: as rules vary widely state by state, some limits may be substantially stricter
than others. Table B.2 in the appendix shows which states have some type of assessment,
rate, and levy limits in year 2007, specifying whether rate limits and levy limits apply to
the property or the jurisdiction aggregated amount. Additionally, the appendix contains
additional information on the data on property tax limitations used.
While property tax limits are often popular with taxpayers, as they are seen as a way
to gain more control over unexpected or unwarranted increases in property taxes, an in-
creasing amount of attention has been devoted in the literature to the effects that limits
have on horizontal equity in property taxation (especially regarding assessment limits and
reappraisal rules) and on resilience of local finances to economic shocks. Including data
on the presence of limits allows us to broaden our question to include the role of limits as
well. In this paper, the data by Paquin (2015) and Lincoln Institute and of Public Policy
(2021b) were used as well as direct research state by state to find which states have limits
and classify them. In the mechanism section, it is described in more details how limits may
affect policymakers’ decisions when facing different types of shocks.
2.2.3 Other data
Two measures were collected for local property values. The first home price index is
issued by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The FHFA index is computed using
sales prices and appraisal values for mortgages bought or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. Small counties with few transactions were found to be typically missing from
the data. The number of counties covered was 1435 in 1990 and 2412 after 2000. The
sample is consistent throughout our estimation period (2000–2016). A second housing
price measures comes from Zillow.12 Zillow separates its price index into three categories:
low-tier, mid-tier, and high-tier. Mid-tier represents the typical home value in the 35th to
65th percentile range. Zillow data covers fewer counties than the FHFA index, so it was
not our primary choice; however, it was leveraged to validate some results from the FHFA
12Data from the FHFA can be found at https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/




The main data source on state and local revenues and expenditures in the United States
is the Census of Governments.14 This data were used to compute the share that several
sources of revenues represent at the county level, as localities may differ on how much
they rely on revenue sources such as property taxes, other taxes, or intergovernmental
transfers from states and the federal government. The Census of Governments data only
covers all jurisdictions every five years, in years ending with ’02 or ’07. The Annual Survey
of State and Local Government Finances covers all years but limits the sample to state-level
finances and large cities and counties.
Demographic data at the county level (total population and share of the population by
race and age groups) comes from the Census and is based on revised intercensal estimates.
Data from NHGIS were used as well15, which is based on the Census and the American
Community Survey on the share of population with a college degree and the share of
urban residents at the county level. Data on unemployment rate used as a control in
some estimations comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 16 All price-related variables
(including the home price index) were adjusted for inflation in 2010 dollars using the GDP
deflator provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis.
2.2.4 Summary statistics
Figure 1 plots the log HPI, NAV, millage, and tax levy between 2002 and 2015. The
top panel includes all information available for all four variables, while the bottom panel
removes counties for which the home price index is missing. Note that all values are ad-
justed for inflation (except for the mill rate, which is not a price variable), and levy and
assessed values are calculated per capita. Behind the aggregate change in home values and
property tax features displayed in figure 2.1 lies a lot of variation. Table 2.2 displays sum-
mary statistics for the four variables mentioned. The first panel computes statistics based
on yearly variation between 2000 and 2016, 2000 and 2007, and 2008 and 2015. The bot-
tom panel displays summary statistics for three periods with three-, five-, and eight-year
13Top-tier ZHVI is the typical value for homes within the 65th to 95th percentile range for a given region,
and bottom-tier ZHVI indicates the typical value for homes that fall within the 5th to 35th percentile range.
All data were seasonally adjusted.
14Census of government data:https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cog.html
15National Historical Geographic Information System
16Census population data:https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/
2010s-counties-detail.html. NHGIS data:https://www.nhgis.org/user-resources/
datasets-overview Unemployment rate: https://www.bls.gov/lau/
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differences: the immediate aftermath the recession (2007–2010), the difference between
the highest and lowest average home price index in our period (2007–2012), and the dif-
ference before the recession and after recovery (2015)17.
Over our entire time period, the average yearly change was found to be 0.5% for home
prices, 1.6% for assessed values, 2.3% for tax levy, and about 0.9% for the mil rate. How-
ever, these results are the outcome of averaging between drastically different pre- and
post- recession periods. Additionally, the percentiles and standard deviation show signif-
icant variation across counties. HPI, NAV, and property tax revenues increased in similar
proportion between 2002 and 2007, indicating that there was not a lot of millage off-
setting on average and that policymakers used the rise in home values to raise taxes. In
post-recession periods, however, a different story emerges. Between 2008 and 2015, it is
seen that home prices experienced on average a 1.8% decrease but assessed values instead
increased by around 0.8%, and revenues by about 1.9%, while the mill rate was on average
1.2% higher. The yearly patterns post 2007 are consistent with the longer time differences
in terms of signs but of larger magnitude. While assessed values went down in some areas
(as we can observe from the 25th percentile), the tax base remained stable on average,
while property taxes increased despite the fall in home values. This can be attributed to
the rise in property tax rates.
For all time periods, a large variation can be observed in the distribution of changes in
the variable of interests. This is also highlighted in figure 2 which plots the yearly average
and median change as well as the inter-quartile range, in boxes, and 1.5 times the 25th
and 75th percentile with whiskers. Substantial variation can be observed across units. Fig-
ure 3 plots the trends in states with and without rate limits and levy limits. The trends
for HPI and assessed value per capita are comparable across the four panels. In absence
of rate limits, the mill rate was found to decrease on average before 2010 and started
inverting the trend only after 2010, whereas in presence of rate limits, the mill rate was
found to start increasing sooner. Different patterns can also be seen between areas with
and without levy limits. In particular, localities with levy limits are characterized by larger
increases in the mill rate, whereas localities without levy limits seem to offset less with
mill rates. Surprisingly, the levy appeared to also start increasing after 2011 in localities
with levy limits, whereas in localities without levy limits, it decreased between 2011 and
2013.
These results highlight the variation over time and across localities on the effect that
172015 was chosen rather than 2016 or 2017 as a handful of states have missing data after 2015.
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changing home prices have on tax revenues. The following section focuses on the mecha-
nisms behind this relationship.
2.3 Mechanism
Let us start by defining the total revenue as R = Transfers + Property Taxes +
NonProperty Taxes (R = Rg + Rp + Rnp), where Rp = A × τm = T , the assessed
value times the mill rate. The change in revenue can then be decomposed as follows.
∆Rp = ∆A × τm + A × ∆τm. The first item is the mechanical effect of a change in the
tax base, and the second item is the policy effect from a change in the tax rate based on
the current tax base.18 For exposition, it is assumed that transfers and other taxes are not
directly impacted by home values.19
Given that local policymakers typically choose a budget which then determines the
property tax liability, and by extension the tax rate, the change in the mill rate based on
policymakers’ choice of levy can be determined as follows:




∆At × τm,t−1 + ∆Rnp,t + ∆Rg,t
}
where ∆B is the chosen change in a local government’s budget. Overall. the degree of
millage offset will depend on the change in assessed values, the amount of revenues from
other sources, and the chosen budget, which together determine the levy required.
To understand why the decline in home values had little impact in the aggregate but
large variation across areas, the role of the Great Recession on 1) the tax base and 2)
local tax policy must be analyzed first. The first mechanism is the relationship between
the housing market and the taxable value of real estate—the property tax base. Home
values are typically assessed by county officials based on the estimated market value by
the assessor and the assessment ratio, which multiplied by the market value determines
18Note that here for simplification it is assumed that the assessed values are not a variable impacted by
policy choices. However, the assessed values may be affected by policy. A prime example is the large number
of states with limits on assessment growth—either on individual properties or on the aggregate value of
property in the state. Local governments also affect the taxable value of property by allowing exemptions
or reductions for specific goods. Homestead residences typically are granted exemptions and reduction on
their assessed value. Local incentives that reduce tax liability for businesses are also quite common.
19There is an extensive literature on the relationship between home values and consumption, which finds
that higher housing wealth leads to higher consumption. Home prices may also affect the consumption of
goods associated with home purchases and construction, affecting sales tax and fee collections.
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the assessed value, effectively the property tax base:20
Levy = Assessment ratio×Market V alue×MillRate÷ 1000
While we expect assessed values and housing markets to be correlated, there might be
significant differences between the two for several reasons.
First, there is a natural lag as property tax levies are typically based on the previous
year’s assessed values. For example, in Minnesota, the assessed values were determined by
January 1, 2020, tax levy is chosen by the legislature in the summer, and taxes would be
payable by January 2021. Our dataset determines the year of the tax base when it is used
to determine levy, which is 2020 in this example. However, the tax base reflects values
from 2019, creating this short lag.
Second, property is typically not appraised every year. Several states have re-appraisal
schedules every two to three years, creating a lag between changes in market values and
assessed values. In jurisdictions with infrequent reappraisal, temporary changes in value
may not be reflected in assessment at all. An extreme example of this is Delaware, where
the most recent assessment of the three counties was in 1983. Although county assessors
have guidelines on how to estimate the market value of property, they ultimately have
some discretion in determining the taxable value. This can create disparities across and
within jurisdictions as well as across time. Recent research has highlighted how the relative
tax burden can vary substantially based on the value of the home (Berry (2021)) or the
demographic characteristics of a neighborhood (Avenancio-León and Howard (2019)).
These are important findings that highlight how property appraisal and its relationship
with market value is murky and varies widely. Additionally, it is common to reassess
homes when they are bought and sold. As the number of homes sold in the years following
the Great Recession dropped, it is likely that the share of property reassessed dropped as
well.21
Third, many states have assessment limits, which restrict the maximum amount by
which the assessed value of a house can increase year to year. In areas with rapidly rising
real estate prices, these limits can create substantial wedge between the taxable value and
the market value of property.22 The extent to which assessment limits are binding and
20As previously discussed, numerous states and localities have exemptions and deductions which lower
the taxable value of specific properties. Nonetheless, the final taxable value would be the estimated market
value times the assessment ratio, minus applicable exemptions. While the exemptions can and are revised by
state and local officials, they are typically specified amounts and thus do not depend on the value of a home.
E.g., in Michigan the base exemption was $40,475 in 2020, and that figure is revised every three years.
21The number of homes sold went from seven millions in 2005 to just above four millions in 2008 and five
millions in 2013 (See https://www.statista.com/statistics/226144/us-existing-home-sales/).
22E.g., this is the case in Florida where assessed values are required to not exceed market values. As an
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their effects on property tax collections are fascinating questions, which is left for future
research. 23
Finally, the measure of local values will be measured with error. The relative taxation
of homes along the value distribution is not captured by a single index. The presence
of non residential property in the tax base, mainly commercial property, will also lead to
measurement error if their change in value is not highly correlated, which may also be
more likely in the short run.
The second mechanism behind the relation between property values and tax revenues
is what determines the millage rate—the tax rate applied to taxable assessed values to
determine the property tax levy. For other sources of government revenues such as sales
or income taxes, the exact tax base is unknown when policymakers determine the tax rate.
The property tax base on the other hand is known in advance of the fiscal year. Hence
the mechanism through which the millage rate is set is different from the one through
which other tax rates are set. Usually, local governments decide on a budget and then
estimate the property tax levy to be the total amount of spending minus expected other
revenues. This mechanism coined the “residual view,” whereby policymakers decide on a
budget, and the mill rate offsets changes in the tax base accordingly. Assuming no changes
in spending and other revenue sources, a rise in assessed values should be accompanied
by a similar decline in the mill rate. Critiques of this view offer an alternative hypothesis
called “fiscal illusion.” They posit that a rise in the tax base can be followed by a rise in
tax levy, as policymakers exploit the salience of the tax rate, and “hide” increases in levy
behind partial offsets in the mill rate, which nonetheless declines. An alternative view is
that changes in the tax base and home values can also imply a shift in preferences for
public goods provision and taxation, explaining the partial offsetting. In this paper, the
focus is on disentangling the effect of the tax base and policy changes and abstract from
changes in preferences. The estimation strategy uses first-differences, essentially removing
constant local regulations, characteristic,s and preferences. The extent to which the Great
Recession changed preferences toward local taxation is another important and fascinating
example, take a house that was bought for $100,000 in 2000 and assessed at $50,000. The assessed value
should be the minimum between the estimated market value times assessment ratio (e.g. here 0.5) and
the maximum amount allowed to increase given the limits. In 2007, that house was worth $200,000, but
was assessed at $75,000 because of assessment limits. If the value of the house goes down to $150,000,
the assessed value will remain the same. If the value goes below $150,000, then the assessed value will go
down. In either case, the correlation between assessed value and home market value is either zero or much
lower than in periods when the housing market was going up.
23Assessment limits were not included in our analysis as the focus here is on the Great Recession and
the role of the real estate crash. Theoretically, assessment limits were not expected to be binding in areas
experiencing declines in property values.
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question for future research.
2.3.1 Limits and local policy-making
As discussed earlier, in addition to assessment limits, the other two common and pri-
mary types of limits are levy and rate limits. Policymakers may offset declines in assessed
values to manage or avoid a decline in tax revenue. In that situation, rate limits are most
likely to be binding. Rate limits may have different effects in the short and medium run
as well. For example, they may be more likely to be binding in the short run. Imagine
a county that experiences a one-year temporary decline in assessed values. Policymakers
will offset that decline by increasing the tax rate as much as the limit allows. If assessed
values go back up in the following years, they will be able to recover the previous loss in
revenues by keeping the mill rate the same or not lowering it as much as another county
which did not experience a previous decline in revenues. Essentially, in this scenario, the
limit creates short-run variation in tax revenue but is not binding in the medium run. On
the other hand, a persistent decline in the tax base may imply that the rate limit is forcing
lower tax revenues permanently. After the Great Recession, home prices bottomed out in
2012 and assessed values shortly after. This scenario is more likely to make rate limits
binding on a yearly basis as well as in the short and medium run.
The role of levy limits was analyzed as well, which may have had an impact on recov-
ery post Great Recession for two main reasons. First, areas experiencing small declines in
property values or even increases may want to increase revenues coming from property
taxes, especially if they face declines from other sources, such as local sales taxes or in-
tergovernmental transfers. Second, jurisdictions with stringent levy limits facing negative
shocks in their tax base may be reluctant to reduce levy, as it may be more difficult for
them to “catch up.” Thus, while the levy limit itself may not be binding, forward-looking
policymakers may optimize their current decisions based on expectations about the future
tax base and the stringency of the limits.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
This section presents evidence on the relationship between the home price index and
assessed values as well as on the effect of a change in the tax base on local property tax
revenues and tax rates. The role of levy and rate limits in the aftermath of the Great
Recession and the extent to which they bound and affected recovery was investigated.24
24In our yearly analysis, the yearly changes in the tax base, tax collection, or tax base where the amount
was more than doubled or was reduced by more than half (i.e. a change higher than 100% or smaller than
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2.4.1 Housing market and assessed values - the role of the tax base
The first step in the analysis involved evaluating the effect of home prices on the tax
base, i.e., total county assessed value per capita. Given the large heterogeneity in assess-
ment rules and methods both across and within states, the model was evaluated in first
differences. Essentially, the variation in home prices over time in a county between 2000
and 2016 was exploited:
∆ logNAVt = β∆ logHPIt + εt (2.1)
where NAV is the net assessed value per capita, and HPI is the county level home price
index. Both variables were adjusted for inflation.25 Cluster standard errors were used
at the county level to take into account serial correlation over time. As discussed and
observed in figure 2.1, there can be a significant lag between assessed values and market
values. To test for this, the following equation with three lag changes in the home price
index was estimated:
∆ logNAV = β0∆ logHPIt + β1∆ logHPIt−1 + β2∆ logHPIt−2 + β3∆ logHPIt−3 + εt
Column 3 in table 2.3 shows that, on average, a 1% increase in home prices is associ-
ated with an increase of 0.3% in the property tax base the same year. However, we know
that assessed values typically lag home values, depending on the assessment rules across
counties.26 Adding three lagged values confirmed that lagged changes have stronger pre-
dictive power. The coefficient with the contemporaneous change was unsurprisingly at that
point only 0.1 and likely the result of inter-temporal correlation in property changes. All
lags were found to have significant coefficients and larger estimates (βlag1 = 0.21, βlag2 =
0.18, βlag3 = 0.13). Column (5) replicates the analysis but weighing results by population.
The overall outcomes are very similar, indicating that in the aggregate, population is not
associated with large differences in the relationship between home values and the tax base.
Although not likely, changes in demographic and economic characteristics could be asso-
ciated with changes in assessment rules. Column (6) includes controls variables, and the
coefficients are virtually similar. Column (6) also restricts the sample to counties observed
-50%) were removed. In the long-difference analysis, the highest 1% change in magnitude of the same three
variables was removed. The main reason behind this decision is the potential for mistakes in the raw data.
Additionally, translating some PDFs and scanned documents occasionally resulted in small discrepancies
as well. Not removing outliers resulted in almost identical results, with slightly lower estimates due to
measurement error and slightly higher standard errors. However, the qualitative findings and statistical
significance remained..
25The GDP deflator provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis was used to adjust all price related
variables, effectively levy, assessed values, and the home price index.
26In the first two columns, the model was estimated in levels, with and without county fixed effects.
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every year between 2000 and 2016 and yields similar results as well. Column (7) uses a
different measure for home values: the price of a median home value sold in a county. The
coefficients are about 10%–20% smaller, but again the qualitative results are comparable.
Columns (8) and (9) split the sample before and after 2008. The relationship between
changes in home values and the tax base is much weaker in the second period: the coef-
ficients on log hpi are between 50 and 60% smaller after the Great Recession, indicating
that the tax base was less likely to be affected by changes in home prices after recession.
Long differences and asymmetric responses
To focus on the effect post-2007, the models were estimated using three-, five- and eight-
year differences.27 This allowed us to estimate whether the relationship between the tax
base and property values was different for positive changes and negative changes in home
values. Essentially, the following was estimated:
∆3y logNAVt = β1∆3y logHPIt × (HPIt > 0) + β2∆3y logHPIt × (HPIt < 0) + εt
The first striking observation is that there is essentially no correlation between changes
in home prices and changes in assessed values between 2007 and 2010, for both positive
and negative changes. Note that very few observations had positive changes, and only 164
counties experienced increases, while 2,264 counties saw a decline in property values.
Looking at the 2007–2012 and 2007–2015 changes, it is noticed that the coefficients
associated with both positive and negative changes in home prices strengthen and the coef-
ficient associated with lower home values becomes statistically significant (β07−12 = 0.18).
The weighted results are consistent, with a higher estimated relationship in magnitude
between lower home values and a lower tax base. This could be an indication that the
home price index is less subject to measurement error in more populated areas or that
assessment rules, limits, and the frequency of appraisal is correlated with population den-
sity. However, the coefficient on log positive HPI is large and negative, implying that a
rise in home prices is associated with a decline in the tax base. This is likely the result of
volatility in home prices throughout this time period and the fact that recovery in values
only started in 2012 in most places. With the exception of the last column of weighted
results, it cannot be rejected that in the aggregate, and over the medium run, adjustment
in the tax base is symmetrical for increases and declines in home values. 28
272010 was chosen as it was the first year when the recession ended officially, 2012 as it was the year home
prices bottomed out, and 2015 rather than later years for sample reasons, since the data of some states were
lost after 2015.
28To further test for symmetrical responses, the yearly model was tested with third lagged differences—i.e.,
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Taking stock of the mechanical effect
Before moving to the policy analysis, it is worth recapping what has been learned so
far about the relationship between home values and assessed values. First and unsur-
prisingly, the home price index was found to have a precise and strong effect on the tax
base, whereby a 10% change in the former led to a 3%–5% change in the latter. Second,
there was a significant lag—up to several years—until changes in property values were
reflected in the tax base. Third, the relationship between home prices and assessed values
was found to be significantly weaker after the Great Recession. The main explanation is
the combination of slow adjustment and high volatility in home prices. Fourth, symmetric
effects of changes in the home price index on net assessed values were typically found.
2.4.2 Housing market and property tax revenues—the role of policy
We can now turn to the role of policy. Given a specific change in assessed values, how
did the levy and tax rate change? To answer this question, the following equation was
estimated:
∆ logLevyt = β∆ logNAVt + εt (2.2)
where ∆ logLevyt is the difference in log property tax revenue per capita adjusted for in-
flation. The upper panel of table 2.5 shows results for this regression. The first column
coefficient implies that a 1% increase in the tax base leads to a 0.5% increase in tax rev-
enue. Asymmetric responses were tested for in column (2): a positive shock was found
to yield a stronger effect compared to a negative shock (β∆>0 = 0.56 and β∆<0 = −0.4).
It is possible that areas relying on different sources of income experience different trends
in their adjustment to the tax base. In addition, changes in population and income may
change preferences toward local taxation.29 In column (3), the change in demographic
characteristics, change in income per capita and unemployment rate as well as the frac-
tion of local income coming from property taxes, other own revenues, and transfers are
included. The qualitative results are similar, but the response to a positive shock is smaller,
and the response to a negative shock is larger in magnitude. While this could indicate
changes in preferences, it is also possible that controls are correlated with local home
prices and, by extension, the tax base. In that case, such controls would be characterized
by regressing ∆ logNAV on logHPIt − logHPIt−3. The results are shown in table B.4 in the appendix and
confirm that symmetrical adjustment of assessed values cannot typically be rejected to local home values.
29This type of sorting pioneered by Tiebout (1953) could imply that trends are accentuated over time
until a local area reaches an equilibrium. If sorting is orthogonal to observable characteristics, it cannot be
controlled for. However, if Tiebout sorting is uncorrelated with changes in assessed values, our coefficient
will not be biased.
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as “bad controls,” since their effect stems from their correlation with the underlying vari-
ation in the explanatory variable. By taking first differences, all time-consistent variations
across jurisdiction were effectively controlled for. It was chosen not to include controls
in following estimations, given that the likelihood of having bad controls outweighs the
omitted variable bias issue in our opinion.
The weighted specification gave consistent results, with estimates being slightly lower
in magnitude.30 Estimated coefficients shown in columns (5) and (6) were found to be
similarly consistent before and after 2008.31
We now turn to the effect of the tax base on the mill rate, which is shown in the lower
panel. Unsurprisingly, estimates were found of the opposite sign and similar magnitude
as the levy. Both positive and negative shocks were found to be roughly 50% offset by
mileage decrease/increase. Offsetting of negative shocks was a bit smaller on average
(50% for negative shocks versus 40% for positive shocks on average). In different words,
this means a 1% increase in the tax base is associated with a decrease in the mill rate of
about .4%, implying that 40% of the positive shock was offset. 32
Finally, it may be of concern that assessed values are endogenous. An example would
be local policymakers changing rules of assessment, such as reducing the frequency of
re-appraisal and limiting downward changes in assessment of giving local assessors new
instructions on how to assess homes, either formally or informally. While there is no
concrete and systematic evidence that this took place, the previous model was evaluated
using an instrumental variable specification, where the change in tax base (NAV) was
instrumented using the change in home prices. The instrumented results are shown in
column (7) of table 2.5. The estimated coefficients are largely similar, indicating that the
level of endogeneity of assessed value to changes in home prices is potentially not very
large or common.
Testing for non-linear effects
It is possible that policymakers react differently to small and large shocks. For example,
small shocks may be adjusted using other sources of income. For small positive shocks, a
30E.g. a 10% decline in the tax base was associated with a 3.6% decline in revenues, compared to a 4%
decline in our baseline.
31The smaller effect in magnitude of a negative change in NAV may be a reflection of samples and hetero-
geneous responses, given the small number of places experiencing a negative shock in their assessed value
before 2008.
32As policymakers react to assessed values, it is the correct variable to use to understand policy changes.
However, it can also be interesting to look at the correlation between home values and policy outcomes.
The results of regression levy and mill rate on the third lagged difference in the home price index is
shown—similar to table B.4.
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lower degree of rate offsetting may be less salient. Large shocks may force policymakers
to have referendums in states with rate limits. A quadratic polynomial version of equa-
tion 2.2 was estimated for both levy per capita and mill rate as the outcome variable of
interest.33 The predicted outcomes were then plotted based on the change in positive or
negative net assessed values in figure 5. The left-hand side panels display the predicted
values for the linear model, which confirm the symmetric responses with slightly more rate
offsetting for negative shocks. When analyzing the polynomial model, it is seen that there
is very little rate offsetting for negative shocks up to roughly a 30% decline in the tax base,
after which it increases with a steeper slope. The effect of positive shocks is much closer
to the linear model outcome, with the exception of small shocks, which are not offset at all.
These results overall shed light on policy responses as a function of the intensity of
the shock on the tax base. Small negative shocks (less than a 5%–7% change) are offset
almost fully, while small positive shocks are not offset at all. Policymakers seek to smooth
tax revenues as much as possible and potentially take advantage of less salient changes.
The Great Recession and long-differences
Next we turn to the short- and medium-run analysis of how changes in the tax base
affected local tax rates and levies. The same periods as in our earlier tax base analysis
were used, namely 2007–2010, 2007–2012, and 2007–2015. The results are shown in
table 2.6. The first observation is that the average effect of a change of 1% in the tax base
is linked to a .5% change in levy. This result, however, hides important difference between
areas experiencing positive and negative shocks in their tax base. While a positive shock is
strongly correlated with an increase in tax levy, a negative shock has a small and imprecise
effect—for the 2007–2012 difference, β∆>0 = 0.71 and β∆<0 = −0.12.
The mill rate results show that declines in the tax base were offset by a much larger
magnitude: mill rates hikes were found to offset between 70% and 80% of a decline in the
tax base. On the other hand, increases in the tax base were barely offset by a lower mill
rate—between 25% and 30%.
2.4.3 The role of levy and rate limits after 2007
The previous results investigated how changes in assessed values related to changes
in property taxes levied and in mill rates. The majority of states however impose some
33Effectively, the following was estimated: ∆ logLevyt =
∑4
k=1 βk(∆ logNAVt)
k × (∆ logNAVt > 0)k +∑4
j=1 βj(∆ logNAVt)
j × (∆ logNAVt < 0) + εt.
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form of property tax limits, the most common being rate limits and levy limits, followed
by assessment limits. Limits can be formulated in a variety of ways, but their overall aim
is to prevent sudden tax increases. The role of rate and levy limits is focused on here.
Assessment limits typically restrict growth in assessed values, and since the focus was
placed on the period between 2007 and 2012, they are likely to be less binding. In times of
steeply declining assessed values, localities would need to increase mill rates substantially
to offset the change in the tax base and maintain a constant levy. Limits on tax rates are
then more likely to become binding in periods of sustained assessed value decrease and to
limit the capability of localities to avoid a decrease in levy. A “rate limit” dummy variable
was used that takes value 1 for localities in which any type of rate limits hold, and a “levy
limit” dummy variable was used that takes value 1 whenever a locality has an aggregate
levy limit. More details on the limits data are available in the appendix.
The role of rate limits and levy limits during the Great Recession was investigated by
estimating the following model for ∆ logLevyt and for ∆ logMillt:
∆ log Yt = β1∆ logNAV post + β2∆ logNAV negt + γ1∆ logNAV post × Levy Limit
+γ2∆ logNAV negt × Levy Limit+ εt
(2.3)
In table 2.7, it is seen that the presence of levy limits reduces the change in levy after a
positive change in assessed values, so that in jurisdictions with levy limits, a 10% increase
in assessed values is associated with an increase in levy of 6.4%, lower than localities
without limits, for which it is 7%. Notably, levy limits were found to reduce the change
in levy also in the case of declines in assessed values. A 10% decrease is associated with
a 6% lower levy in localities without levy limit and a 3.1% decrease in localities with levy
limits. Even though they are not likely to be binding when the tax base is decreasing, this
observation could be explained by localities with strict levy growth limits being reluctant
to allow large drops in levies. The presence of growth limits would then make the “catch
up” phase in tax revenues more difficult. In column 1, it is observed that in the presence
of a rate limit, a negative change in assessed values is associated with a larger decrease in
tax revenue. This implies that in presence of rate limits, offsetting the change in the tax
base becomes more difficult, and the levy declines more as a result. In case of a positive
change in assessed values instead, the rate limit does not affect the change in levy.
The bottom panel of Table 2.7 analyzes the patterns related to changes in the mill rate.
The presence of rate limits decreases the extent to which localities are able to offset the
impact of a change in assessed values, in particular in the case of negative shocks. If in
localities without any rate limits a 10% decrease in net assessed value is on average asso-
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ciated with a 7.9% increase in mill rate, the presence of limits reduced this effect to 4.4%
on average. The results for aggregate levy limit are consistent with the model with levy
as the dependent variable: in presence of a levy limit, localities tend to offset a negative
change in assessed values more. In columns 3 and 4, the weighted results show a negative
and significant coefficient associated with positive shocks and levy limit interaction. This
is likely driven by few localities experiencing an increase in assessed values between 2007
and 2012, which they offset by a larger decrease in mill rates.
While table 2.7 presented results for one-year differences, Table 2.8 looks at three-,
five-, and eight-year changes. It was found that in the medium run, rate limits do not have
significant effects on the change in levy. Levy limits, on the other hand, have a significant
impact: in column 6, localities with levy limits are associated with smaller increases in
levy in response to positive changes in assessed values. Coefficients on the 3 and 5 years
positive changes and levy limits instead are not significant: this is not surprising, as the
majority of the sample saw a decline in the tax base between 2007–2010 and 2007–2012.
In all three specifications, however, the coefficient on negative changes in tax base and levy
limits is statistically significant. This implies that in the presence of a levy limit, a decrease
in tax base between 2007 and 2010, 2007 and 2012, and 2007 and 2015 was associated
with a small increase in levy. This is consistent with the results found in the previous table,
which suggested that localities with levy limits are more likely to offset changes in the tax
base. This is also visible in the bottom half of the table, which shows that localities with
levy limits are associated with larger offset in mill rates in response to both negative and
positive changes in assessed values. The coefficients on the presence of rate limits instead
are only significant for the short term and not in the medium term. This seems to indicate
that rate limits are binding in the short run, on a yearly basis, but less likely so over longer
periods of time. A potential explanation is the possibility of overrides, through referen-
dums for example, or other changes in property tax collection. In addition, localities that
face stringent limits in some years may “catch up” in years when the limits are not binding.
Non-linear effects: when are rate limits effective?
To shed light on the effect of rate limits on mill rates and tax levy for a given tax base
shock, the four degree polynomial version of equation 2.2 was evaluated separately for
counties with and without a jurisdiction rate limit. As in the previous section, the pre-
dicted values were plotted in levy and local mill rate for a given change in the tax base in
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figure 6.34
Looking at the linear predicted values first, it was observed that counties with a juris-
diction rate limit experienced similar effects, with the magnitude of the mill response being
slightly larger for both positive and negative shocks in areas without limits. Turning to the
polynomial plot, a different picture emerges. For negative shocks below a 40% decline
in the tax base—which is effectively more than 95% of counties for our sample—places
with a rate limit offset the decline in the tax base less. For larger shocks, the reverse was
found to happen. This suggests that when the negative shock is large, even counties with
limit are able to raise the mill rate. For example, a large number of states with rate limits
allow referendums to increase the rate beyond the maximum authorized. On the other
hand, the effect of a positive shock is almost identical for areas with and without limit, an
expected result when limits are least likely to be binding. To read the graph more easily,
the confidence intervals for the polynomial model were not plotted. It is worth noting that
intervals overlap for areas with and without a limit, implying heterogeneity in how binding
limits actually are. As discussed previously, the stringency and details vary widely state to
state, and some limits would be expected to be virtually never binding, while others would
severely restrain the ability of policymakers to adjust tax rates.
2.4.4 Taking stock
We can now take stock of our analysis on how the decline in home prices between 2007
and 2012 affected the tax base and how policymakers responded to positive and negative
shocks to provide answers to some broad questions in the literature. First, upon observing
a decline in property tax revenue, we can weigh in on how much of the change can be
attributed to a change in the tax base and how much can be attributed to a change in
policy.35 Second, an estimate of the short- and medium-run correlation between home
prices and local property tax policy ca be provided. These questions are intimately related
to the previous discussion focusing on the policy response to a change in the tax base.
Here, one step is taken backward, and the findings are used to shed light on the mechanism
between home prices and the outcomes of interest.
Looking at table 2.9, the first observation is that outcomes are very similar both shortly
after the great recession (2007–2010) and in the medium run (2007–2015). In a nutshell,
34This exercise was also carried out with all rate limits. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar and available upon request.
35Where the change attributed to the tax base can be larger than 1% and the change in policy negative,
effectively offsetting the negative shock.
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the change in home prices had very little explanatory power on revenue per capita, with
an effect close to zero (β07−15 = −0.05 with s.d. = 0.10). This result is mostly driven by
negative shocks (which make up a vast majority of counties for all time periods). The few
areas with positive changes in home values actually increased their revenues per capita
substantially, whereby a 1% increase in the home price index was associated with an in-
crease in levy of 1.6%. That result should however be understood with a grain of salt, as
it is driven by a small number of counties. Very few places experienced positive changes
in property values, and these increases were small. Perhaps jurisdictions with more stable
home prices shifted to higher reliance on property taxes, especially if they faced declining
revenues from other sources. These are important questions for future research.
Turning to the results on mill rate at the bottom of table 2.9, we see that negative shocks
were offset by an increase in the mill rate: a 10% decline in the home price index led to a
1.2% increase between 2007 and 2010 and a 3% increase between 2007 and 2015. These
numbers highlight the importance of having data on assessed values. One could wrongly
conclude that policymakers only partially offset decline in home values. However, table
2.4 highlights that between 2007 and 2015 the correlation between home prices and the
tax base was only 0.2 on average. This implies that the mill rate response to the change
in the home price index fully offsets the decline in the tax base and more, which explains
why levies have not decreased.
2.4.5 The road to recovery
Figure 7 plots the share of counties with values of HPI, NAV, levy, and mill rate higher
than in 2007. It can be observed that while the property values remained lower than 2007
through 2016 for the large majority of localities, assessed values remained at 2007 values
or higher in about 50% of localities. The majority of localities were able to retain levels of
levy per capita to the 2007 level or higher; however, a fraction (around 30%) of localities
had not recovered the same level of levy per capita in 2016. When looking at the un-
weighted plots in figure 8, one can notice that in localities with rate limits in the medium
run, the mill rate was at the 2007 level in a lower share of localities; similarly, the levy
2007 level was recovered in a lower share of localities. Figure 9 instead analyzes the share
of counties with higher outcomes compared to 2007 by levy limit sub-sample. Overall, in
both weighted and unweighted plots, a lower share of counties without levy limits seemed
to recover 2007-level levy than counties with levy limits. While the trajectory regarding
mill rate levels is similar, this may hide heterogeneity in how much localities increase the
mill rate, as the plot in figure 9 only takes into consideration whether the rate is at the
level of 2007 or higher. In Table 2.7 though, it was found that localities with levy limits
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tend to offset changes in NAV more than localities with no levy limits. Thus, the levy limits
results in figure 9 could be driven by the inframarginal effect of some localities with levy
limits increasing mill rates more than localities without levy limits.
A probit model was also evaluated to study how the presence of rate limits may affect
the ability of localities to recover the level of levy per capita they had in 2007 before the
Great Recession. 36 The margins were plotted from the unweighted regressions in Figure
10, and it was found in Panel a that the presence of a mill rate does not have a statistically
significant impact on the probability that the rate in t is greater than the 2007 rate. In
Panel b, the average effect of a mill rate limit on the probability that a locality recovers
the level of levy per capita available in 2007 was plotted. It was found that the effect was
negative and significant for some years, with the probability that the levy per capita was
recovered lower by between 14 and 19 percentage points between 2012 and 2016 for lo-
calities with rate limits. Finally, the marginal effect of changes in net assessed values on the
probability that levy recovers to the 2007 levels was plotted in Panel c, and the marginal
effect of changes in property values on the probability that assessed values recover the
2007 levels was plotted in Panel d.37. In Panel c, a one percentage point increase in NAV
per capita between 2008 and 2007 increases the probability that levy per capita is higher
in 2008 than in 2007 by almost three percentage points. The effect of an increase in NAV
on the recovery of levy was found to remain positive and significant through 2016, albeit
with a lower margin coefficient of around 0.01. In Panel d, the effect of a one percentage
point increase in HPI between 2008 and 2007 on the probability that the per capita net
assessed value in 2008 was higher than in 2007 is not statistically significant and close
to zero. The margin coefficient was found to steadily increase between 2008 and 2011
and hovers around 0.01. Thus, for years between 2011 and 2016, a one percentage point
increase in HPI is associated with a one percentage point increase in the probability that
the net assessed values per capita recovered or surpassed the 2007 levels.
36Specifically, the following estimations were run for t ∈ [2008− 2015]:
1(Mill Ratet > Mill Rate2007) = β1∆t−2007 logNAV per capita+ β2Rate Limit+ εt
1(Levy per capitat > Levy per capita2007) = β1∆t−2007 logNAV per capita+ β2Rate Limit+ εt
1(Levy per capitat > Levy per capita2007) = β1∆t−2007 logNAV per capita+ εt
1(NAV per capitat > NAV per capita2007) = β1∆t−2007 logHPI + εt
37Results for Panels c and d refer to percentage point changes in NAV and HPI
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper sought to shed some light on what happened to property taxes during and
after the Great Recession. As home prices plummeted throughout the United States, many
economists and policymakers wondered how that would impact property taxes, one of the
largest sources of local revenues. Some worried that fiscal crisis would be commonplace
in many areas of the country. Undoubtedly, several state and local governments faced
hardships in the years following the recession, yet the most dire predictions did not mate-
rialize. Leveraging a newly collected dataset on local assessed values, property tax levies,
and local tax rates between 2000 and 2016, some new answers were provided in this paper.
First, local assessed values, i.e. the tax base, was on average not affected until a few
years after the initial decline in home prices. Even by 2015, a 10% decline in average
home values from 2007 led to a decline in assessed values of only about 2%. One possible
explanation is the difference between when values are determined for the tax base, the
time they are levied and collected, as well as infrequent reassessments. Future research
could shed light on other factors, such as the role of jurisdiction specific assessment rules,
the role of county assessors, changes in assessment rules before and after the crisis, as well
as the effect of assessment limits. Identifying what features of local property tax systems
yield more or less stable assessed values would be of importance for tax policy understand-
ing.
Second, it was shown that policymakers react strongly to changes in assessed values.
Both increases and decreases in the tax base are offset by adjusting the millage rate. It was
found that yearly changes in the tax rate are about symmetrical—i.e., the policy response
to positive and negative shocks is similar and indicates that policymakers seek to avoid
abrupt changes in local property tax revenues. However, the length and severity of the
decline in property values between 2007 and 2012 implied that shortly after the recession,
and up to 2015, the compounded millage offset for negative shocks was large. Between
2007 and 2015, a 10% decline in the tax base led to an increase in the mill rate of 8%,
an almost complete offsetting, which contrasts with positive changes. Over the same time
period, a 10% rise in the tax base led to a decline in the rate of about 3% and an increase
in revenues of 7%. Again, this suggests that policymakers seek to avoid decline in tax
revenues across many years but take advantage of increases in the medium run. Com-
paring weighted and unweighted results, qualitatively similar responses were found, but
of slightly different magnitudes. While our estimates were typically estimated with high
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precision, this also suggests that local responses to shocks are quite heterogeneous. More
research is needed to understand what drives different policy responses, such as the role
of local property tax features, reliance on local taxes, or local preferences.
Third, and regarding the last point, one of the most (in)famous features of local prop-
erty tax systems was analyzed: levy and rate limits. Rate limits may restrain policymakers
in their ability to offset declines in the tax base, while levy limits may create incentives
to avoid temporary declines in tax revenues, as limits on levies’ growth would make it
more difficult to make up for current losses in future periods or forbid the use of property
revenues to compensate for changes in other sources of income.
It was found that areas with property tax rate limits offset yearly shocks in their tax
base less, which implies a larger decline in revenue. While still having a reducing millage
offsetting effect, rate limits seem to be less important in the short run. This is consistent
with some areas being restrained some years, while in years where the limit is not binding,
policymakers are able to “catch up.”. Levy limits were found to reduce the rise in tax levy
in years where the tax base increases, consistent with theoretical predictions. Levy limits
also reduce the effect of negative shocks on tax revenues and are associated with higher
offsetting. A potential explanation is that policymakers seek to smooth out negative shocks
and avoid larger declines, which are likely to stick longer. Overall, it was shown that tax
limits are associated with considerably different responses to shocks in that tax base, and
we believe more research is warranted to hone down on the exact mechanism through
which they work.
To summarize, the current research exploited newly collected data on assessed values
and millage rates to disentangle the role of policy and the effect of the tax base when eval-
uating how property values affect property tax revenues. It was shown that policymakers
respond to both positive and negative shocks. The combination of a stable tax base and
increases in tax rates explains why property tax collections remained stable after the Great
Recession. Rate limits seem to restrain millage increases following negative shocks. Both
the tax base, policy responses, and the effect of limits were found display a lot of variation
across jurisdictions. A lot of interesting questions remain, such as how the shock affected
reliance on and local preferences toward property taxes, how shocks in other local sources




Table 2.1: Data collected: summary
Mill rate Assessed values Tax levy Years available Aggregated
Alabama X X X 2000-2017 Both
Alaska No data
Arizona X X X 1999-2017
Arkansas X X X 2005-2018 Both
California X X X 1998-2016
Colorado X X X 2001-2018
Connecticut X X X 1991-2017 X
Delaware X X X 1996-2015 X
Florida X X X 1999-2019 Both
Georgia X X X 1994-2019
Hawaii No data
Idaho X 2001-2017
Illinois X X X 1990-2018
Indiana X 1998-2016 X
Iowa X X X 1999-2016 Both
Kansas X X X 1987-2018
Kentucky X X 1999-2018 X
Louisiana X X X 2002-2017
Maine X X X 2001-2016
Maryland X 2002-2016 X
Massachusetts X X X 1981-2017
Michigan X X X 2004-2016
Minnesota X X X 2000-2017
Mississippi X X X∗∗ 1995-2019
Missouri X X X 2000-2019 Both
Montana X X X 1998-2015
Nebraska X X X 1997-2020
Nevada X X X 2000-2017
New Hampshire X X X 2001-2017 Both
New Jersey X X X 1997-2017 X
New Mexico X X X 2003-2020
New York X X X 2002-2018 Both
North Carolina X 1991-2017 X
North Dakota X X X 1997-2017
Ohio X X X 1990-2019
Oklahoma No data
Oregon X X X 2001-2016
Pennsylvania X 1988-2018 X
Rhode Island X 2000-2017 X
South Carolina No data
South Dakota No data
Tennessee X X X 2000-2017
Texas X X X 1999-2017
Utah X X X 2000-2019
Vermont X X X 2004-2016∗ Both
Virginia X X X 1991-2017 X
Washington X X X 2001-2019
West Virginia X 2003-2017 X
Wisconsin X X X 1989-2018
Wyoming X X X 1998-2016 X
Our baseline mill rate is computed as the total tax levy divided by the taxable assessed value × 1000. The column Aggregated
indicates whether the data was collected at the county level or for at the taxing district level, and then aggregated for all counties.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: %∆ by periods: HPI, tax levy, assessed values, mill rate
Yearly statistics
∆ Yearly - 2000-2016 Mean Median p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI 0.47 0.39 -2.43 3.13 5.45 29,247
%∆ NAV per capita 1.60 0.33 -1.98 3.74 7.83 38,385
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 2.28 1.50 -1.08 4.80 8.20 38,385
%∆ Mill rate 0.92 0.22 -1.45 3.04 8.22 38,385
∆ Yearly - 2000-2007 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI 2.77 1.88 -0.02 4.58 4.86 12,414
%∆ NAV per capita 2.73 1.27 -1.47 5.08 7.97 16,405
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 3.08 2.45 -0.37 5.65 7.45 16,405
%∆ Mill rate 0.75 0.24 -1.82 3.30 7.73 16,405
∆ Yearly - 2008-2015 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -1.99 -1.89 -4.59 0.73 5.11 13,927
%∆ NAV per capita 0.81 -0.28 -2.43 2.83 8.02 18,137
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 1.91 0.94 -1.50 4.24 8.85 18,137
%∆ Mill rate 1.21 0.28 -1.12 3.05 8.78 18,137
Long differences
∆2007− 2010 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -11.74 -9.49 -16.60 -4.59 10.72 1,776
%∆ NAV per capita 3.98 1.64 -5.09 10.67 16.85 2,230
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 6.47 5.68 -0.53 12.37 13.22 2,230
%∆ Mill rate 3.19 1.60 -2.35 8.49 11.91 2,230
∆2007− 2012 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -17.95 -16.29 -25.78 -8.97 13.41 1,768
%∆ NAV per capita 3.53 0.35 -9.53 12.59 21.86 2,243
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 8.81 6.99 -1.47 16.89 18.14 2,243
%∆ Mill rate 6.60 3.43 -2.25 13.76 16.39 2,243
∆2007− 2015 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd count
%∆ HPI -14.89 -15.93 -23.84 -7.36 13.46 1,767
%∆ NAV per capita 8.95 1.44 -12.26 17.35 36.83 2,182
%∆ Property tax levy per capita 14.45 10.33 -1.40 24.84 26.22 2,182
%∆ Mill rate 8.26 4.96 -2.05 17.95 22.38 2,182
HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. NAV refers to Net
Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes. Lvy per capita is
the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county level. Mill rate is the millage
rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base.
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Table 2.3: The tax base: Home price index and assessed values 2000-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. variable Log NAVt ∆ Log NAVt
All years All years y < 2008 ≥ 2008
logHPIt 0.10c 0.17c
(0.00) (0.00)
∆ logHPIt 0.28c 0.10c 0.02 0.10c 0.11c 0.06c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
∆ logHPIt−1 0.21c 0.24c 0.21c 0.30c 0.13c
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
∆ logHPIt−2 0.18c 0.21c 0.18c 0.27c 0.16c
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
∆ logHPIt−3 0.13c 0.13c 0.11c 0.22c 0.09c












Sample All All All All All Balanced All All All
R2 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.34 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.08
Observations 29,735 29,735 29,730 29,352 29,352 27,641 21,611 12,584 16,768
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial corre-
lation. All variables are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the reference year.
HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency. NAV refers to
Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property taxes. Zillow referes
to the median typical home sold. Weights are based on the average national share in the county population
between 2000 and 2010. Demographic controls include the share of white, black, college-educated, and ur-
ban residents, as well as the share of 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59 years old in a county. Income controls
include the county log personal income per capita, log employment, log wage income, and unemployment
rate. Fraction includes the share of county revenues from own source, from property taxes, from other taxes,
and from transfers. The balanced sample refers to counties which are observed every single year between
2000 and 2016.
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Table 2.4: The tax base: long differences
Unweighted results
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAVt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI 0.03 0.18b 0.22b
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09)
∆ logHPI > 0 0.02 0.16 0.42
(0.42) (0.21) (0.58)
|∆ logHPI < 0| -0.03 -0.18b -0.21b
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05
Observations 1,839 1,839 1,825 1,825 1,826 1,826
Weighted results
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAVt (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI 0.17 0.36c 0.44c
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
∆ logHPI > 0 -0.07 -0.11 -1.47b
(0.58) (0.31) (0.59)
|∆ logHPI < 0| -0.17 -0.36c -0.48c
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15)
R2 0.13 0.13 0.41 0.41 0.27 0.36
Observations 1,839 1,839 1,825 1,825 1,826 1,826
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial corre-
lation. All variables are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000 as the reference year.
Assessed values are computed per capita. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal
Housing Finance Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad
valorem property taxes. Weights are based on the average national share in the county population between
2000 and 2010.
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Table 2.5: The policy effect: the tax base and property tax revenues
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per cap (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years 2000-2016 y < 2008 ≥ 2008 All - IV
∆ logNAVt 0.52c 0.56c
(0.01) (0.03)
∆ log NAVt > 0 0.56c 0.43c 0.56c 0.53c 0.59c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
|∆ log NAVt < 0| -0.40c -0.56c -0.36c -0.20c -0.47c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
Dem controls X X
Income controls X X
Local finance controls X X
Pop. Weighted X
R2 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.34 0.26 0.26
Observations 36,598 36,598 36,583 36,583 16,395 20,203 27,920
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years 2000-2016 y < 2008 ≥ 2008 All - IV
∆ logNAVt -0.43c -0.44c
(0.01) (0.03)
∆ logNAVt > 0 -0.40c -0.53c -0.42c -0.44c -0.37c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| 0.51c 0.35c 0.62c 0.78c 0.41c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
Dem controls X X
Income controls X X
Local finance controls X X
Pop. Weighted X
R2 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.34 0.25 0.14
Observations 36,598 36,598 36,583 36,583 16,395 20,203 27,920
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000
as the reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property
taxes. Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county
level. Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are
based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010. Demographic con-
trols include the share of white, black, college-educated, and urban residents, as well as the share of 20-29,
30-39, 40-49, and 50-59 years old in a county. Income controls include the county log personal income per
capita, log employment, log wage income, and unemployment rate. Fraction includes the share of county
revenues from own source, from property taxes, from other taxes, and from transfers.
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Table 2.6: The Great Recession: disentangling the tax base and policy effect
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV 0.47c 0.47c 0.52c
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
∆ logNAV > 0 0.60c 0.71c 0.68c
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.14 -0.12 -0.11
(0.20) (0.17) (0.24)
R2 0.28 0.34 0.27 0.37 0.31 0.39
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV -0.43c -0.47c -0.44c
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.32c -0.24c -0.29c
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.68c 0.82c 0.82c
(0.23) (0.18) (0.25)
R2 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.34
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000
as the reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property
taxes. Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county
level. Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are
based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.
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Table 2.7: The Great Recession: The role of rate and levy limits 2007-2012 (any rate limit
- aggregate levy limit)
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Yearly ∆ for years 2007-2012
∆ logNAVt > 0 0.65c 0.70c 0.50c 0.80c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| -0.20c -0.60c -0.16c -0.72c
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
∆ logNAVt > 0× rate limit 0.00 0.10
(0.03) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × rate limit -0.31c -0.33c
(0.03) (0.06)
∆ logNAVt > 0× agg. levy limit -0.06b -0.36c
(0.03) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × agg. levy limit 0.29c 0.48c
(0.03) (0.05)
Pop. Weighted X X
R2 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.46
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,877 12,877
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7 – Continued from previous page
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Yearly ∆ for years 2007-2012
∆ logNAVt > 0 -0.33c -0.30c -0.49c -0.20c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| 0.79c 0.37c 0.83c 0.24c
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
∆ logNAVt > 0× rate limit 0.06b 0.14b
(0.03) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × rate limit -0.35c -0.35c
(0.03) (0.07)
∆ logNAVt > 0× agg. levy limit 0.02 -0.29c
(0.02) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × agg. levy limit 0.27c 0.53c
(0.03) (0.05)
Pop. Weighted X X
R2 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.41
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,877 12,877
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000
as the reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property
taxes. Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county
level. Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights
are based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010. Rate limit equals
1 when a state has some type of rate limit as defined in the text and table B.2 in the appendix. Aggregate
levy limit equals 1 when a state has a levy limit on the change in total revenues for counties, cities and other
jurisdictions such as school districts.
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Table 2.8: The Great Recession: the role of limits - long differences
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 0.55c 0.61c 0.72c 0.71c 0.72c 0.94c
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.05)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.16a -0.57c 0.01 -0.51c 0.23c -0.63c
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.09 -0.02 -0.06
(0.13) (0.16) (0.21)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim 0.03 -0.16 -0.39
(0.27) (0.24) (0.28)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim -0.01 -0.01 -0.28c
(0.14) (0.15) (0.10)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.81c 0.67c 0.89c
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
r2 0.34 0.40 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.46
N 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Continued on next page
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Table 2.8 – Continued from previous page
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.47c -0.40c -0.28b -0.28b -0.27 -0.06
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.19) (0.05)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.79c 0.35c 0.99c 0.46c 1.16c 0.32c
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) (0.10)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.23b 0.06 -0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.20)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim -0.13 -0.21 -0.39
(0.30) (0.25) (0.30)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim 0.11 0.06 -0.24b
(0.12) (0.12) (0.09)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.62a 0.64b 0.85c
(0.35) (0.25) (0.26)
r2 0.26 0.29 0.38 0.42 0.34 0.41
N 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000
as the reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property
taxes. Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county
level. Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights
are based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010. Rate limit equals
1 when a state has some type of rate limit as defined in the text and table B.2 in the appendix. Aggregate
levy limit equals 1 when a state has a levy limit on the change in total revenues for counties, cities and other
jurisdictions such as school districts.
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Table 2.9: Tax base versus policy effect: taking stock
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.12 -0.05 -0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
∆ log HPI > 0 1.25c 1.24c 1.59c
(0.28) (0.43) (0.22)
|∆ log HPI < 0| 0.12 0.06 0.10
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11)
R2 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.12
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ log HPI -0.11b -0.21c -0.29c
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
∆ logHPI > 0 0.13 0.00 0.11
(0.97) (0.76) (1.05)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.12b 0.22c 0.31c
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
R2 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Observations 1,685 1,685 1,712 1,712 1,685 1,685
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000
as the reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property
taxes. Log levy per capita ita is the total ad valorem property tax revenue from all jurisdictions at the county
level. Log mill rate is the log of the millage rate, defined as the tax levy divided by the tax base. Weights are
based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate
(a) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - full sample
(b) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - areas with HPI available
Top figure plots the county unweighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2002. The bottom figures plots the unweighted US average change of the four denominated variables
only using counties for which the home price index is available.
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Figure 2.2: Median and inter-quartile range of yearly changes 2000-2016
(a) % Change in housing prices (b) % Change in assessed value
(c) % Change in mill rate (d) % Change in property tax levy
Our baseline mill rate is computed as the total tax levy divided by the taxable assessed value × 1000. The
column ”Mill avg.” indicates whether the mill rate was computed by finding an average of the mill rate for
multiple jurisdictions in the county. When both are available, we use the baseline mill rate. The column
Aggregated indicates whether the data was collected at the county level or for at the taxing district level,
and then aggregated for all counties.
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Figure 2.3: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate - subsamples
(a) Counties with some rate limits (b) Counties without some rate limits
(c) Counties with some levy limits (d) Counties without some levy limits
This top figure plots the county unweighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2003, by whether counties are in a state with or without any rate limit, or with/without any aggregate
levy limit. Refer to tables and text for exact definition of rate and aggregate levy limits.
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Figure 2.4: States with aggregate levy limit, and jurisdiction rate limit
The map depicts which states have some rate limit, some levy limit or both. A rate limit here is defined as
either limitation on the maximum rate applied to specific property as a percentage of market or assessed
value, or limits on the mill rate chosen by local jurisdictions.
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Figure 2.5: Testing for non linear effects - Full sample
(a) Log mill rate - Linear model (b) Log mill rate - Polynomial 4 model
(c) Log levy per capita ita - Linear model (d) Log levy per capita ita - Polynomial 4 model
These figures plot the predicted value from the linear and four polynomial regression of the change in levy
on assessed value: ∆ logLevyt =
∑4
k=1 βk(∆ logNAVt)




(∆ logNAVt < 0) + εt. The top figures look at change in mill rate as the outcome, while the bottom figures
look at the change in levy per capital.
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Figure 2.6: Testing for non linear effects - By rate limit
(a) Log mill - Lin. model by rate limit (b) Log mill - Poly 4 model by rate limit
(c) Log levy per capita - Lin. model by rate limit (d) Log levy per capita - Poly 4 model by rate limit
These figures plot the predicted value from the linear and four polynomial regression of the change in levy
on assessed value: ∆ logLevyt =
∑4
k=1 βk(∆ logNAVt)




(∆ logNAVt < 0) + εt. The top figures look at change in mill rate as the outcome, while the bottom figures
look at the change in levy per capital.
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Figure 2.7: Recovery: share of counties with higher values compared to 2007
(a) U.S. unweighted average change
(b) U.S. population unweighted average change
These figures plot fraction of counties with higher HPI, NAV, levy, and mill rate, compared to 2007. The
bottom panel weighs results by average county population in our sample period. All values are calculated
per capita and adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 2.8: Share of counties with higher outcomes compared to 2007 - by jurisdiction
rate limit
(a) Counties w/ some rate limit - Unweighted (b) Counties w/o some rate limit - Unweighted
(c) Counties w/ some rate limit - Pop Weighted (d) Counties w/o some rate limit - Pop Weighted
These figures plot fraction of counties with higher HPI, NAV, levy, and mill rate, compared to 2007 in states
with and without some rate limit in the top panel. The bottom panel weighs results by average county
population in our sample period. All values are calculated per capita and adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 2.9: Share of counties with higher outcomes compared to 2007 - by levy limit
(a) Counties w/ some levy limit - Unweighted (b) Counties w/o some levy limit - Unweighted
(c) Counties w/ some levy limit - Pop Weighted (d) Counties w/o some levy limit - Pop Weighted
These figures plot fraction of counties with higher HPI, NAV, levy, and mill rate, compared to 2007 in states
with and without some levy limit in the top panel. The bottom panel weighs results by average county
population in our sample period. All values are calculated per capita and adjusted for inflation.
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Figure 2.10: Likelihood of recovery - 2007-2016
(a) Probit - mill ratet > mill rate2007
(b) Probit - levy per capitat >
levy per capitat2007
(c) Probit - levy per capitat >
levy per capitat2007
(d) Probit - nav per capitat >
nav per capitat2007
The tables plot the average marginal effects from yearly probit regressions. In Panels a and b we control for
the log change in net assessed values between t and 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Results for panels c and d refer to percentage point changes in NAV and HPI.
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CHAPTER III
Robotization, Structural Shocks, and Local Public Finance
Abstract
How did exposure to robotization impact local revenues and public goods provision? In
this paper, it is shown that exposure to robots leads to a decline in total revenues, driven by
a large fall in tax revenues, specifically property taxes. Spending was found to be similarly
affected, with expenditures on transport, capital outlays, and insurance and trust being
primarily hit. The role of local autonomy, as defined by areas with functional home rule,
as well as the role of property tax limits were investigated. It was found that the decline in
taxes was less pronounced in areas with higher autonomy and more pronounced in areas
with strict property tax limits. Using a dataset on local property tax rates, it is shown
that robotization leads to an increase in the average rate, driven largely by high autonomy
areas. It is shown that these results are consistent with a model of optimal local policy,
which depends on transfers and local income. Further, the importance of accounting for
policy changes when investigating outcomes that are highly policy dependent with shift-
share instruments is highlighted.
JEL Codes: JEL Codes: H41, H71, H72, H77, R51
Keywords: Structural Shocks, Robotization, Local Public Goods, Local Taxation
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3.1 Introduction and motivation
Increased globalization and rapid technological changes have had a profound influence
in reshaping local labor markets in the past 30 years. In this paper, the effect of exposure
to robotization is analyzed, and its impact on local governments, specifically on revenues,
as well as expenditures and public goods provision is evaluated.1 Additionally, new data
on local property tax policy were used to ascertain whether exposure to robotization led
to changes in property tax rates.
While there is growing evidence on the impact of structural shocks on local labor mar-
ket outcomes, little is known on how they affect the provision of local public goods as well
as the structure of local revenues. One could typically associate robotization with growth,
technological development, as well as wealth creation. Picture high-technology machin-
ery, and you will likely imagine wealthy and fast-growing areas such as Silicon Valley. This
would lead to expectations that robots lead to higher tax revenues. However, not everyone
gains from robotization. Although there can be obvious complementarity between cer-
tain jobs and new technologies, robotization and automation have also historically been
used as labor substitutes. Recent work by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) documents the
profound impact that automation has had on local labor markets since 1990, with an ad-
ditional robot leading to lower wages (0.25%–0.5%) and lower employment to population
ratio (0.18–0.34 percentage points). These effects are qualitatively comparable to another
major recent structural shock, namely the import competition from China.2
The decline in wages and overall employment may have had important consequences
for local revenues and expenditures. The most important sources of revenues for local
governments besides transfers is property taxes, while sales taxes can be large in certain
areas. A lower demand for housing, resulting in lower relative property values, and re-
duced consumption implies potentially large downfalls in revenues. Ultimately, the null
hypothesis of the effect of robotization on local public finance need not necessarily be zero
and could be positive or negative. The net effect on public finance will depend on how
many areas and workers benefit from robots as well as where the gains and the losses are
located.
Local policymakers were expected to respond as well, which could exacerbate or lessen
the impact of a shock. For example, they could decide to shift the burden of tax from
1Given the importance of Chinese import competition as a structural shock on labor markets, this shock
is discussed as well.
2The seminal work by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a) provides the theoretical and empirical founda-
tions on the effect of Chinese import penetration on wages and employment.
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workers hit by shocks to those who were not or those who even benefited from it. Second,
changes in the provision of public goods such as education or public safety may have long-
lasting and important effects on human capital development and well-being in regions
most affected by the shock. Adding another layer of complexity, the ability to choose the
level of taxation and spending locally varies greatly. As such, the focus was placed on the
role of local constraints and autonomy. The role of local government’s autonomy, especially
their dynamic effects, is of growing importance, and it was aimed to shed some light on
important mechanisms affecting local public finance.
As most state and local governments face weak to extremely strict balanced budget
constraints, as well as tax and expenditure limits, policymakers must be expected to re-
spond to shocks on local labor markets to the extent revenues and/or expenditures are
affected. However, it is also unclear what the optimal response is. Local preferences to-
ward public goods provision and taxation will dictate the optimal local response in terms
of revenue and spending adjustments. The local policy response function is unlikely to be
linear and will depend on several factors. For example, optimal local taxation and spend-
ing is highly influenced by the amount of transfers received by localities. The level of local
tax competition may also influence the optimal response. Structural shocks could poten-
tially increase the degree of local tax competition. Theoretically, a shock on local income
will also affect the relative marginal benefit of providing public goods. In this paper, a
simple model of two-layered government was derived to predict the local response and
test these predictions.
Robotization and automation are likely to keep increasing and can have a potentially
important impact in the future on labor market and local public finance. The results of this
paper would also guide our understanding of the future penetration of machines and in-
creased use of industrial robots. Beyond the effect of robotization on local public finance,
this work could also help shed additional light on structural shocks more generally and
their effect on local public goods provision and taxation.
Turning to the empirical side, structural shocks are typically computed as shift-share
instruments. Since Bartik (1991), shift-share instruments have been used in a wide vari-
ety of contexts, from immigration to international trade. The wide applicability from the
design of the instrument and its intuitive concept has gained traction among economists.
The main idea behind shift-share instruments relies on computing local shares of industry
and interacting them with the ”shock,” a national or global change in a variable of inter-
est (e.g., the change in imports from China in an industry, or the change in immigrants).
Conceptually, the local shock captures the exposure of the locality to global trends. To al-
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leviate concerns about the shares capturing anticipation effects to the shocks, researchers
typically use historical data. Incidentally, the national shock may be endogenous to local
changes. A recent work, however, points out that the shares themselves should be seen as
the instrument. Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2018) showed that the IV coeffi-
cient capturing the average treatment effect of the shock can be thought of as a weighted
average, where the weights are represented by the shares and capture the relative expo-
sure of an area. They argued that researchers should think of the exclusion restriction with
respect to the shares themselves, not only with respect to the shock. They proposed several
tests that researchers can use to determine whether the outcome variable of interest may
be endogenous with respect to the shares.
In this paper, some of the methods discussed in the recent literature were used to alle-
viate the concerns about the shares’ endogeneity. Additionally, it is shown that when the
outcome is affected by policy choices, the coefficient of interest captures both the direct
”mechanical” effects of the shocks as well the ”indirect” policy effects. The intuition is sim-
ilar to an omitted variable bias although to the extent that the policy responses are caused
by the shock; the coefficient can still be interpreted as causal. However, a potential bias
exists when dealing with multi-period estimations. Intuitively, since shocks are correlated
over time by design, and assuming policymakers react to contemporaneous shocks, the
policy effect at time t will be correlated with the shocks in all previous periods leading to
a bias.
The paper most closely related to the current work is by Feler and Senses (2017), who
evaluated the effect of exposure to Chinese import competition on local business activity,
local revenues and spending, and other local outcomes such as crime or pupil per teacher.
They found a strong and negative impact of increased import competition and identified
lower property values, which led to lower revenues and expenditures, as the main factor.
More generally, the current work is viewed as part of the literature that evaluates local gov-
ernments’ response to economic shocks. Cromwell and Ihlanfeldt (2015) evaluated how
cities and counties in Florida react to lower intergovernmental transfers as well as lower
property tax revenues. They found that local governments increase mileage rates and cut
capital spending and expenditures, especially on nonessential services. Shoag, Tuttle and
Veuger (2019) used national bankruptcies of big-box retail chains to study abrupt exoge-
nous declines in local sales tax revenues. Their results indicated lower spending on safety
and administrative services. In addition, they found that the decline was more pronounced
in areas with low fiscal autonomy.
Local governments’ response also varies according to the degree of local autonomy.
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Cities in home rule states raise taxes or issue bonds and have a swifter reaction. Using
death penalty trials as exogenous shocks on a county’s budget, Baicker (2004) showed
that these costs are financed by increases in local taxes as well as decreases in police and
capital spending. She also found significant inter-jurisdictional spillovers. At the state
level, the seminal work by Poterba (1994a) evaluated the importance of fiscal institutions
as well as tax and expenditure limitations. He found that for states, higher restraint rules
were correlated with faster fiscal adjustment in the late 1980s and that political factors
play an important role as well: full party control leads to a slower adjustment, while
spending cuts and tax hikes are much smaller during gubernatorial election years.
To summarize, the current paper’s contribution is the following. First, we believe we
are the first to document the effect of increased exposure to robotization on local public fi-
nance outcomes. It is shown that robots had a negative impact on revenues and spending.3
Second, the importance of local fiscal autonomy, as well as property tax limits, for local
policymakers to adjust following structural shocks is demonstrated. Finally, it is shown that
shift-share instruments will lead to a bias in multi-period estimations when the outcome
variable of interest is highly policy dependent. The potential size of the bias is explored in
different circumstances, and certain evidence is presented in the current context.
In the next section, information is provided on both shocks and our data, and the esti-
mation strategy is derived. Section 3 discusses the channels of transmission for the shocks,
presents the baseline results for the entire sample and by level of local fiscal autonomy.
The role of local policy is discussed more specifically in section 4. A simple model is pre-
sented to predict how local governments set optimal local taxes to predict their potential
reaction to the shocks and show estimates on the effect of the shocks on local tax policy.
Then, it is shown how shift-share instruments are potentially biased. In section 5, some
robustness checks are conducted, and the results are discussed. The last section concludes
the paper.
3.2 Estimation strategy
First, the structural shocks used in the estimation strategy is described. The rest of
this section describes how the shocks were computed. Then a description of the data is
presented.
3It is shown that the impact of robots on local revenues and expenditures is distinct and larger than the
exposure to Chinese imports.
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3.2.1 Exposure to robotization
Exposure to rising import competition is a local industry-weighted sum of exposure
to national changes in imports. The current measure of exposure to robotization follows
the recent work by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017). Robots are capital equipment that
do not require human operation and are designed to perform manual tasks and automate
production.4 It is similar to the “China shock” in spirit but also includes an adjustment for
industries’ growth rates. One concern is that robot-heavy industries may also be growing
at higher rates compared to other industries. The shock aimed to capture the increase use
of robots within industries, rather than the rise in robotization originating from the growth







where APR represents the adjusted penetration of robots in industry j − ∆Rjt
Lijt−1
− gjt RjtLjt−1 .
As pointed out by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), one may worry about shocks in local
labor demand driving the adoption of robots. Second, the adoption of robots by firms in
one area may affect the decision by other firms in the same area to invest in robotization.














where ÂPRjt is the average change in robot exposure in five European countries. Because
industry-level data on the use of robots is only available in the United States starting
from 2004, only the reduced-form estimation could be used when performing the multi-
period analysis. To circumvent this issue, a “long” form model between 1993 and 2007
was estimated using the use of robotization in the United States and robot penetration
in Europe as an instrument. A map of relative exposure by commuting zone is shown in
figure 3.1.
4From Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017): “The International Federation of Robotics—IFR for short—defines
an industrial robot as ‘an automatically controlled, reprogrammable, and multipurpose machine’ (IFR, 2014).
That is, industrial robots are fully autonomous machines that do not need a human operator and that can be
programmed to perform several manual tasks such as welding, painting, assembling, handling materials, or
packaging. Textile looms, elevators, cranes, transportation bands or coffee makers are not industrial robots




In the baseline framework to evaluate how structural shocks affect local governmental
outcomes, constant observable local characteristics that may be correlated with both the
outcome of interest and with the instrument were taken into account. The following first-
difference model was estimated:
∆Yct = αt + β1∆Ŝhockct +X
′
itΓ + θt + λs + εct (3.3)
where X ′itΓ includes baseline differences between commuting zones at the beginning of
the period.5 Additionally, because local demographic characteristics may be correlated
with the amount and type of revenues, and local public good provision, the demographic
share of different age and race groups was included.6 As discussed earlier, the basic frame-
work is a two-period stacked first difference model. Given that the “robots” shock could
only be computed after 2004 in the United States, only the reduced form estimation was
performed with the stacked model. A time fixed effect that captures differential trends at
the national level between the two periods was included, and to follow ADH, the baseline
regression was estimated using divisions fixed effects that capture differential trends at the
division level.7 10-year equivalent changes were used, such that the shocks’ data matched
the other data we had8 In some of our specifications, two-digit industry-level shares were
also included in the base period. Controlling for trends in large industry groups may be im-
portant if we believe that there is variation among large industry group over time, which
are potentially correlated with the outcome variable of interest. Similarly, most of our
specifications included the fraction of different sources of revenues in the base period. The
share was included in own revenue, taxes, and property taxes. This controls for the fact
that the initial revenue mix may also affect the change in different types of revenues. For
example, it could be imagined that areas that rely heavily on property taxes may want to
5The design followed Autor, Dorn and Hanson and included the start-of-period share of employment in
manufacturing, the population share with a college education, the population share that is foreign born,
the share of employment in routine occupations, and the average offshorability index of occupations in the
commuting zone.
6For example, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) showed that the provision of local public goods in the
United States was inversely proportional to ethnic fragmentation. Population age might also affect the type
and level of local spending, as older individuals may have different preferences for public goods (e.g., Jäger
and Schmidt (2016)). The data from the county-level intercensal population data were used, and the shares
of the population aged 15–34,35–54, 55 and over, the share of black residents, and Hispanic residents, and
the share of men were included.
7Some results without fixed effects capturing trends are presented in the appendix.
8Exposure to robotization shocks were calculated between 1993 and 2000 and 2000 and 2007. Both
were rescaled by 10/7. Import shocks were calculated between 1990 and 2000 and 2000 and 2007, and
the second one was rescaled by 10/7. While the primary shock of interest was exposure to robotization,
rescaling both shocks also allowed us to compare them.
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diversify their revenue mix over time or on the contrary increase their reliance on property
taxes over time.
When looking at the role of local autonomy and property tax limits, the following model
was evaluated:
∆Yct = αt + β1∆Ŝhockct + β2∆Ŝhockct ×HR +X ′itΓ + θt + λs + εct (3.4)
where HR is a binary indicator equal to 1 when a commuting zone is in a state with
functional home rule. Essentially, the same model as in equation 1 was estimated, making
the shock interact with the binary indicator. Since the model is in first difference, HR was
not included as a variable, as it would capture trends in areas with functional home rule
and could mistakenly absorb variation attributed to the shocks.
Our results were clustered at the state level, defining the cluster in each commuting
zone as the state with the largest population share in multi-state commuting zones. The
state was chosen as a clustering unit because given the structure of local taxation, it was
believed that relevant clusters signify all jurisdictions facing similar rules and fiscal au-
tonomy. Observations within the same state should then be highly correlated across each
other and over time.
3.2.3 Data
The shocks data from Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) were used for the exposure to
robotization.9 Log average wage from ADH as well as commuting zone level control vari-
ables were used10. The commuting zone employment to population ratio was obtained
from Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017).
The data on local public finance from the Census of State and Local Governments
(CSLG) were used. The CSLG is carried out every year for states and large counties and
municipalities and gathers information on revenues and expenditures. For smaller juris-
dictions, the Census Bureau collects data every five years, with years ending in ’2 and’7.
Our shocks cover the time period from 1990 to 2007. A linear extrapolation of the 1997
and 2002 Census for 2000 was used, and the Census of 1992 was employed for 1990 data.
Because the Chinese imports and robotization were still in an infancy period in the early
9Shocks from Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a) were used for exposure to import competition from China.
It was possible to replicate their shocks as well as derive shocks at the state and county level following the
same methodology. Due to a lack of access to the robots’ data by industry, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017)
was used for all robotization shocks.
10List all controls from ADH such as the share of workers in manufacturing, the share of workers with a
bachelor
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1990s, we believe it is unlikely that 1992 was affected by the shocks in any significant
manner.11 Both changes were extrapolated to get 10-year differences as well.
In the present analysis, the state of Michigan was excluded for three important reasons.
First, Michigan passed Proposal A to reduce the reliance of school funding on property
taxes. The sweeping reform led to a drop in property taxes of nearly 30% in 1994 and
introduced new limits on the growth rate of property tax levy and home assessment.12
Second, Michigan was one of the states most impacted by robotization: the average for
our measure of robot penetration is twice the national average, and the three commuting
zones with the highest robotization impact are in Michigan. Finally, the structure of local
taxation in Michigan differs from most other states, where the state levies a State Education
Tax, which is then transferred back to municipalities. As such, lower local taxes collected
would likely impact transfers more than local taxes. While another handful of states passed
new legislation on local taxation during the present study’s analysis period, none were of
the scope of Michigan and in states highly impacted by robotization.13
The current data on the local housing market comes from two different sources. First,
data on median home value were used as well as the share of homes in different value
ranges from USA counties, which uses data from the US Decennial Census for 1990 and
2000 and the American Community Survey for 2006–2008. Data for 2007 are the average
value for all years between 2006 and 2008. Second, a measure of local housing prices was
used from Zillow which computes a local price index measuring the change in a typical
home.14. Because data is not available for most areas before the mid 1990s, data between
1995 and 2007 were used, which covers 2022 counties and 616 commuting zones.
The demographic data at the county level from the Census Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) as well. These include the share of population by gender, age, and race/ethnicity.
3.2.3.1 Local policy data
Property tax rates and assessment ratio
In a related project with Chiara Ferrero, a historical collection of local property tax rates,
assessment information and levy was collected by hand and compiled. Archived mill tax
rate and assessment information from state level data, such as annual tax reports, were
used. The data ranged from 1980–2018, and mill rate data for 44 states and assessment
11An extrapolation of 1987 and 1992 was used for 1990 as a robustness check, and the results were
significantly similar and consistent.
12Source: The Michigan Property Tax Real and Personal, Michigan Department of Treasury, Office of
Revenue and Tax Analysis,May 2002
13Results including Michigan are presented in the appendix as well.
14More information is available at https://www.zillow.com/research/data/
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data for 39 states were obtained. When the state provided a county average directly,
that information was used. Some states have data averaged at the county level, while
others have data at the municipality and school district level. The total valuation was
aggregated at the county level. With the local tax rate, the average tax rate for each layer
of government for all jurisdictions in the same county was used, and the tax rates were
added up to find the county level average.15 In this project, the unit of observation is the
commuting zone, which combines several counties. The total assessed value of property
per capita for was aggregated at the commuting zone level for each county. For the mill
rate, the aggregate assessed values and levy at the commuting zone were used, and the
effective mill rate was defined as the ratio of levy over assessed value.
Local fiscal autonomy and local tax limits
Defining and measuring the level of local autonomy can be a complicated task, both
because the definition itself of local autonomy varies across situations and because of
the large variation in state laws and degrees of freedom accorded to local governments.
While extensive literature has been produced in public policy documenting differences
in structures of government across states, a lot remains to be done to understand how
autonomy interacts with revenue shocks. In the current context, the interest lies not only
in the ability of local government to adapt to structural shocks in terms of expenditures and
public goods provision but also regarding whether the sources of revenues are impacted
differently across states granting different levels of autonomy.
The first measure of local autonomy follows Shoag, Tuttle and Veuger (2019) and
comes from the 1993 report from the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions (ACIR). States are classified by whether cities or counties operate under the structural
or functional home rule. Structural home rule is defined as the ability of local policymak-
ers to choose their own form of government (e.g., size of city councils), while those with
functional home rule have greater autonomy over specific local government function such
as taxation. In 1993, there were 40 states with cities operating under structural home rule
and 28 allowed city governments functional home rule while 21 states had functional rule
for county-level government. 31 states had either county or city level functional home
rule while 18 allowed both. In the main specification, functional home rule is defined as
that of states which allow it for either cities, as cities and school districts typically have
a much larger role in levying revenues than county-level governments, and robustness
checks analysis were carried out defining structural home rule states as either for cities
15For example, the simple average for all school districts in the same county was found, and the same was
done for all municipalities.
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only or for either cities or counties.
Local property tax limits
A large fraction of local revenues comes from property taxes, and as such property tax
limits may affect the ability of local governments to either increase property taxes to make
up for declining revenues from transfers or other local taxes. Property tax limits typically
fall into three categories: tax rate limits, assessment limits, and/or overall revenue limits.
Property tax rates limits usually specify a maximum statutory rate, while assessment lim-
its are typically defined as maximum percentage-wise increase in the assessed value of a
home year-to-year.16 Levy limits usually put a cap on year-to-year growth rate in property
tax collections.17 In 2017, 46 states had some form of property tax limitations. Our two
primary sources are from Winters (2008) and Augustine (2009) who list overall or specific
property rate limits, assessment limits, and overall and real estate revenues and expen-
diture limits for each state. The current analysis covers years 1992–2007, during which
a few states passed new legislation on local tax limits. However, for the vast majority of
states, these limits were in place before 1990, and given that the exposure to robotization
and import competition increased rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000, it is unlikely
that structural shocks led to policy changes before the mid 1990s. There, local property
tax limits in place in 1995 are defined.18
When faced with structural shocks affecting all sources of revenues, including property
tax collections, we want to measure the ability of local governments to shift their reliance
on property taxes. As such, an assessment limit would not block governments to increase
the tax rate and vice versa. More importantly, if local governments receive less in transfers
or collect less from other sources, the critical binding factor will be overall levy limits.
Additionally, if structural shocks have a negative effect on home prices, the assessment
limit is unlikely to be binding. Areas that want to increase the tax rate to make up for
a relative decline in the tax base or shift to property taxes would be likely to raise rates
and/or overall amount of property taxes collected. As such, in the current analysis, the
focus was placed on states which have a combination of levy and rate limit. The exact
16Perhaps the most notorious example of this is Proposition 13 in California which sets the maximum real
estate tax rate at 1% and the maximum assessment value increase to 2%, unless ownership of the property
changes.
17Proposition 2 1/2 in Massachusetts, for example, limits the growth rate of property taxes collected from
existing homes to 2.5% annually.
18It might still be a concern that changes occurring during the current time period of study affected local
tax revenues, however, only a handful of states passed new laws between 1995 and 2005. Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island for example passed new property tax revenue limits in 2006, but it is unlikely to have had an
effect on data prior to 2007.
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classification for each state based on functional home rule and tax limits is depicted in
figure 3.2.
3.3 Reduced form results
In this section, the results of the reduced form analysis are analyzed. First, channels of
transmission from structural shocks to local revenues and expenditures are discussed.
3.3.1 Channels
State governments in the United States rely primarily on sales taxes, intergovernmental
transfers, income taxes, and charges and fees. Local governments rely heavily on intergov-
ernmental transfers and charges and fees as well; however, but tax revenues come mainly
from property taxes. While some cities and counties in the United States have the ability
to set additional sales taxes and income taxes, it is limited to a few states.19 A direct effect
of lower wages and employment induced by rising robotization and import competition
would be a decline in the income tax base as well as a decline in consumption. At the
local level, an indirect effect of declining wages and employment opportunities would be
a decline in demand for housing, or even an increase supply of housing, either due to mi-
gration to a different area, or due to workers affected by the shocks not being able to pay
for their mortgages. The home prices and assessment values used to determine the prop-
erty tax are not perfectly correlated, hence the relatively lower fluctuation in property tax
revenues compared to income and sales tax revenues. However, while local governments
may not immediately adjust assessment values following a decline—or slower rise—in
home prices, one could expect medium- and long-run adjustment to take place, such that
declining home prices would be eventually followed by a decline in property tax bases.
Incidentally, one may suspect that state and local governments would respond to the
shock. The vast majority of state governments are subject to balanced budget require-
ments, of which the stringency and level of enforcement varies across states. Localities are
typically also subject to tight budget rules, such that they are forced to balance budgets in
relatively short time frames—typically a fiscal year, although this can be a slightly longer
time frame depending on the state. Responses might then be expected both in terms of
tax policy and in terms of expenditures. Some state legislatures face additional complica-
tions and limits on the ability to implement tax changes. It is also worth mentioning that
19Table 3.2 shows the amount per capita (in 2000 USD) for major revenues and spending categories in
all sub state local governments. Intergovernmental transfers made up about 37% of revenue in 1997, taxes
about 30%, and the rest was comprised of charges, fees, and other miscellaneous revenue.
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robotization may create high paying jobs, capital gain, and overall growth which may have
a positive impact on revenues. However, it is unclear whether the gains associated with
robots happen in the same areas where machines are implemented.
In addition to varying degrees of autonomy and constraints, depending on local politi-
cians’ preferences, one might expect heterogeneous policy responses across jurisdictions.
Characterizing how policy response affects our outcome of interest thus depends on sev-
eral local characteristics. In the next section, a simple model that highlights how shocks
may affect optimal state and local policies is introduced.
3.3.2 Results
Table 3.1 displays the mean and standard deviation for exposure to import competition
from China and the instrumented variable between 1991 and 2000 and 2000 and 2007,
rescaled to 10-year equivalents, as well as for the entire 1991–2007 time period. Values
are in thousands of dollars of imports per worker, such that the average exposure is of an
increase of $1,910 in imports per worker from China in the US between 1990 and 2007,
and the instrumented variable captures an increase just slightly smaller, an increase of
$1,770 in imports per worker. Adjusted penetration of robots was measured by the num-
ber of robots per thousand worker. The data by industry in the United States starting in
2004 were obtained. For the 1993–2007 period, the change in the instrumented adjusted
penetration was of about 1.00 robots per worker per 10-year scaled period. The ten-year
equivalent penetration of robots in the US between 2004 and 2007 was 0.7 robots per
1,000 workers.
To have a baseline on the relative effects of the shocks on local employment and in-
come, some of the results of the effects of shocks on local labor markets were replicated
first. Columns (1) and (4) in table C.1 in the appendix show the results for our baseline
specification. It is seen that an increase in one robot per thousand worker leads to a 10-
year adjusted decline of roughly 2.3% in weekly wages. The effect on employment is also
significant, with an additional robot per thousand worker leading to a lower employment
to population ratio by 0.6 percentage point. 20
Turning to how robotization affected housing markets, it is seen that increased expo-
sure had a significant and negative impact on the median home price as well as on the
local price index. An additional robot was associated with a decline of 9.2% in the value
20The current results are similar to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017), although slightly smaller in magnitude,
as a different set of controls was used in this paper.
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of a median house and 6.5% for the home price index. 21
The effect of the shock on local public finance outcomes is analyzed now. Table 3.3 dis-
plays the results for the baseline specification on revenues and expenditures. Exposure
to robotization leads to lower revenue, with a coefficient of roughly β=-3.95, implying a
roughly 4% decline in total local revenues per each additional adjusted robot. Again, while
this may sound large, this is the reduced form estimate. Based on 2004–2007 data, the
rate of robotization per 1,000 workers was about half. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
would thus estimate the effect of an additional robot in the US to lower total local rev-
enue by about 2%. Throughout the paper, an adjusted instrumented robot is signified to
when an additional robot is mentioned. This effect was found to be driven by a decline in
taxes (β=-5.7), especially property taxes (β=-5.5), and to some extent transfers (β=-2),
although the effect was not significant for both state and federal transfers.
The bottom panel in table 3.3 looks at expenditures. Higher robot penetration leads to
a decline of 2.9% in total expenditure, 1.5% in education spending (although not statisti-
cally significant), and large declines in safety and transport (β=-2.13) and β=-5.75 respec-
tively). A noticeable effect is also seen on capital outlays (β=-5), and insurance/non-debt
related financial obligations (β=-4.75).
The interaction between local autonomy and the shocks is studied now. Because local
autonomy and local restrictions are typically one-sided and restrict the growth of local
governments, rather than their reduction, the results will be driven by local preferences
and how local policymakers respond. For example, if following a mechanical decline in
revenues, the policymakers’ optimal decision would be to slash spending, and little or
no difference should be seen between areas with higher or lower fiscal autonomy. On
the other hand, if policymakers decide to make up for loss revenue by increasing taxes,
fees, or by finding other sources of revenue, a stronger decline in taxes should be seen
for places with lower autonomy. In table 3.4 the measure of local fiscal autonomy is in-
cluded—whether states grant functional home rule to cities and counties—and made to
interact with the shocks. Second, the results of the shock made to interact with whether a
region has both levy and rate limits for property taxes are presented. Note that it was also
required to ensure that the impact of robotization on the labor and housing market was
not significantly different in areas with and without home rule and tax limits. Table C.1 in
the appendix presents estimates from model 2. The impact was found to be highly similar
21Data for the home price index is only available for a subset of counties, especially in the 1990s. The data
for 1994 were used, and the difference between 1994 and 2000 was scaled up to obtain a 10-year equivalent
change.
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overall for all outcomes, and none of the interacted coefficients were large or statistically
significant.
In terms of total revenues, no differences were seen between areas with and without
functional home rule. Similarly, regions with and without property tax limits were found
to be affected similarly by exposure to robotization. Although aggregate revenues looked
similar, important differences were seen in specific sources. Total taxes and property taxes
were found to be affected less negatively in areas with home rule (βnoHR=-7.5 and βHR=-
5.2), although the interacted coefficient was not statistically significant. Places with higher
autonomy saw a larger reduction in transfer for a similar shock (βnoHR=-0.5 and βHR=-
2.4). This indicates that although the impact on overall revenues is similar, areas with
functional home rule experienced shocks differently with a larger decline in transfers and a
smaller decline in taxes. Unsurprisingly, areas with property tax limits saw a larger decline
in taxes, driven by a much larger decline in property taxes (βnoLim=-2.16 and βLim=-6.6).
They also experienced a smaller negative effect in transfers (βnoLim=-4.1 and βLim=-1.2).
In terms of expenditures, again, little differences were seen between areas. None of
the interacted coefficients were statistically significant, and most were small in size as
well. The only major exception is a much larger decline in capital outlays in commuting
zones without functional home rule (βnoHR=-8.9 and βHR=-5.2). It can be concluded
that while the presence of limits and home rule seems to affect how jurisdictions react to
structural shocks in terms of revenues, there is little difference on expenditures.
3.3.3 Long-run IV results
The drawback in the stacked estimation is that we only the reduced-form effect is an-
alyzed. While it gives some information on the sign of shocks, and whether they are
statistically significant, the magnitudes can be difficult to interpret. To evaluate the actual
impact of exposure to robotization, the long-form model was evaluated with an instrumen-
tal variable, looking at differences between 1993 and 2007.22 The downside of this model
is that long-run adjustment can make it more difficult to precisely identify the impact of
the shocks.
Table 3.5 presents the long-run IV model with and without interaction with functional
home rules. All other controls are similar to the stacked estimation. The first observation
is that total revenues in the long run do not seem to be affected by robotization, with the
exception of areas with functional home rule, which experience a larger decline (βnoHR=-0
22To match our data from 1990, the shock was effectively rescaled to a 17-year shock between 1990 and
2007.
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and βHR=-1.2). However, the shock has an impact on the source of revenue, and is asso-
ciated with lower taxes and higher transfers. An additional robot per thousand workers
leads to a 2.7% decline in total taxes, and a 2% increase in transfers. Interestingly, we see
a significant difference in areas with home rule. Robotization leads to a smaller decline in
taxes (βnoHR=-3 and βHR=-1.5), and large differences in transfers (βnoHR=2.8 and βHR=-
0.5). In terms of expenditures, little effect was seen in the general estimation as well as
in the interaction with the presence of home rule. This is consistent with our stacked re-
sults. While exposure to shocks may affect the sources of revenues, in the long run it has
little impact on overall revenues or expenditures. Note that these findings are consistent
with both jurisdictions adjusting to structural changes over time in terms of policy as well
as natural adjustment in the labor and housing market, which makes it more difficult to
identify long-run effects.
3.3.4 Sample selection and shift-share instruments
A recent and rising section of literature on shift-share instruments has shed some light
on the mechanics behind them. Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2018) argued that
the exclusion restriction should be stated in terms of both shares and shocks. A shift
share instrument captures a weighted average treatment effect, where the weights are the
relative exposure to the shock, captured by the shares. Naturally, one may worry that
shares are correlated with unobservable characteristics that affect the level of the outcome
of interest. To deal with this issue, most research designs using shift-share instruments
use first-difference models. However, shares may not satisfy the exclusion restrictions if
they are correlated with trends in the dependent variables. Effectively, this implies that
researchers should ensure that shares are uncorrelated with the change in the outcome of
interest. Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2018) offered ways to test for this by high-
lighting three main methodologies. First, researchers should check whether or not shares
are correlated with outcomes other than the ones posited by the researchers. In the current
context, shares should be uncorrelated with local factors which have differential trends,
and have an effect on wages. Second, researchers should test for trends in the instrument
when data makes it possible. Third, researchers can consider alternative estimators and
run overidentification tests, which builds on the idea that shift-share instruments in fact
combine several instruments in a specific manner.23
23Alternatively, Borusyak, Hull and Jaravel (2018) pointed out that running a regression on shift-share
instruments is similar to running a regression on industry weighted average. This allows researchers to
condition for industry-specific fixed effects that capture potential industry trends correlated with the outcome
of interest.
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In the current context, the primary concern is then that the shocks are correlated with
trends in local public finance outcomes rather than having a causal effect. First, the effect
of shocks on local labor markets could be correlated with the structure of local revenues.
The baseline regression was run with the fraction of income coming from different sources
in the base period as the outcome variable with no significant results being. Second,
shocks may be correlated with trends in the structure of local public income. To test for
this, regressions using the change in our variable of interest between 1977 and 1987 as
the dependent variable were run.24 As shown in table 3.6, there was no overall significant
correlation between the exposure to robotization and total revenues, taxes, transfers, and
expenditures when using no controls. When introducing division fixed effects and interac-
tion with the presence of home rule, no large or statistically significant correlations were
found either, with the exception of a small positive correlation between education spend-
ing and robotization. Finally, the same controls as in the baseline model were included,
and no statistically significant effect was found, with a small and negative correlation with
taxes and a small and positive correlation with transfers in areas with the functional home
rule.
To summarize, these findings indicate there is no consistent and precise correlation
between public finance outcomes and the shocks, overall, or in areas with or without
home rule. We believe it is highly unlikely that serial correlation between local trends and
our measures of shocks drove our main results. To limit the role of trends, the change in
the respective variable of interest between 1977 and 1987 as a control was also included
in all our specifications.
The next section looks more closely at the role of local policy, develops a simple model
to derive predictions on the reaction of local governments, and shows how shift-share
instruments will bias coefficients when the outcome of interest is highly policy dependent.
3.4 The role of policy
This section investigates the role of policy in response to local shocks. First, a simple
two-layer model of government where local policymakers choose an optimal tax rate based
on local income and on transfers received from the state is introduced. Subsequently, it
is shown how local tax rates and assessment were affected by both shocks, using the data
described in section 2. Second, it is shown how shift-share instruments bias outcomes
24Regressions using changes between 1977 and 1992 and between 1982 and 1992 were run as well. The
results were very similar and are available on request.
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that are highly dependent on policy. Further, some evidence is shown that the mechanical
effect of shocks on local property taxes was somewhat lower in low-autonomy places and
somewhat larger in high-autonomy places.
3.4.1 Model of local policymaking
A simple model with two levels of government is introduced here. The goal of the
simple and stylized model is to illustrate how local taxes and public goods provision are
affected by income shocks. This framework also highlights the relationship between goods
provided at the state level as well as goods provided at the local level.
There are J regions in each state. There are two types of individuals: high skill (and
high income) and low skill. The fraction of high-skill type in each region is denoted by
αhj, with
∑
i αij = 1. It is assumed that agents derive utility from consumption of private
goods and public goods U(cij, gj, gs), where cij is the consumption of type i in region j, gj
is the amount of public goods provided at the local level, and gs is the amount of public
goods provided at the state level. For tractability, it is assumed that labor is supplied
inelastically, and there is no mobility. Local governments and state governments levy a tax
on income (or consumption since there is no saving), and the individual’s budget constraint
is cij = yij(1− τj − τs). State governments provide transfers to the regions, denoted by rj.
The local government’s budget constraint is τj
∑
i αijyij+rj = gj, and the state government




i αijyijs = gs −
∑
j rj.
It is assumed that the following set of events happens:
1. At the beginning of the period, both governments observe the share of each types
and the income level in each region.
2. State governments pick the tax rate, transfers and state-provided public goods, and
the information becomes public.
3. Local governments observe the transfers they receive and the tax rate imposed at the
state level. They choose their tax rate and amount of public good provision.
For now it is assumed that both local and state policymakers act as social planners and
maximize social welfare functions for their constituents. The first-order condition for the















Because state policymakers choose their optimal tax policy anticipating the response func-
tion of the local government, ∂τs
∂τj
= 0. Local policymakers then choose a tax rate τj and
an amount of public good provision that equals the weighted marginal utility of consump-
tion (i.e., the marginal cost of public funds) for each type to the total marginal utility of












where the weights on the marginal utility of private consumption is equal to the share of




At the state level, politicians maximize the utility of all residents, taking into account the




































































































When choosing the optimal tax rate at the state level, policymakers have to balance the
amount of distortion it creates through changes in local tax rates and the increase in
marginal utility through higher public good provision (assuming transfers are kept con-
stant). Similarly, transfers increase the amount of local public good provision but distort
the local tax rate.
Let us choose a specific example for the utility function and derive optimal tax rates and
transfers. It is assumed that the utility function is additively separable between private con-
sumption and public goods and that the utility function is quasi-linear - u(c, g) = c+ v(g).
Hence, the local optimum is defined as follows:
∑
i αijβij = v
′(gj). An example would be





















If transfers and the share of incomes stay constant ( ∂rj
∂yj
= 0), there are two forces affect-
ing optimal taxes. Lower income means that the amount of public goods provided per
capita by transfer rj increases, leading to a lower tax rate locally. On the other hand, the
relative marginal benefit of providing public goods goes up, since the marginal utility of
consumption is constant, which leads to a higher tax. The relative effect depends on the
size of transfers rj as well as how transfers change following a shock in income. How
would a change in the share of poor versus rich individuals affect the tax rate? Assuming
no changes in relative income, it follows that when there are more poor people in region
j, the optimal tax rate increases since
∑
i αijβij decreases. Intuitively, the shift in the bud-
get constraint leads to under provision of public goods—since the value of public good is
independent on income—and the tax rate increases to equate the marginal cost of public
fund and marginal benefit. If on the other hand there is a shift in the distribution from
poor to rich, such that total income does not change, there will be no effect on the income
tax. If we assume elastic labor supply and that rich individuals have higher elasticities of
taxable income, an increase in share of poor individuals and a right shift in the income
distribution can lead to an increase in tax rate.25









With this utility function, transfers are never optimal because of the positive effect on local
public good provision (1+
∂τ∗j
∂rj
yj = 0). On the other hand, the state tax rate does not distort














. It can be seen that a decrease in income leads to a higher tax rate.
3.4.1.1 Political incentives
To capture how political incentives may affect the optimal level of taxation and public
good provision as well as the optimal response to a shock, first-order conditions were


















is the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to the next of (total) tax rate. Now the optimal amount of public good and tax rate considers the
distortionary effect of taxes on each group. The same logic applies, but the magnitude changes, from the
added distortion.
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derived under the median voter theorem. Now, policymakers maximize the utility of the














Now the distribution of income and the relative income of the median voter is essential
to determine the local tax. The effect of a decline in average income is unambiguous and





), while a decrease in the median income leads to a lower
tax. For tractability, it is assumed that state policymakers are elected statewide and thus







which simplifies to τs = 1ys , given that there are no transfers with this utility function. At
the state level, a decrease in the median voter income and a decrease in the average in-
come lead to a decline in the tax rate. Importantly, if the average income goes down, but
the median income is unchanged, there will be a decline in the provision of public goods.
The goal of this section was to highlight that even with a very simple model, it can be
shown that optimal local responses in terms of tax policy and public good provision de-
pends not only on the local average income but also on the distribution of income as well
as the share of individuals who are poor or rich. It also highlights the relationship between
local and state government. Local governments take into consideration both transfers and
state tax policies when choosing the optimal bundle of tax and public goods. It was also
shown that political incentives, derived from a simple median voter framework, poten-
tially leads to differential responses from the social planner. The next section describes
the estimation strategy to evaluate the effect of structural shocks on tax revenues and
expenditures.
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3.4.2 The effect of shocks on local property tax policy
Table 3.7 presents how exposure to robotization affects local property tax policy. 26 The
top panel looks at the impact on the mill rate, assessed values, and the ratio of assessed
values to local home prices. It was seen that an additional instrumented robot led to an
increase in the property tax rate of about 3%. This effect was almost fully driven by areas
with structural home rule (βnoHR=0.14 and βHR=3.15). The increase was also smaller in
areas with tax limits (βnoLim=4.06 and βLim=2.5). However, none of the coefficients in the
interacted models were significant, indicating a wide range of responses. Unsurprisingly,
it was seen that the shocks had a negative impact on assessed values with similar effects in
areas with home rule. Assessed values declined more for a given exposure to robotization
in jurisdictions with property tax limits. Further, little impact was seen on the assessment
ratio, indicating that the shocks did not have a major impact on assessment rules.
In the bottom panel, the baseline model restricting the sample to areas for which prop-
erty tax data was obtained is estimated. The magnitudes are smaller and less precisely
estimated than the results shown in tables 3.3 and 3.4. However, the qualitative impacts
of the shocks are similar, indicating that our findings are not sample-specific. Overall, it
can be concluded that areas with more autonomy seem to react differently by increasing
the property tax rate for a given shock. Areas with rate and levy limits increase the tax
rate less than areas without limits, even though they experience a decline almost twice as
large on their tax base.
To summarize, it was found that areas which experience lower transfers for a given
exposure to robotization are more likely to increase their tax rate, consistent with the
model. This prediction also aligns with our previous findings where areas with autonomy
experienced a larger decline in total transfers and a smaller decline in taxes. It was shown
that the smaller decline in taxes was mostly due to an increase in the property tax rate.
3.4.2.1 Omitted variable bias
As discussed earlier, the coefficients of interest in tables 3.3 and 3.4 include both me-
chanical and policy effects. Policy can be seen as an omitted variable. Policy responses
26As discussed in the data section, the average data between 1994 and 1995, 2000 and 2001, and 2006
and 2007 were used. Using the data for 1995 rather than 1990 allowed us to use a much larger sample in
the first time period. Moreover, the two-year average was used to obtain a more precise estimate. Using
the data from 2000 and 2007 rather than the two-year average did not change our results. The change was
rescaled to obtain a 10-year equivalent
127
due to the shocks are part of the overall effect of structural changes on local public fi-
nance, and hence, it is not termed as an omitted variable bias. Rather, the coefficient
can be thought of as capturing both the direct and indirect effects of shocks. However,
as shift-share instruments rely on the industry shares from the base period, shocks will
be highly correlated over time. Intuitively, if the policy response in period 2 is correlated
with the shock in period 2, it will be correlated with the shock in period 1 by construc-
tion. Simply put, assume shocks are correlated over time—Cov(Shockst, Shocks,t−1)  0.
Second, assume that shocks have a direct effect on outcome—Cov(Shockst, Yst)  0. Fi-
nally, assume that policy response (kst) is correlated with the outcome of interest (e.g. tax
revenues)—Cov[ks, Yst] 6= 0]. Given these three assumptions, policy is correlated with all
previous shocks— Cov(ks,t, Shocks,t−1) 6= 0.
It can be shown that the expected coefficient β1 will be as follows (with the full deriva-
tion in the appendix):







where it is assumed that the correlation between the current shock and the first change in
policy is zero (E[∆ShockstαT∆κst−T ] = 0 as well as the correlation between the shock and
the residual in the policy function (E[
∑T
t=0 α
t∆est−j]. The expected value for the coefficient
is then equal to the direct effect of the shock, the indirect effect of the shock, and what we
call the mechanical bias, which comes from serial correlation of the shock over estimation
periods. The indirect effect of the shock is the product of the effect of the shock on policy
(γ) and the effect of policy on the outcome variable (β2). The specificity of shift-share in-
struments is that they are by design correlated over time, as practitioners usually keep the
shares constant using the base year. Even when the shares are updated, they will be imper-





creates a mechanical bias. How large it is depends on the number of periods T , on the de-
gree of path dependence of the policy (α), and on the degree of correlation within shocks
over time.
3.4.2.2 Disentangling direct effects, indirect effects, and bias
Can we put a sign and number on the indirect effect of the policy and on the bias? The
answer depends on the number of policies that we expect to be correlated with the shocks
as well as the relationship between the policy and the outcome variables. In the context
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of the structural shocks investigated in this paper, the first question we can ask is whether
or not the indirect effect and bias is large when estimating the effect of the shock on local
labor market outcomes. We can start with β2, which captures the effect of the policy, e.g.,
a tax change on the share of employed individuals, or on wages. We can reasonably expect
β2 to be significantly small.
As an example, let us take the effect of the shock on the wage bill and how tax policy
response may bias the coefficient. Chetty et al. (2011) reviewed the evidence on labor
supply elasticity estimates and found ranges between around 0.2 and 0.8. Here, β ≈ −0.2
was picked to be conservative, such that an increase in the tax rate of one percentage point
leads to a decline in the wage bill of 0.2%. Second, let us assume that policymakers adjust
the tax rate to exactly make up for half of loss revenue. This is somewhat arbitrary, but
it is seen as a reasonable estimate, as we would expect a decline in expenditures and a
rise in transfers to make up for some of the loss in revenue. From Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017), it is assumed that one robot per thousand workers decreases the total wage bill
by about 1%. Hence the tax rate would have to increase by roughly one percentage point
to make up for loss revenue, which implies γ ≈ 1. This would imply that 10% of the
impact of robots could come from indirect effects through the tax responses. When using
a multi-period approach, the bias would be close to -0.1, assuming α = 1 and shocks
are highly correlated over time. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) typically found more
negative responses in the “stacked,” i.e., multi-period estimates, which is consistent with
our theory. However, two important caveats were identified here. First, local governments
rely on property taxes. A rise in property taxation could be interpreted as a rise in the cost
of housing consumption and could lead to an increase in labor supply if individuals are
budget constrained or have a very low elasticity of substitution between the consumption
of housing and other goods. Second, evaluating the effect of other policies such as changes
in welfare spending or transportation on wages and labor supply may be difficult.
Now let us consider the outcome variable being tax revenues. To find β2, the mechani-
cal and behavioral effect of a change in tax rate needs to be evaluated. For small changes,
the envelope theorem can be applied, and focus can be placed on the mechanical effect.
A one percentage point increase would then imply beta2 ≈ 10 or 10% increase in tax col-
lections, assuming an average state tax rate of 10%. Coefficient γ captures the tax policy
response to the shock. Again, it is assumed that the change in the tax rate compensates for
the loss of revenues from the direct effect of the shock on tax revenues, which is ∆Y ∗ τ ,
where ∆Y is the change in the wage bill. Again using a 10% tax rate, γ ≈ 1 ∗ .1 = .1 is
obtained, which implies β2γ = 1. This implies a large indirect effect which unlike in our
previous examples has an opposite side to the direct effect. Things are greatly simplified
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here, as tax policies and expenditures decisions are taken jointly and are also affected by
the amount of transfers governments receive. However, we believe it is critical to keep
in mind how important both the mechanical effect and the bias can be when interpreting
results. There is a rising literature that evaluates the effect of the China shock on a range
of outcomes such as health, crime, etc. that can be highly policy dependent.
3.4.3 Estimation with policies
While it is difficult to precisely estimate the role of the bias, one can potentially use
observed changes in policy as controls to “block” the policy effects of the shock and find
the mechanical effect. There are two important challenges with such a methodology. First,
there may be data limitations on the type of local policies that is observed and available.
Additionally, researchers need to deal with the large variety of local systems, such that
local nominal tax rates may have significantly different effective tax rates across regions.
Second, one would need to accurately identify the types of policies that are response to
shocks (hence γ > 0) as well as have a significant impact on the outcome variable of in-
terest (β2 > 0). It is to the discretion of the researcher to determine which policies are
relevant in the estimation strategy.
Another strategy is to evaluate β2, γ, and α separately. The effect of the policy on the
outcome variable of interest can be evaluated directly for areas that have available data,
with the assumption that the sub sample of states and regions that have a comparable data
on policy leads to consistent estimates. That is, it needs to be assumed that the availability
of policy data is quasi-random and is uncorrelated with the shocks and the effect of the
shock. Even then, one may worry about restricting the sample size, which could lead to
highly imprecise estimations. Fundamentally, β2 captures the joint effect of policy changes
on the outcome variable. Let us take income tax collections as an example. If we focus on
the direct effect of policies, then we can evaluate how much an income tax rate change will
affect tax revenues, which will be the addition of the mechanical effect of the tax change
and the behavioral response.
For the sample of state and counties for which policy data was obtained, it was in-
vestigated how including the policy change as a dependent variable affected the relevant
coefficients in table 3.8. Accordingly, property tax revenues and transfers were analyzed.
Property taxes constitutes the outcome variable that is directly affected by the policy, while
transfers potentially affect optimal policy; it was not expected to find that the tax rate was
correlated with changes in transfers, especially in the medium run. Column (1) shows the
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baseline result without including the change in property tax rate, and column (2) includes
changes in tax policy. In the baseline sample, including the tax rate had almost no effect on
the outcome, indicating that the role of policy and the bias were relatively small. Turning
to areas with home rule, it was observed that the negative effect of exposure to roboti-
zation increased in areas with low local autonomy—from -7.7 to -6.6, a decline of more
than 15%. The interacted coefficient in high autonomy states was found to decline from
about 5.8 to 4.4. The tax rate itself was positively correlated with property tax revenues,
as expected. The results are somewhat consistent with the predictions and findings on the
effect of shocks on tax rates. In places with low autonomy, a decline in tax rates implies
a negative bias, while in places with high autonomy, a rise (or no change) in tax rates
relative to other areas leads to a positive bias. In terms of transfers, no differences were
found when including the policy, which is consistent with the predictions.
However, it is worth pointing out that coefficients in the estimations including changes
in tax rates should not be interpreted purely as the mechanical effect of the shocks—given
the whole array of other policies that affected overall revenues and property taxes.
3.5 Discussion and robustness checks
In this section, the role of weighting is discussed, and some results with an unweighted
specification are presented. This section also looks at another major structural shock,
import competition from China. Finally, it mentions other ways to evaluate local autonomy.
To summarize our findings so far, it was shown that exposure to robotization leads to
a decline in revenues, mostly driven by a decline in property taxes, although transfers and
other sources of revenues went down as well for a given exposure. This had a negative
effect on spending, with the largest categories hit negatively being transport, capital out-
lays, and insurance and other non-debt related financial obligations. Taxes declined less
in jurisdictions with more autonomy and more in areas with strict property tax limits. It
was revealed that exposure to robotization leads to an increase in the tax rate, which is
driven by areas with more autonomy, which also see a decline in transfers compared to
other areas.
3.5.1 Unweighted results
It is important to note that the results are weighted by local population. To the ex-
tent that we care about the overall effect on the population from lower public services or
higher tax burdens, we want to weigh by local population. However, unweighted results
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also provide information. If local outcomes depend on policy changes, small and large
jurisdictions may have considerably different reactions. A policy response function is un-
likely to be linear. For example, cities may use different tools to react to a small shock or
a large shock. As the outcome of interest is calculated per capita, unweighted results thus
give us an average across commuting zones, which implies that laws implemented in small
and large commuting zones will be on equal footing in our estimation strategy.
Table C.4 and C.6 in the appendix shows the unweighted results for the baseline esti-
mation strategy and the interaction with local autonomy. The qualitative results are signif-
icantly similar, but the magnitudes for most coefficients are halved or more. The statistical
significance of some results (transfers specifically) in high autonomy places disappears.
Overall, the conclusions are not unchanged from the weighted estimations. Areas more
densely populated seem to have stronger responses as demonstrated by the coefficients
smaller in magnitude in the unweighted results.
Table C.8 shows the unweighted results from the long-run IV estimation, and again
considerably similar outcomes were found qualitatively, with slightly smaller magnitudes.
It is also worth pointing out the outcomes when including Michigan, which are shown
in table C.3 in the appendix. The impact of robotization on expenditures is very sim-
ilar, with the only exception being the negative impact on safety and education being
statistically significant, while non-debt related financial obligations and insurance loses
its significance. However, significantly different results were observed in revenue. Total
revenue was still found to decline but by lesser amounts, while no impact on taxes but
a large decline in transfers, driven by state transfers, was observed. This highlights how
the specificity of Michigan regarding its property tax and transfer structure can affect the
result, given its status as one of the most affected states by robotization as well.
3.5.2 The role of Chinese import competition
One may still wonder whether there is potential correlation between exposure to robo-
tization and import competition from China. Additionally, given that both shocks are struc-
tural and have been pinned as having had a major impact on local labor markets in the
United States, a comparison is warranted. In table C.5, it is analyzed whether the impact
of robotization is affected by adding the “China shock”. The coefficients associated with
robotization are similar to our baseline estimation, about 10%–20% smaller in magnitude
with similar statistical significance. Exposure to import competition from China itself was
also associated with a decline in revenues and expenditures, similar to findings by Feler
and Senses (2017), although with typically smaller magnitude. In table C.7, the interac-
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tion between the shock and local autonomy or strict property tax limits is analyzed. Almost
no coefficient was found to be statistically significant, and no pattern was found that would
highlight different impacts, unlike with robotization.
Notably, with the long-run estimation shown in table C.9, no effect of the China shock
was seen on either revenues or expenditures. If anything, it had a positive impact on both.
This clearly highlights how long-run adjustments can make it difficult to identify the role
of structural shocks, especially in the case of policy-dependent outcomes.
A quantitative comparison between the two shocks is difficult, given the different met-
rics used and the lack of robotization data in the United States before 2004. Qualitatively,
both shocks seem to primarily affect local revenues through a decline in property taxes,
largely driven by the negative effect of the shocks on home prices. Notably, education
was found to decline more than total expenditures for a given exposure to Chinese com-
petition, while it was the opposite for robotization. Safety was found to be negatively
affected by an additional robot but not by exposure to import competition. While there
was some correlation between both shocks, their intensity varied across commuting zones.
The different outcomes in expenditures were found to be potentially driven by differences
in preferences for local public goods as well as the local structures of government. Overall,
more research is required on the relationship between preferences for local public goods
provision and responses to structural shocks.
3.5.3 Other measures of local autonomy
So far, local autonomy has been defined as states that allow either cities or counties to
have more power in levying taxes and choosing spending. In table C.10, the results when
focusing on states that allow only cities to do so are presented. Moreover, specific focus
was placed on levy limits as opposed to the combination of rate and levy limits. The results
are very similar to our baseline, indicating that autonomy of cities and levy limits are the
driving forces behind our previous results. This is not too surprising, as the sample with a
city-only autonomy is largely similar to either city or counties, with a couple of exceptions.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, it was shown that exposure to robotization leads to a decline in local
revenues, mostly driven by overall declines in total taxes and property taxes. The effect
on transfers is small and statistically not significant but negative. Local expenditures were
also found to decline for each additional robot, with safety, transport, and insurance and
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trust spending declining the most. There was a small but imprecise decline in education
spending. Areas with higher fiscal autonomy, specified as states which grant localities func-
tional home rule, experienced a similar decline in revenue and spending. However, they
faced smaller declines in taxes and larger declines in transfers. The effect on expenditures
was similar in areas with high and low autonomy, with the exception of capital outlays, for
which the negative effect was about half as large in high autonomy jurisdictions. States
with levy and rate limits experienced a larger decline in taxes, driven by a much larger
reduction in property taxes. However, they faced much smaller losses in transfers.
In the pre-trend analysis, it was shown that it is unlikely that differential trends be-
tween regions drove our results, a potential concern with shift-share instruments. Using
a collected database on local property tax rates and assessment values, differential re-
sponses between areas with high and low fiscal autonomy were highlighted. Places with
low autonomy showed no impact of robotization on tax rates, while property tax rates
were found to increase in high-autonomy jurisdictions. It was shown that these results
are consistent with a simple model of optimal local tax policy, which depends on local
income and transfers. Areas that increased taxes were also found to face larger declines in
transfers.
It was shown that when the outcome is policy-dependent, there is an omitted variable
bias resulting from the correlation between the shocks over time and their effect on policy.
In this application, the bias is unlikely to be large. When including changes in tax rates
to block the property tax policy channels, similar outcomes were found, although slightly
smaller in magnitude for areas with large jurisdiction, a potential sign of a small bias.
Robots and automation are not going anywhere. We believe there are important ques-
tions that would benefit from further research, which could provide more evidence on the
relationship between autonomy, preferences for public good, revenue mixes, and levels
of taxation. A deeper understanding of the extent to which the structure of transfers in-
fluence local response to structural shocks—in the short and long run—would be highly
valuable. We also believe there is some promising research to be done on the role of local
political incentives and how they affect policy changes.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Shocks: summary statistics - shocks
10-year scaled ∆ 1990-2000 2000-2007 Average 1990-2007
mean sd mean sd mean sd
∆R̂obots 1993− 2007 0.65 0.58 1.35 1.07 1.00 0.93
∆RobotsUS 2004− 07 . . 0.70 0.84 0.70 0.84
∆ÎPW 1.01 1.07 2.52 2.57 1.77 2.11
∆IPWUS 1.18 1.80 2.64 3.05 1.91 2.61
Observations 701 701 1402
1990-2000 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Funct. HR Funct. HR Levy lim. No levy lim. Prop. tax samp.
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
∆R̂obots 1993−2000 0.75 0.51 0.61 0.59 0.70 0.56 0.60 0.58 0.73 0.61
∆ÎPW 1.29 1.21 0.92 1.01 1.18 1.17 0.87 0.97 0.85 0.78
∆IPWUS 1.39 1.89 1.12 1.77 1.26 1.40 1.12 2.08 1.17 1.79
Observations 172 529 317 384 220
2000-2007 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Funct. HR Funct. HR Levy lim. No levy lim. Prop. tax samp.
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
∆R̂obots 2000−07 1.62 1.07 1.26 1.05 1.41 0.94 1.29 1.16 1.45 1.04
∆RobotsUS 2004−07 0.86 1.03 0.64 0.77 0.68 0.75 0.71 0.92 0.74 0.84
∆ÎPW 2.86 2.53 2.41 2.57 2.77 2.48 2.31 2.62 2.65 2.60
∆IPWUS 2.97 2.42 2.53 3.22 3.18 3.25 2.19 2.81 2.78 3.19
Observations 172 529 317 384 491
Changes are 10-year equivalent re-scaled shocks except for the 1990-2007 average, which is 17-year scaled.
The second panel shows the summary statistics for states classified either as operating under the functional
home rule or not (columns 1 and 2) and for states that have either a y. The third column of the second
panel displays the summary statistics for the commuting zones for which we have local property tax data.
For commuting zones crossing 2 states, the level of autonomy is defined by the state with the highest share
of the population. The state with the highest population share changes in 3 commuting zones over time, and
these have been dropped from the estimations.
135
Table 3.2: Shocks: summary statistics - local government revenues and expenditures
No Functional HR Functional HR Prop. tax sample
1990 2007 1990 2007 1990 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total revenue 2,561 4,059 2,569 3,922 2,401 4,139
Own sources 1,611 2,565 1,614 2,380 1,548 2,623
Taxes 725 1,141 800 1,145 829 1,211
Property taxes 597 865 668 894 699 944
Sales and income taxes 109 259 112 233 115 249
Other taxes 19 18 20 18 15 18
Charge and misc. 600 1,011 541 861 520 986
Other revenue 287 412 273 374 199 425
Total transfers 950 1,495 955 1,542 853 1,516
Federal transfers 70 127 94 153 63 130
State transfers 819 1,269 787 1,283 739 1,276
Total expenditure 2,519 3,916 2,548 3,857 2,345 4,036
Education 1,070 1,622 1,065 1,585 1,062 1,642
Safety 180 336 171 297 172 337
Health 39 74 47 94 42 85
Transport 153 195 189 255 158 210
Housing 32 57 36 63 33 63
Parks 54 95 54 105 46 99
Welfare 39 50 98 118 50 90
Sanitation 79 135 97 159 90 151
Liquidity, insurance, trust 310 433 300 423 216 468
Interest 133 115 147 109 121 124
Capital Outlays 288 492 301 483 241 508
Observations 382 382 337 337 222 479
Figures are per capita revenue and expenditure. The first 4 columns are the non-weighted average across
commuting zones for 1990 and 2000 in low autonomy and high autonomy states respectively. The All figures




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Effect of shocks on local revenues: with local autonomy measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
R̂obots ∆10year -4.08c -4.25c -7.53c -3.75c -7.47b -2.16 -0.51 -4.10b
(1.47) (1.29) (2.31) (1.21) (3.34) (1.73) (2.14) (1.96)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR 0.15 2.28 2.44 -1.85
(0.98) (1.42) (2.27) (1.82)
R̂obots ∆10year × Lim 0.40 -2.66a -4.60a 2.91a
(1.13) (1.53) (2.42) (1.57)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.21
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
R̂obots ∆10year -3.33b -3.44c -2.36 -1.90 -0.92 -1.57 -8.97a -4.67
(1.48) (1.17) (1.59) (1.51) (1.49) (1.36) (5.28) (3.45)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR 0.47 1.13 -1.48 4.81
(1.04) (1.37) (1.21) (3.27)
R̂obots ∆10year × Lim 0.67 0.61 -0.76 -0.51
(1.25) (1.40) (1.37) (4.07)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.08 0.08
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
In this table, we evaluate model 3.4, which interacts exposure to robotization with local autonomy as defined
by being in a jurisdiction with functional home rule. We also interact the shock with states that have both levy
and rate limits. See table 3.3 notes for controls - all estimations include the same controls. All estimations
are weighted by the national population share in 1990. See text for a discussion on local autonomy and local
property tax limits.
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Table 3.5: Effect of shocks on local revenues: IV estimation 1993-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
Robots ∆17year -0.30 -0.01 -2.64c -2.98c -2.14c -2.22c 1.99c 2.75c
(0.47) (0.43) (0.49) (0.41) (0.75) (0.77) (0.75) (0.58)
Robots ∆17year ×HR -1.19a 1.54b 0.42 -3.20b
(0.71) (0.73) (1.06) (1.41)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34
CZ-by-year 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
Robots ∆17year -0.41 -0.20 0.61 0.51 -1.00 -0.93 -1.00 -1.60
(0.47) (0.45) (0.44) (0.41) (0.70) (0.74) (1.52) (1.39)
Robots ∆17year ×HR -0.91 0.41 -0.29 2.46
(0.71) (0.81) (0.96) (1.59)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.28 0.28 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.23 0.23
CZ-by-year 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table looks evaluates the IV model using changes between 1993 and 2007, adjusted for inflation. All
varialbles are per capita. The robots shock in the United States is calculated between 2004 and 2007, and
rescaled to get a 14-year change. Both the Chinese shock and the shift-share instrument are rescaled to get a
14-year difference. The specification is identical to table 3.4 and includes the same controls. The estimation
is weighted by 1990 commuting zone population. There is no time trend since there is only one observed
period. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. See table 3.3 and 3.4 for details on controls and
definition of home rule.
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Table 3.6: Exogeneity test: 1977-1987 change as outcome variable
∆1977−1987 in dependent variable - no controls
Revenues Taxes Transfers Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Own Total Prop Salesinc. Total State Total Educ
R̂obots93−07 -0.57 -0.02 -0.13 0.35 -0.03 1.51 0.89 -0.51 0.55
(0.64) (0.02) (1.61) (1.82) (0.06) (0.97) (1.06) (0.79) (0.86)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
CZ-by-year 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701 701
∆1977−1987 in dependent variable - division fixed effects
Revenues Taxes Transfers Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Own Total Prop Salesinc. Total State Total Educ
R̂obots93−07 0.98 0.01 -0.43 -0.56 0.03 1.93 1.03 1.04 1.55a
(0.73) (0.02) (1.83) (2.19) (0.03) (1.17) (1.41) (1.01) (0.79)
R̂obots93−07 -1.11 -0.03 -1.27 -0.84 -0.09 1.06 1.96 -1.04 -0.91
Structural HR (0.86) (0.02) (2.12) (2.51) (0.08) (1.53) (1.87) (1.11) (0.97)
R2 0.35 0.52 0.63 0.62 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.30 0.41
CZ-by-year 701 701 701 701 656 701 701 701 701
∆1977−1987 in dependent variable - full specification
Revenues Taxes Transfers Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total Own Total Prop Salesinc. Total State Total Educ
R̂obots93−07 0.65 0.00 -0.16 0.08 0.01 0.99 0.61 0.49 0.77
(0.57) (0.01) (1.39) (1.58) (0.04) (1.04) (1.24) (0.89) (0.61)
R̂obots93−07 -0.09 -0.02 -1.61 -1.90 -0.07 1.88 2.65 -0.01 -0.20
Structural HR (0.69) (0.02) (1.57) (1.87) (0.07) (1.41) (1.72) (1.03) (0.81)
R2 0.48 0.63 0.71 0.74 0.21 0.35 0.32 0.40 0.53
CZ-by-year 701 701 701 701 656 701 701 701 701
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table evaluates the role of pre-trends in local public finance outcomes. The dependent variable is the
change between 1977 and 1987 of the outcome of interest. The first panel has no fixed effects or controls,
the second panel includes division fixed effects, while the last panel is the same full specification as tables
3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 3.7: Effect of shocks on local tax rates and assessment - 1993-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log mill rate Log assessed value Log assess.ratio
R̂obots ∆10yr 3.11a 0.14 4.06 -3.74b -4.56 -2.39 0.40 1.15 -0.25
(1.55) (3.19) (2.50) (1.74) (3.75) (3.14) (2.03) (3.76) (3.01)
R̂obots ∆10yr ×HR 2.99 0.83 -0.76
(2.42) (3.10) (2.90)
R̂obots ∆10yr × Lim -1.56 -2.22 1.07
(2.67) (3.83) (3.86)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X X
R2 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.47
CZ-by-year 656 656 656 656 656 656 594 594 594
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Property taxes Total transfers Home price Index
R̂obots ∆10yr -2.60a -1.82 -5.69c -1.24 2.84 -2.88 -5.84c -2.14a
(1.39) (1.36) (1.70) (1.63) (2.30) (1.86) (1.99) (1.19)
R̂obots ∆10yr ×HR -0.06 2.46b -3.87 1.68
(0.92) (1.18) (2.32) (1.88)
R̂obots ∆10yr × Lim -1.37 -3.34b 3.05 -3.36c
(1.59) (1.50) (2.41) (1.15)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.45 0.45 0.63 0.63 0.39 0.39 0.81 0.82
CZ-by-year 656 656 656 656 656 656 594 594
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table looks at the effect of robotization on local property tax rates, and assessed values, and the ratio
of assessed values and home prices between 1993 and 2007, with two time periods 1993-2000, and 2000-
2007. Property tax rates are in mills (tax per 1,000 valuation). Assessment ratio is defined as the change in
assessed property value per capita (and adjusted for inflation), while assessment ratio is the later divided by
local price index at the county level. See text for more details on the source and computation of tax rates
and assessed value at the commuting zone. All controls are the same as table 3.3
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Table 3.8: Blocking the property tax policy channel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Property Taxes Transfers
R̂obots ∆10year -3.61b -3.53c -7.72b -6.61b -0.67 -0.68 -0.21 0.07
(1.40) (1.29) (3.30) (2.94) (1.29) (1.30) (1.82) (1.77)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR 5.80 4.37 0.45 0.08
(3.87) (3.39) (2.68) (2.49)
∆ Log Mill rate 0.07b 0.07b -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.53 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.21
CZ-by-year 786 786 786 786 786 786 786 786
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table evaluates our baseline specification from table 3.4 including property tax changes as an indepen-
dent variable to absorb the indirect effect of policy on the outcome variable. Essentially it is designed to
block the local property tax rate policy channel. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. See table
3.3 for a description of controls and table 3.4 for definition of home rule.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Change in exposure to robotization in robots per 1,000 worker - 1993-2007
This figure shows the commuting zone exposure to our shift-share instrument for robot penetration, which
is based on the use of robots in European countries between 1993 and 2007. See text for details on how the
shocks are computed.
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Figure 3.2: Maps of local fiscal autonomy
(a) Functional home rule - cities or counties (b) Function home rule - cities only
(c) Property tax levy limit, rate limit, assessment
limit (d) Levy limit and rate limit
(e) Property tax rate limit (f) Property tax levy limit
These Chapter3/Figures depict which states are classified as having high or low levels of local autonomy
either based on whether they are granted functional home rule - panels (a), (b) - or whether states have
property tax limits. Panel (c) displays states with all three types of limits on local property taxation with
levy, assessment, and rates. Panel (d) shows which state have overall levy limit, and a tax rate limits.Panel
(e) shows which states have a rate limit, and panel (f) which state have a levy limit. See text for more
information on the limits and functional home rule.
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A.1 Additional Tables
Table A.1: Summary Statistics - Census tract data
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
Firm dynamics
Entry rate 11.03 5.89 10.63 5.73 11.03 5.94
Exit rate 11.81 16.80 11.87 17.18 12.14 17.20
New firms per 100 people 0.34 1.53 0.32 1.18 0.35 1.75
Total firms per 100 people 2.84 2.11 2.83 2.07 2.88 2.15
Employment in new firms 86.33 107.29 83.29 103.59 88.78 109.06
Demographic data
Share white 0.69 0.27 0.69 0.28 0.68 0.27
Share black 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.19
Share 20-59 years old 0.53 0.10 0.52 0.10 0.53 0.11
Share college 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.13
Population 4,382 1,830 4,343 1,764 4,434 1,893
Observations 1123602 405177 661000
Average - by distance to the border
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distance from border < 5 miles 5-10 m 10-20m 20-40m 40-60 m 60+ miles
Firm dynamics
Entry rate 10.71 10.60 10.48 10.48 10.18 10.53
Exit rate 11.95 11.86 11.75 11.77 11.34 11.79
New firms per 100 people 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.32
Total firms per 100 people 2.74 2.81 2.88 2.86 2.90 2.83
Employment in new firms 78.44 81.28 87.35 84.62 83.49 83.33
Demographic data
Share white 0.64 0.67 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.70
Share black 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.15
Share 20-59 years old 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52
Share college 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.19
Population 4,153 4,289 4,435 4,247 4,340 4,283
Observations 112510 85713 123315 173579 31305 526422
The summary statistics are calculated with Infogroup data from 1997-2017. I discard the 1% outliers for
entry and exit rate. I also discard tracts without observations for at least 16 years over the sample period.
Demographic data come from the NGHIS and I use county level data when census tract data is not available.
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Table A.2: County level panel regression - weighted results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log Entry rate
Magnitude tax hike -1.39c -1.21 -1.63 -1.04 -1.68b -1.57c
(0.44) (0.76) (1.13) (0.62) (0.74) (0.43)
Magnitude tax cut 0.86 0.73 3.26b 1.17a -0.81 0.68
(0.67) (0.61) (1.27) (0.68) (1.11) (0.83)
County controls X X X X X X
State policy controls X X X X X X
Year & Division FE X X X X X X
Pop Weighted X X X
# Counties Weighted X
Border counties X X
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.19
Observations 20,860 20,860 8,143 8,143 12,717 12,717
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log Exit rate
Magnitude tax hike 1.28b 0.14 0.68 0.67 0.51 1.69c
(0.50) (0.78) (1.04) (0.50) (1.35) (0.57)
Magnitude tax cut -0.48 0.77 0.53 -0.05 -1.71a -0.65
(1.01) (1.04) (1.81) (1.47) (0.97) (0.88)
County controls X X X X X X
State policy controls X X X X X X
Year & Division FE X X X X X X
Pop Weighted X X X
# Counties Weighted X
Border counties X X
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.24
Observations 20,854 20,854 8,139 8,139 12,715 12,715
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table features population or number of counties weighted outcomes from table 1.4. Population weighs
are based on the national share of a county’s population. Number of counties weighs are the inverse proba-
bility of a county in a specific state being selected. This puts more weight on states with very few counties
(e.g. Rhode Island), and less weighs on states that have a lot more observations due to the larger number of


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.1: Trends in State Taxation
(a) Changes in corporate income tax
The figure depicts the median, 25th, and 75th percentile in state personal income tax rates.
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Figure A.2: Large changes in state taxes: 1978-2016
(a) Large changes in corporate income tax
(b) Large changes in personal income tax
These figures depicts states experiencing large changes as defined as the 75th percentile of tax hikes and
cuts respectively. The top panel shows large changes in the corporate income tax, while the bottom panel
illustrates states with large changes in the personal income tax.
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Figure A.3: Corporate and personal income tax average and change.
Average top marginal tax rate 1978-2017
(a) Corporate income tax (b) Personal income tax
Change in top marginal tax rate 1978-2017
(c) Corporate income tax (d) Personal income tax
In this figure I show the average top marginal and personal income tax rates and the total change
in top marginal tax rates between 1978 and 2017. See main text and appendix for data sources
and more information on tax reforms during this time period.
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Figure A.4: Model simulation with changes in total statutory corporate tax rate
(a) Entry rate (b) Exit rate
(c) Average size of new firms (d) Total number of firms
In this figure I show the results for the change in entry and exit rate, as well as average firm size and
total firms in the market following a change in the tax rate on business income. General equilibrium
computes optimal business decisions taking into consideration input prices adjustment (wages in
the model as the price of capital is normalized to 1).
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Figure A.5: Estimated coefficients and spillovers near the border
Tax cut in state A - negative spillovers








Tax cut in state A - positive spillovers







These two figures depict what happens near a state border when one state cuts the corporate income tax. I
assume that the outcome variable of interest, here entry rate, goes up in the treated state and look at what




A.3.1 Important corporate tax reforms
this section I provide more information on major tax reforms and tax changes in the
datasets. I focus on reforms covering the sample period (1997-2017). Unless otherwise
noted, when I describe periods of taxation, I assume the starting year to be the sample
start (i.e. 1997).
Ohio corporate tax reform
Until 2005, Ohio had a corporation franchise tax which taxed both the firm’s net worth
and the firm net income. In 2005, the net worth rate was 0.4% based on the company’s
equity valuation with a maximum tax bill capped at $150,000. The income tax rate worked
similarly to a corporate income tax, with a rate of 5.1% on the first 50,000 of income, and
a rate of 8.5% on the remaining income. Ohio decided to move to a commercial activity tax
(CAT) in 2005, with a 0.26% rate on annual gross receipts over 1 million, and a minimum
tax of 150 for receipts bewteen 150k and 1 million. Business with revenues lower than
150k are not taxed. The old franchise tax was phased out between 2005 and 2010, where
businesses had to pay 80% of their tax liability in 2006, 60% in 2007, 40% in 2008, 20%
in 2009, until the full phase out in 2010, where they only paid the CAT.
Michigan corporate tax reform
Until 2012, Michigan had a dual tax system taxing both profits and gross receipts at rate
4.95% and 0.8% respectively, with an additional 21.99% surcharge on total tax liability. In
2012, they switched to a flat net income tax rate of 6%, which was roughly similar to the
previous system in terms of average tax liability.
Texas corporate tax reform
Texas uses a franchise tax on total business revenues, which varies by industries (1% for
most firms, 0.5% for retailers and 0.575% for small businesses with less than 10 million
in revenue in 2015). Prior to 2005, Texas had a franchise tax based on annual receipts, in
addition to a surplus based on the federal taxable income plus executive compensation and
taxed at 4.5%. There was an additional property tax on capital of 0.25%. Following a large
decline in the tax base in the 1990s due to a loophole allowing pass-through businesses
to avoid the tax, Texas passed a large reform in 2005 which went into effect in 2008.
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They expanded the tax base to most pass-through entities (such as LLCs), increased the
minimum threshold to pay the tax from 150k to 300k and introduced the ”margin” tax
concept, where the tax base was calculated by multiplying a firm’s tax margin, defined as
revenues minus one of four possible deductions, with the firm’s revenues in Texas.
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A.3.2 List of corporate tax reforms 1978-2017
States with 1 corporate tax change
Alabama
• Tax hike 1.5pt in 2001
Arkansas
• Tax hike 0.5pt in 1991
Delaware
• Tax hike 1.5pt in 1978
Florida
• Tax hike .5pt in 1985
Iowa
• Tax hike 2pt in 1983
Maryland
• Tax hike 1.25pt in 2008
Mississippi
• Tax hike 1pt in 1983
South Carolina
• Tax cut -1pt in 1989
Tennessee
• Tax hike .5pt in 2003
States with 2 corporate tax changes
Alaska
• Tax cut -.4 in 2017
• Tax hike .4 in 2018
Maine
• Tax cut -.7pt in 1979
• Tax hike 2pt in 1983
Minnesota
• Tax cut -2.5pt in 1987
• Tax hike 0.3pt in 1990
Oklahoma
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• Tax hike 1pt in 1985
• Tax hike 1pt in 1991
Utah
• Tax hike .35pt in 1983
• Tax hike .65pt in 1984
States with 3 corporate tax changes
California
• Tax hike .6pt in 1980
• Tax cut -.3pt in 1988
• Tax cut -.46pt in 1997
Kansas
• Tax hike .6pt in 1993
• Tax cut -.3pt in 2008
• Tax cut -.05pt in 2011
Massachusetts
• Tax cut -.7pt in 2010
• Tax cut -.55pt in 2011
• Tax cut -.25pt in 2012
Missouri
• Tax hike 1.5pt in 1990
• Tax cut -.5pt in 1992
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1994
States with 4 corporate tax changes Idaho
• Tax hike 1.2pt in 1983
• Tax hike 0.3pt in 1988
• Tax cut -.4pt in 2001
• Tax cut -.2pt in 2013
Oregon
• Tax hike .5pt in 1978
• Tax cut -.9pt in 1987
• Tax hike 1.3pt in 2009
• Tax cut -.3pt in 2011
States with 5 corporate tax changes
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Pennsylvania
• Tax cut -1pt in 1985
• Tax cut -1pt in 1987
• Tax hike 3.75pt in 1991
• Tax cut 0.26pt in 1994
• Tax cut -2pt in 1995
Vermont
• Tax hike 1.5pt in 1985
• Tax cut -.75pt in 1988
• Tax hike 1.5pt in 1997
• Tax cut -.85pt in 2007
• Tax cut -.4pt in 2008
States with 6 corporate tax changes
Arizona
• Tax cut -1.2pt in 1990
• Tax cut -.3pt in 1994
• Tax cut -1.03pt in 1999
• Tax cut -1pt in 2001
• Tax cut -.47pt in 2014
• Tax cut -1.6pt in 2017
Kentucky
• Tax hike .2pt in 1981
• Tax hike 1.25pt in in 1985
• Tax hike .75pt in 1991
• Tax hike .25pt in 1992
• Tax cut -1.25pt in 2005
• Tax cut -1pt in 2007
New Mexico
• Tax hike 1pt in 1981
• Tax hike 1.2pt in 1983
• Tax hike .4pt in 1987
• Tax cut -.3pt in 2014
• Tax cut -1.1pt in 2017
• Tax cut -.3pt in 2018
Rhode Island
• Tax hike 1pt in 1983
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• Tax cut -1pt in 1984
• Tax hike 1pt in 1989
• Tax hike .99pt in 1991
• Tax cut -.99pt in 1994
• Tax cut -2pt in 2017
States with 7 corporate tax changes
District of Columbia
• Tax hike .6pt in 1985
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1987
• Tax hike .25pt in 1989
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1993
• Tax cut -.275pt in 1995
• Tax cut -.975pt in 2017
• Tax cut -.75pt in 2018
Illinois
• Tax cut -.35pt in 1981
• Tax hike .8pt in 1983
• Tax cut -.8pt in 1985
• Tax hike 0.8pt in 1989
• Tax hike 2.2pt in 2011
• Tax hike -1.75pt in 2017
• Tax hike 1.75pt in 2018
Indiana
• Tax hike 1pt in 1983
• Tax hike .9pt in 1987
• Tax hike .6pt in 2003
• Tax cut -.5pt in 2012
• Tax cut -.5p in 2014
• Tax cut -1.25pt in 2017
• Tax cut -.25pt in 2018
New Jersey
• Tax hike 1.5 pt in 1981
• Tax hike .375pt in 1989
• Tax hike 0.05pt in 1990
• Tax cut -0.05pt in 1991
• Tax cut -.375pt in 1994
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• Tax hike .36pt in 2006
• Tax cut -.36pt in 2010
States with 8 or more corporate tax changes
Colorado
• Tax hike 1pt in 1987
• Tax cut -.5pt in 1989
• Tax cut -.1pt in 1990
• Tax cut -.1pt in 1991
• Tax cut -.1pt in 1992
• Tax cut -.1pt in 1993
• Tax cut -.1pt in 1994
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1999
• Tax cut -.12pt in 2000
Connecticut
• Tax hike 1.5pt in 1983
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1995
• Tax cut -.5pt in 1996
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1997
• Tax cut -1pt in 1998
• Tax cut -1pt in 1999
• Tax cut -1pt in 2000
• Tax hike 1.5pt in 2012
• Tax cut -1.5pt in 2017
Nebraska
• Tax cut -.55pt in 1978
• Tax hike .55pt in 1979
• Tax cut -.825pt in 1980
• Tax hike 2.175pt in 1982
• Tax hike .7pt in 1983
• Tax cut -.35t in 1984
• Tax hike .35pt in 1985
• Tax cut -.35pt in 1986
• Tax hike .59pt in 1990
• Tax hike .57pt in 1991
New Hampshire
• Tax hike 1pt in 1978
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• Tax hike 1.08pt in 1982
• Tax hike .48pt in 1983
• Tax cut -1.31pt in 1985
• Tax cut -2.5pt in 1987
• Tax cut -.5pt in 1993
• Tax cut -.5pt in 1995
• Tax hike 1pt in 1999
• Tax hike .5pt in 2001
• Tax cut -.3pt in 2017
New York
• Tax cut -1pt in 1987
• Tax hike 1.35pt in 1990
• Tax cut -.225pt in 1994
• Tax cut -.45pt in 1995
• Tax cut -.45pt in 1996
• Tax cut -.225pt in 1997
• Tax cut -.5pt in 2000
• Tax cut -.5pt in 2001
• Tax cut -.5pt in 2002
• Tax cut -.4pt in 2008
• Tax cut -.6pt in 2017
North Carolina
• Tax hike 1pt in 1987
• Tax hike 1.06pt in 1991
• Tax cut -.0775pt in 1992
• Tax cut -.0775pt in 1993
• Tax cut -.0775pt in 1994
• Tax cut -.0775pt in 1995
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1997
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1998
• Tax cut -.25pt in 1999
• Tax cut -.1pt in 2000
• Tax cut -.9pt in 2014
• Tax cut -3pt in 2017
North Dakota
• Tax hike 2.5pt in 1978
• Tax cut -1.5pt in 1981
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• Tax hike 3.5pt in 1983
• Tax cut -3.5pt in 2005
• Tax cut -.5pt in 2008
• Tax cut -.1pt in 2010
• Tax cut -1.2pt in 2012
• Tax cut -.05pt in 2013
• Tax cut -0.62pt in 2014
• Tax cut -.22pt in 2017
West Virginia
• Tax hike 2.05pt in 1983
• Tax cut -1.05pt in 1986
• Tax hike 2.75pt in 1987
• Tax cut -.15pt in 1989
• Tax cut -.15pt in 1990
• Tax cut -.15pt in 1991
• Tax cut -.3pt in 1993
• Tax cut -.25pt in 2008
• Tax cut -.25pt in 2009
• Tax cut -.75pt in 2012
• Tax cut -.75pt in 2013
• Tax cut -.5pt in 2014
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A.3.3 Matching and additional analysis
In this section I present additional results at the census tract level using a matching esti-
mations.
Census tract level
The main matching techniques uses observable characteristics to combine tracts that are
most similar. I create an similarity index based on both demographics (population, share
of black, white, college educated, and 20-59 year old inhabitants) and economic character-
istics (total firms, firm entries, firms exits, employment in new firms). I find the average of
each characteristics for years 1997-1999 and then subtract the national mean and divide
by the standard error of each characteristics across all tracts in the same period. I then
define the similarity index between two tracts as
Ic1,c2 =
∑( ȳc1 − ȳ√
var(y)
− ȳc2 − ȳ√
var(y)
)2
which is essentially the sum of the squared difference between the tracts. I then match
each tract to the 10 closest tracts according to Ic1,c2. I define 3 indexes, one based on
demographic characteristics, one based on economic characteristics, and the combination
of the two. For all indexes I use population as a parameter. Given the large potential
of tracts, I restrict the potential matching sample to the 500 closest tracts (the average
number of pairs by tract when restricting to areas within 50 miles of the border and tracts
within 50 miles of each other is close to 700).
The second matching technique is based on distance between census tracts. For each
tract I find the closest 10 tracts across the border. I then compute the difference in out-
comes across tracts. Second, I perform the same matches but limiting the sample to tracts
in border counties.In areas with small counties, it is not unusual to have the majority of
potential tract matches to not be located in a border county.
The last matching technique randomizes the choice of matches within specific subsets.
Within each particular subset, I randomly select 10 matching tracts for the analysis. One
particular subset is limiting matches to tract in border counties. The main reason is so that
I can compare the results to the county border differential estimates. The second subset
uses the 100 closest tracts by distance, or the 100 closest tracts by the overall index.
Under the assumptions that spillover will be larger as firms are closer to the border, I
look at the effect of changes in corporate tax rates based on distance between the census
tract and the closest border. I categorize spillover effects into two main categories. The
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first one is
I evaluate the following model
ÿc1c2t = βτ̈s(c1)s(c2)t ×Dist+ ΘẌc1c2t + λc1c2 + εit (A.1)
where ¨xc1c2 = xc1 − xc2 is the average difference between matched census tracts.
Table A.5: State taxes - effect on log entry rate
Index 20 full index 20 dem 20 bus 10 all 10 dem 10 closest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Corp rate -0.67b -0.75b -0.71b -0.74b -0.63b -0.69b -0.70b -0.82a
(0.32) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.41)
Pers rate 0.06 0.73 1.04 1.12 1.10 1.13 1.15 1.22
(0.75) (0.80) (0.84) (0.85) (0.82) (0.87) (0.88) (0.89)
Weighted X X X X X X X X X
Other policy X X X X X X
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
N (in 1000s) 891 860 840 879 817 798 797
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
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A.4 Theory
A.4.1 General Equilibrium Model
I use a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms in perfect competition and a
representative household. Household utility is given by U(C,N) = logC − vN , where v
represents the disutility of labor. Household discount the future at rate β. Firms produce a
homogeneous good according to the production function y = f(z, k, l), where z represents
a the firm’s total factor of productivity, and k and l are capital and labor inputs respectively.
Productivity follows a Markov process which implies that the firm’s output each period
is uncertain. Firms also face a random cost of production cf , which is a fixed cost for
remaining operational. Each period firms decide how much to invest and how many people
to hire. Investment is denoted as i = k − (1 − δ)k−1, where δ is capital depreciation, and
k−1 is stock of capital from the previous period. Firms pay a capital income tax τ on profits.
Firms also face a cost of capital adjustment specified as φ(k, k−1) and labor can be adjusted
without any costs.
At the beginning of each period, firms decided whether to continue operating or exit
the market.1 Continuing firms then learn their productivity draw z and their profit is
π = y−wn− i− cf − φ(k, k−1). If a firm exits they sell their remaining capital and make a
profit of π = (1− δ)k−1− φ(0, k−1). Entry in the market is free but firms must pay an entry
cost of ce. Entrants know their lagged productivity z−1 and decided whether to enter or
not based on their expected value function. As such they behave as incumbents where the
main difference is that they do not pay adjustment cost for their initial capital investment
upon entering.
Firms are taxed at rate τ on their economic profit. Firms can deduct labor costs, the
fixed cost of production and the capital adjustment cost. Entrants cannot deduct the entry
cost. Investment can be expensed gradually as was the case in the United States until
2017. I assume that tax depreciation is the same as economic depreciation, which implies
firms can deduct δk from their tax bill. I assume that firms exiting the market do not pay
taxes on selling the remaining capital (which is equivalent to a negative investment).2 The
tax bill is then Tc = τ(πc + i− δk) for continuing firms, and Tx = τ(πx + i) = −τφ(0, k−1).
Importantly, I assume that firms can carryback their operating loss when they exit, hence
making tax bill is negative for exiting firms.3 I assume the government runs a balanced
1One could model the firm’s decision after observing their productivity draw. However, this specification
makes solving the model more tractable, as discussed in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
2Some states have capital income gains taxes in place. The model assumes a constant price of capital so
capital gains taxes would not affect firms decisions.
3Firms could carry back losses up two years until 2017 federally. Several states allow carrybacks between
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budget and returns tax collections in the form of a negative lump sum tax to households.
We can now turn to the value function. Given that households own the firms and
discount the future, the implied interest rate in a stationary equilibrium is r = 1/(β − 1).
The firm value function before making the exit decision is




πc − Tc +
1
1 + r
V (z, k)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Continuation value
, πx − Tx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Exit value
}
We can now define a productivity value z∗−1 at which the firm is indifferent between
continuing and exiting. The cutoff is increasing in input prices (namely the wage rate)
and production costs, as they lower the present value of the firm and drive out lower
productivity firms. I assume that there is a positive mass of entrants in equilibrium, which
implies that the cost of entry is equal the the expected value of entrants, ce = E[Ve(z−1)].
The value for new firms is also declining in the wage rate and production cost cf . Note
that it is also declining in the cutoff level, since it increases the likelihood a firm will exit
in the future, and reduces its expected value.
Total labor demand, investment (including fixed costs and adjustment costs) and capi-
tal are denoted by L, I and K, total output by Y . The price of goods is normalized to 1. I
can define the equilibrium as
• Optimal decision rule by firms for labor (n), investment (i) and exit ( z∗−1)
• Optimal decision rule by household for consumption (C) and labor supply (N)
• Government tax rate (τ)
• Mass of entrant Me and wage rate w which clear the labor and goods market.
which solve the household and the firms objective function, satisfy the free entry condition,
balance the government’s budget, and clear the labor market. While I cannot derive close-
formed predictions, in the next section I discuss the effect of tax changes qualitatively and
focus on the direct and indirect effects. I then simulate the model and derive the new exit
and entry rates, as well as firm size and optimal labor and capital.
Calibration Following Sedlacek and Sterk (2019) I parametErize the fixed operational
cost cf as stochastic following a logistic distribution with mean µf and standard deviation
f . This implies that all firms have a positive probability of continuing, regardless of their
2 and 3 years (e.g. California, Idaho, Missouri, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Georgia, West Virginia, Virginia,
Delaware and Maryland had a 2-year carryback provision, while Montana, Wyoming, Utah, South Dakota
and New York had a 3-year provision in 2017.) In the simulation, I also look at the effect of tax reform on
entry and exit without carryback rules.
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productivity draw. The discount factor β is set to 0.96 (roughly equivalent to a 4% in-
terest rate). The production function is y = z(kαl1−α)θ, with the share of capital income
α = 0.35, and the span of control θ=0.9.4. The capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.08.
Productivity follows a log normal distribution log z = µz + ρzlogz−1 + ε, with ε ∼ N(0, σ2z).
The remaining parameters (mean of TFP shocks - µ, dispersion of TFP shocks - , auto cor-
relation of TFP shocks - ρz, mean of cost shocks - µf , the adjustment costs parameters ζ0
and ζ1) are set such that the model matches specific statistics from the data. Note that the
disutility of labor v is set so that the wage rate is normalized to 1, and the entry cost ce is
set to normalize the mass of new firms to 1.The calibration process and specific matching
moments is described in the appendix. Parameter values and the statistics targets in the
model are shown and discussed in the appendix. I calibrate the model with a starting
tax rate of 41.6%, which is equivalent to the sum of the statutory federal tax rate of 35%
between 1993 and 2017, and the average state corporate income tax between 1997 and
2017 (6.6%).
The target parameters and outputs from the calibration are shown on the following table:
4These values are standard in the macroeconomics literature, and span of control being in the range
documented by Basu and Fernald (1997)
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Parameters Value
r Discount rate 0.04
α Capital share 0.35
θ Span of control 0.90
δ Depreciation rate 0.08
ρz Autocorrelation of TFP shocks 0.38
σz Standard Deviation of TFP shocks 0.19
µz Mean of TFP shocks 0.26
µH Mean of cost shocks 2.20
σH Dispersion of cost shocks 2.95
ζ0 Non-convex adjustment costs 0.001
ζ1 Convex adjustment costs 0.27
ce Entry cost 1.55
v Disutility of labor 0.01
τ Tax rate 0.416
Parameter values
Target Data Model
Investment rate mean 0.12 0.10
Investment rate standard deviation 0.34 0.41
Investment autocorrelation 0.06 0.05
Inaction rate 0.08 0.07
Average exit rate 0.09 0.10
Relative exit rate 2.2 2.2
Average size 21 19
Targets: data and model
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B.1 Additional Tables
Table B.1: Data description for selected variables
Variable Description
HPI Average house price index at the county level
Nav Net assessed value of properties at the county level
Mill rate
Property tax on $1, 000 of assessed value averaged at the county
level
Aggregate levy limit Limit on the growth of levy at the jurisdiction level
Jurisdiction rate limit Limit on the growth of mill rate at the jurisdiction level
Assessment limit overall Presence of assessment limit in the county
Demographic controls Share of white population, share of black population
share of population age 20-29, share of population age 30-39
share of population age 40-49, share of population age 50-59
share of college educated population, share of urban area in county
unemployment rate
Public finance controls Fraction of own source revenues
Fraction of property tax on total revenues
Fraction of other taxes on total revenues
Fraction intergovernmental revenues on total revenues
Income controls Personal income, employment income, wage income
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics: limits by state
Assessment limit Rate limit Rate limit Levy limit Levy limit
on property for jurisdiction on property in aggregate
Alabama X X
Alaska X
Arizona X X X X
Arkansas X X X
California X X X
Colorado X X X X
Connecticut X
Delaware X X





Illinois X X X
Indiana X X













Nevada X X X
New Hampshire
New Jersey X
New Mexico X X X X
New York X X X
North Carolina X
North Dakota X X
Ohio X X X
Oklahoma X X
Oregon X X X
Pennsylvania X X
Rhode Island X
South Carolina X X
South Dakota X
Tennessee X




Washington X X X
West Virginia X X X
Wisconsin X X
Wyoming X
Notes: Data from Paquin (2015) and Lincoln Institute and of Public Policy (2021b)
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Table B.3: Summary Statistics: by local property tax limits
No levy limits Aggregate levy limit
∆Y ear Mean p50 p25 p75 sd Mean p50 p25 p75 sd
%∆ HPI 0.33 0.29 -3.00 3.44 6.49 0.41 0.28 -2.34 2.87 4.83
%∆ NAV per cap 1.91 0.69 -1.78 4.58 8.13 1.43 0.14 -2.07 3.38 7.73
%∆ Levy per cap 1.94 1.30 -1.44 4.61 7.37 2.42 1.54 -0.94 4.85 8.30
%∆ Mill rate 0.11 0.00 -1.26 1.79 6.23 1.28 0.45 -1.57 3.66 8.95
Observations 11884 26501
No levy limits Aggregate levy limit
∆2007− 2012 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd Mean p50 p25 p75 sd
%∆ HPI -23.62 -20.87 -32.55 -13.17 13.88 -14.85 -13.50 -22.32 -7.46 12.08
%∆ NAV per cap -0.56 -1.24 -12.18 10.41 21.71 5.33 0.90 -8.56 13.57 21.69
%∆ Levy per cap 3.11 3.65 -5.75 13.10 17.18 11.50 8.64 0.32 18.69 17.90
%∆ Mill rate 4.95 2.76 -0.75 9.57 11.97 7.39 4.00 -3.20 16.25 18.01
Observations 713 1556
No levy limits Aggregate levy limit
∆2007− 2015 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd Mean p50 p25 p75 sd
%∆ HPI07 15 -19.85 -20.08 -27.51 -12.39 11.31 -12.18 -13.11 -21.24 -4.72 13.78
%∆ NAV per cap 3.80 -0.59 -15.49 14.10 32.50 11.33 2.27 -11.34 18.51 38.53
%∆ Levy per cap 6.75 6.39 -6.78 17.02 22.37 18.19 12.87 0.55 29.34 27.07
%∆ Mill rate 5.56 3.49 -0.57 12.53 14.98 9.57 6.56 -3.49 21.33 25.07
Observations 714 1536
No rate limits Juris. rate limit
∆Y ear Mean p50 p25 p75 sd Mean p50 p25 p75 sd
%∆ HPI 0.60 0.31 -2.85 3.61 6.32 0.28 0.28 -2.42 2.85 5.06
%∆ NAV per cap 2.55 0.69 -1.50 5.07 9.38 1.15 0.12 -2.19 3.28 7.05
%∆ Levy per cap 2.63 1.74 -0.67 5.17 7.19 2.11 1.37 -1.30 4.59 8.36
%∆ Mill rate 0.39 0.10 -1.43 3.05 7.76 1.15 0.26 -1.46 3.04 8.41
Observations 11633 26752
No rate limits Juris. rate limit
∆2007− 2012 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd Mean p50 p25 p75 sd
%∆ HPI -19.92 -17.22 -27.45 -10.64 14.53 -17.03 -15.69 -24.77 -7.99 12.77
%∆ NAV per cap 7.45 3.70 -5.55 15.49 22.72 1.73 -1.59 -10.32 11.21 21.24
%∆ Levy per cap 11.41 8.94 1.82 17.90 16.18 7.77 5.77 -2.98 16.46 18.79
%∆ Mill rate 5.85 4.27 -2.70 13.43 15.97 6.99 3.15 -1.96 14.17 16.60
Observations 707 1562
No rate limits Juris. rate limit
∆2007− 2015 Mean p50 p25 p75 sd Mean p50 p25 p75 sd
%∆ HPI -17.42 -17.54 -26.02 -10.08 12.96 -13.72 -15.26 -22.84 -5.20 13.54
%∆ NAV per cap 11.70 5.39 -6.67 19.55 32.68 7.64 -1.48 -14.06 16.31 38.60
%∆ Levy per cap 17.58 13.63 4.76 25.90 20.47 13.13 8.41 -4.52 23.46 28.36
%∆ Mill rate 8.90 6.68 -0.60 19.20 19.29 8.00 4.16 -2.55 17.03 23.72
Observations 704 1546
All values are adjusted for inflation with 2000 as the base year. Jurisdiction rate limits are limits on what
mill a local jurisdiction can impose. Aggregate levy limits are limit on the maximum growth in tax levy.
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Table B.4: The tax base: Home price index and assessed values 2
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAV per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years All All < 2008 ≥2008 < 2008 ≥2008
(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) > 0 0.17c 0.15c 0.19c 0.13c 0.18c 0.09c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
|(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) < 0| -0.18c -0.19c 0.66b -0.18c 0.28c -0.19c
(0.01) (0.02) (0.29) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
Weighted X X X
R2 0.14 0.30 0.22 0.10 0.39 0.26
Observations 23,814 23,814 7,487 16,327 7,487 16,327
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000
as the reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem prop-
erty taxes. Weights are based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and
2010.The independent variables are the three year first difference in home prices between 2002 and 2015.
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Table B.5: The policy effect: the tax base and property tax revenues - 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logmill ∆ log levy cap
(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) > 0 -0.09c -0.07c 0.07c 0.05c
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
|(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) < 0| 0.05c 0.06c -0.12c -0.09c
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Weighted X X
R2 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.24
Observations 22,534 22,534 22,534 22,534
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ logmill ∆ log levy cap
Years < 2008 ≥2008 < 2008 ≥2008
(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) > 0 -0.14c -0.04c 0.08c 0.07c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
|(logHPIt − logHPIt−3) < 0| -0.47b 0.06c 0.57c -0.12c
(0.22) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01)
R2 0.07 0.04 0.18 0.10
Observations 7,087 15,447 7,087 15,447
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. All variables except for the mill rate are adjusted for inflation using the GDP deflator and using 2000
as the reference year. HPI denotes the home price index and is provided by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. NAV refers to Net Assessed Value and represents the tax base on which is levied ad valorem property
taxes. Weights are based on the average national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.
The independent variables are the three year first difference in home prices between 2002 and 2015.
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Table B.6: The Great Recession: disentangling the tax base and policy effect - Pop Weighted
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV 0.37c 0.33b 0.29a
(0.13) (0.12) (0.17)
∆ logNAV > 0 0.54c 0.48c 0.59c
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.30 -0.30b -0.23
(0.20) (0.14) (0.21)
R2 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.20
Observations 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV -0.55c -0.63c -0.65c
(0.14) (0.13) (0.18)
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.35c -0.35c -0.24c
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.65c 0.67c 0.74c
(0.22) (0.16) (0.22)
R2 0.39 0.42 0.55 0.56 0.48 0.52
Observations 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial corre-
lation. This table presents results from table 2.6 weighting outcomes. Weights are based on the average
national share in the county population between 2000 and 2010.
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Table B.7: The Great Recession: The role of rate and levy limits 2007-2012 (by jurisdiction)
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Yearly ∆ for years 2007-2012
∆ logNAVt > 0 0.70c 0.63c 0.76c 0.42c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| -0.33c -0.42c -0.51c -0.42c
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
∆ logNAVt > 0× jurisd. rate limit -0.08c -0.36c
(0.03) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × jurisd. rate limit -0.16c 0.06
(0.04) (0.09)
∆ logNAVt > 0× ind. property levy lim. 0.22c 0.47c
(0.03) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × ind. property levy lim. -0.29c -0.24b
(0.03) (0.05)
R2 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.43
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,877 12,877
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Years Yearly ∆ for years 2007-2012
∆ logNAVt > 0 -0.29c -0.30c -0.24c -0.52c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| 0.66c 0.52c 0.49c 0.52c
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
∆ logNAVt > 0× jurisd. rate limit 0.00 -0.28c
(0.02) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × jurisd. rate limit -0.21c 0.03
(0.04) (0.09)
∆ logNAVt > 0× ind. property levy lim. 0.06c 0.29c
(0.02) (0.07)
|∆ logNAVt < 0| × ind. property levy lim. -0.04c -0.04c
(0.03) (0.09)
R2 0.20 0.20 0.35 0.41
Observations 12,877 12,877 12,877 12,877
Pop. Weighted X X
Standard errors are clustered at the county level to take into account county level policy and serial correla-
tion. This table presents results from table 2.7 using jurisdiction rate limits rather than overall rate limits.
Jurisdiction rate limits are specified as limits on the mill rate a local jurisdiction can impose. Levy limits on
individual property are limits that restrict the maximum effective tax rate on a property to a certain percent-
age, either based on market value or assessed value. See text and appendix for more details on the data
sources and which states have such limits.
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Table B.8: The Great Recession: the role of limits - long differences - Pop Weighted
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 0.47c 0.92c 0.53c 0.85c 0.65c 1.08c
(0.09) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22) (0.13) (0.18)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.03 -0.60c 0.01 -0.62c 0.11 -0.70c
(0.11) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.12 -0.08 -0.08
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim -0.30 -0.35b -0.36
(0.24) (0.16) (0.24)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim -0.52b -0.45 -0.58b
(0.25) (0.27) (0.24)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.75c 0.54c 0.77c
(0.18) (0.18) (0.16)
r2 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.41 0.21 0.43
N 2,176 2,176 2,205 2,205 2,161 2,161
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV > 0 -0.54c -0.09 -0.47c -0.15 -0.35b 0.07
(0.09) (0.22) (0.11) (0.22) (0.13) (0.18)
|∆ logNAV < 0| 0.94c 0.32c 1.00c 0.33b 1.08c 0.23c
(0.11) (0.07) (0.05) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×rate lim 0.31a 0.18 0.14
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×rate lim -0.32 -0.37b -0.37
(0.26) (0.17) (0.26)
∆ logNAV > 0 ×agg levy lim -0.36 -0.25 -0.38a
(0.24) (0.24) (0.20)
|∆ logNAV < 0| ×agg levy lim 0.82c 0.58c 0.84c
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
r2 0.43 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.53 0.68
N 2,175 2,175 2,204 2,204 2,160 2,160
This table presents weighted results for table 2.8. Weights are based on the average national share in the
county population between 2000 and 2010.
180
Table B.9: Tax base versus policy effect: taking stock - Limited sample
Dep. var: ∆ Log NAV per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.01 0.16c 0.21b
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
∆ logHPI > 0 -0.02 0.18 0.37
(0.42) (0.25) (0.69)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.01 -0.16c -0.21b
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logNAV 0.46c 0.42c 0.47c
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
∆ logNAV > 0 0.57c 0.65c 0.64c
(0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
|∆ logNAV < 0| -0.22 -0.17 -0.18
(0.18) (0.15) (0.20)
R2 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.35 0.31 0.39
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
The top panel of this table presents results from table 2.9 limiting the sample where both levy and assessed
values are available for the years evaluated (2007-2015). The bottom panel estimates the top panel of table
2.6, limiting the sample where the Home Price Index is available.
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Table B.10: Tax base versus policy effect: taking stock - Weighted results
Dep. var: ∆ Log levy per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.00 0.10 0.09
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13)
∆ logHPI > 0 1.47c 1.46c 1.11c
(0.35) (0.38) (0.14)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.00 -0.10 -0.08
(0.08) (0.07) (0.14)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.07
Observations 1,686 1,686 1,713 1,713 1,686 1,686
Dep. var: ∆ Log mill rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2007-2010 2007-2012 2007-2015
∆ logHPI -0.13c -0.24c -0.34c
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
∆ logHPI > 0 0.37 0.28 2.41c
(1.46) (1.28) (0.86)
|∆ logHPI < 0| 0.13c 0.24c 0.39c
(0.05) (0.08) (0.11)
R2 0.11 0.12 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.39
Observations 1,685 1,685 1,712 1,712 1,685 1,685
This table presents weighted results for table 2.9. Weights are based on the average national share in the
county population between 2000 and 2010.
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Table B.11: Correlations between changes in income, demographics, limits and change in
the home price index
Correlation with ∆ logHPIt
∆Share whitet -0.07c Fraction revenue own source 0.46c
(0.02) (0.12)
∆Share blackt -0.55c Fraction revenue property tax 1.30c
(0.15) (0.23)
∆Share population 20-29t 1.32c Fraction revenue other taxes -0.43
(0.19) (0.44)
∆Share population 30-39t -0.38b Fraction inter-gov. transfers -0.77c
(0.18) (0.13)
∆Share population 40-49t 1.67c
(0.13)
∆Share population 50-59t 2.95c Some rate limit 1.72c
(0.15) (0.14)
∆Share colleget -0.90c Rate lim. on jurisdiction -1.48c
(0.05) (0.13)
∆Share urbant -0.13c Rate lim. on property -0.15b
(0.02) (0.06)
∆Unemployment ratet -1.21c Some levy limit -1.03c
(0.05) (0.11)
∆Log income per capt -0.03b Levy lim. - aggregate 0.90c
(0.01) (0.10)
∆Log employmentt 0.41c Levy lim. on property 0.27b
(0.03) (0.12)
∆Log wage per capt 0.05c
(0.01)
This table reports coefficient from four separate regressions to find the correlation between the yearly change
in log home price index and the relevant variables reported. The data covers yearly changes between 2000
and 2016. Standard errors are clustered at the Each horizontal separation denotes a separate regression.
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B.2 Additional Figures
Figure B.1: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate - 2
(a) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - population weighted
full sample
(b) U.S. average change 2000-2015 - full sample un-
weighted / non adjusted for inflation
The top figure plots the county weighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2002. The bottom figures plots the unweighted US average change of the four denominated variables
not adjusted for inflation. Values are standardized from base year 2002. See text and appendix for more
details on how variables are computed.
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Figure B.2: Changes in HPI, Assessed values, property tax levy and mill rate - subsamples
Weighted
(a) Counties with some rate limits (b) Counties without some rate limits
(c) Counties with aggregate levy limits (d) Counties without aggregate levy limits
The top figure plots the county weighted US average change in the four denominated variables starting in
year 2003, by whether counties are in a state with or without any rate limit, or with/without any aggregate
levy limit. Refer to previous tables and text for exact definition of rate and aggregate levy limits. See text
and appendix for more details on how variables are computed.
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Figure B.3: Median and inter-quartile range of yearly changes 2000-2016 - By rate limits
(a) % Change in property tax levy - aggregate levy
limit
(b) % Change in property tax levy - NO aggregate
levy limit
(c) % Change in mill rate - rate jurisdiction limit
(d) % Change in mill rate - NO rate jurisdiction
limit
Our baseline mill rate is computed as the total tax levy divided by the taxable assessed value × 1000. The
column ”Mill avg.” indicates whether the mill rate was computed by finding an average of the mill rate for
multiple jurisdictions in the county. When both are available, we use the baseline mill rate. The column
Aggregated indicates whether the data was collected at the county level or for at the taxing district level,
and then aggregated for all counties.
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Figure B.4: County level 5-year %∆ change
(a) Change in levy per capita 2002-2007 (b) Change in levy per capita 2007-2012
(c) Change in nav per capita 2002-2007 (d) Change in nav per capita 2007-2012
These maps show the 5-year percentage change in levy per capita and assessed value per capita between
2002 and 2007, and between 2007 and 2012. All values are adjusted for inflation.
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Figure B.15: County level 5-year %∆ change
(a) Change in mill rate 2002-2007 (b) Change in mill rate 2007-2012
(c) Change in HPI2002-2007 (d) Change in HPI 2007-2012
These maps show the 5-year percentage change in mill rate and county home price index (HPI) between
2002 and 2007, and between 2007 and 2012. All values are adjusted for inflation.
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B.3 Property tax variables and data collection procedure
This document explains the data collection and cleaning process for all states. We include
documentation on the variables collected and used. The first section describes the typical
format for the collected property tax data, as well as specific issues related to the data
collection and cleaning. Section 2 summarizes the data collected. Section 3 includes
information on the data collected in each state, as well as important details or potential
issues specific to that state. Finally, the last section discusses the sources used to collect
data on property tax limitations and discusses specific issues.
County level mill rate
We determine the mill rate from three different methods
1. Dividing levy by total net taxable assessed value × 1000
2. Using the average county mill rate given directly in tax reports (assumed to be cal-
culated as 1), unless stated otherwise). When both 1) and 2) are available, we check
they are the same.
3. Using the average county level mill rate calculated from the average of all sub ju-
risdictions within a county. For instance, average county mill rate = county rate +
average city rate + average school rate.
1) is our preferred option when others are available. When computing 3), we typically
don’t include special districts. Special districts (e.g. fire departments, library, etc.) only
make up a tiny fraction of property tax levy. The main issue is that because not every
property in the state will be subject to a levy from a special district, a simple average will
cause an upward bias in the mean county mill rate.
Assessed value
There are two main issues to consider. The first one is that some states report the net
taxable value, which is used to determine the tax rate based on the required levy. Some
states may report assessed value before exemptions. Unless specifically stated, we assume
that assessed values reported in annual property tax reports are the net taxable value.
Some states are not specifically reporting assessed values before exemptions, in that case
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we assume they report the taxable value only.
The second issue with assessed value is that it can be different for counties and school
districts. While most states order assessment to be made at the county level (sometimes at
the state level), school district and counties may have different exemption levels, implying
a different net taxable assessed value at the county level for either jurisdictions. When
multiple assessed values are reported, our preferred choice is the county assessed value,
as some school district borders cross county limits. In states where school districts do not
cross county limits, we can also compute the average of the two to find the average taxable
value at the county level.
Tax levy
Tax levies are rather straightforward and typically reported at the county level for the
total of all sub jurisdictions within a county, or by jurisdictions. When reported individu-
ally, we compute the county level total of each sub-jurisdiction (e.g. county total from all
levies by school districts), and the county total for all jurisdictions.
Type of property considered
In many cases the disaggregated values for different types of property are not available,
and the data reported refers to all property tax categories. Usually, personal property
constitutes only a fraction of real property. Therefore, as standard, we will use the Total
Residential Land, Improvements & Personal Property valuation.
Year vs Fiscal year
In some cases, data is reported according to the fiscal year and not the calendar year. In
addition, different states have different definitions of fiscal year, for example New York’s
state fiscal year begins April 1 and ends on March 31, while Michigan’s begins October 1
and ends September 30. In the majority of cases, we follow the state reports in assigning
data to the calendar year in which taxes are levied.
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B.4 Cleaning log
The following list details for each state the source of the data, the variables collected
and / or computed, the years available and specific issues if present. In addition to the
state-specific sources referenced, materials from the Lincoln Institute have been used in
producing this section1.
B.4.1 Alabama
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute for mill rates, and Alabama Department of Revenue
for Annual Reports.
• Data available:
– Net taxable assessed valuation by county (Including Real, Business Personal,
and Motor Vehicle Property (State))
– Net collections (levy) after all exemptions by State, Counties, Municipalities and
Schools at the County level.
– Mill rates: Millage available by county as imposed by the state, the county, the
school districts within the county and the municipalities within the county
• Computed variables: County level millage is computed by summing the total state
and county-wide mill rates to the average of the mill rates for municipalities and
school districts within the county.
• Years: Data for assessment collected from 1997-2019, for levies collected for 2000-
2019. The data on levy is based on year the levy is determined. Taxes are collected
the following year. The data on millage rates is available from 2000-2019, but miss-
ing for 2013 and 2015. Alabama begins the fiscal year on October 1st. Assessment
data reported by fiscal year.
1Significant Features of the Property Tax. https://www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data-
toolkits/significant-features-property-tax/access-property-tax-database/property-tax-rates Lincoln Institute
of Land Policy and George Washington Institute of Public Policy. (Property Tax Rates; accessed: 05/19/2021
09:26:50 PM)
State-by-State Property Tax at a Glance. https://www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data-
toolkits/significant-features-property-tax/state-state-property-tax-glance. Significant Features of the
Property Tax. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and George Washington Institute of Public Policy. (Property
Tax at a Glance; accessed: 10/31/2017 4:41:21 PM)
Retrieved May 12, 2021, from https://revenue.alabama.gov/category/publications/annual-reports/
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• Assessment and levy data includes Real, Business Personal, and Motor Vehicle Prop-
erty.
B.4.2 Alaska
No data is available for Alaska.
B.4.3 Arizona
• Source of data: Arizona Department of Revenue Annual Reports, available at the
Arizona Department of Revenue for years 2008-2020, and Lincoln Institute for years
1999-2019.
• Data available:
– Asssessed value computed using the primary limited property value (LPV) and
the secondary full cash value (FCV). LPV is always lower or equal to full market
value and has limits placed on how much it can increase.
– Primary and secondary Levies by jurisdictions (state, county, municipality, school
districts, community colleges, and all other jurisdictions)
– Primary and secondary mill rates.
• Computed variables: We compute the total levy at the county level by summing
primary and secondary levy for all jurisdictions within a county. Using the secondary
net assessed value and the computed total levy, we obtain a measure of county-level
mill rate.
• Years: We collected data from 1999 to 2017. Data in Arizona is given based on the
fiscal year. The fiscal year is the 12-month period beginning on July 1 and ending
June 30 of the following year.
• Property Classification: In Arizona property is categorized into 9 different groups.
Each classification is assigned a specific assessment ratio prescribed by law which
is then multiplied by the full cash and limited values to produce an assessed value.
Properties in all classes are subject to the same tax rate.
Retrieved May 14, 2021 from https://azdor.gov/reports-statistics-and-legal-research/annual-reports
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• Other: Beginning in Tax Year 2015, both primary and secondary taxes are levied
against the limited (primary) value.
B.4.4 Arkansas
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute for levies by class, assessed values by class and
effective rates by class between 1995 and 2005, and average county mill rates for
2005-2018. Arkansas department of property tax through direct contact for assessed
values at the county level between 2012 and 2018.
• Data available:
– Mill rates by class at the county level between 1995-2005.
– Mill rates by jurisdiction (school district, cities, county) between 2005-2018.
– Assessed values by class at the county level between 1995-2005
– Levies by class at the county level between 1995-2005
– Assessment at the county level between 2012-2018
• Computed variables: For years 1995-2005, compute mill by dividing total levy across
classes over total assessed value across classes. For 2006-2018, average mill rate at
the county level already provided in the data.
• Years: 1995-2018 for mill rates, 1995-2005 for levies, 1995-2005 and 2012-2018
for assessed values. Data in Arkansas is reported for years levied. Taxes reported
would be collected the following year. Data in Arkansas is based on levy, the year of
collection is the following year. The Fiscal Year begins in July in Arkansas.
• Property Classification: Real property is assessed at 20% of true and full market




• Source of data: Lincoln Institute for years 1999-2016. Data also available from the
California State Board of Equalization for 2012-2019
• Data available:
– Net taxable assessed value at the county level
– Levies by jurisdiction (city, county, school, and other districts)
– Average tax rate at the county level
• Computed variables: The mill rate is computed by dividing the sum of the levies
within a county, over the overall net taxable assessed value in the county.
• Years: Data collected from 1999-2016. The year refers to when the tax is levied (not
collected). The fiscal year in California start on July first.
• Property Classification: California does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
• Other: The assessment of property in California is regulated by Proposition 13.
B.4.6 Colorado
• Source of data: Annual reports available from the Department of Local Affairs and
from the Lincoln Institute.
• Data available:
– Assessed valuation at the county level
– Total levy raised at the county level
– Mill rate by jurisdiction (county, average municipal, average school district, av-
erage special district) and average by county





• Years: Data collected from 2001-2018. The fiscal year in Colorado runs from July to
July. The year reported in the data refers to when taxes are levied, which are payable
the following year.
• Property Classification: Colorado has a statewide classification of property. Property
in different classes is assessed at different ratios.
• Other: Assessment is done at the county level, and the State Board of Equalization
has the task to make sure the burden is equally distributed.
B.4.7 Connecticut
• Source of data: Mill rates from direct contact with the Connecticut Office of Policy
and Management. Assessment data available on the Office of Policy and Manage-
ment’s website
• Data available
– Mill rates at the municipality level
– Assessed value at the municipality level: listed as Net Grand List, or the assessed
value of all taxable property within a municipality net of exemptions
• Computed variables: we compute the average mill rate at the county level by averag-
ing out the mill rates in the municipalities within the county. We compute the county
level net assessed value by summing the total assessed values of the municipalities
within the county. We compute the levy using the county level mill rate and net
assessed value.
• Years: Mill rates data collected from 1991-2017, assessed values data collected from
1996-2018. The fiscal year in Connecticut begins on July 1st. The Grand List is
certified before the fiscal year, so a Grand List for 2019 is certified in February 2020
and is used for taxes in Fiscal year June 2020-June 2021, while taxes are due January
2021. The year thus refers to when taxes are levied, not collected.





No data is available for Washington DC
B.4.9 Delaware
• Source of data: Mill rates from the Lincoln Institute
• Data available:
– Mill rates at the county and municipality level, by jurisdiction within municipal-
ity (County rate, school rate, city rate, library rate, others)
– Taxable values at the county level (incomplete - available only for two counties)
– Levy: incomplete, only for one county
• Computed variables: we compute the average mill rate at the county level by aver-
aging out the municipality-level mill rates within the county.
• Years: Data on average mill rate collected from 2005 to 2015. Partial assessment
data collected from 1997 to 2017.
• Property Classification: Delaware does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
• Other: The three Delaware counties have different dates of assessment; they tax a
different proportion of that assessment, and they tax at different rates. Municipal
and school district rates also vary throughout the state.
B.4.10 Florida
• Source of data: We obtain data on mill rates, levies and taxable value from the
Lincoln Institute and from the Florida Department of Revenue
• Data available
– Taxable value and just value, where just value represents the market value of
the property, and taxable value represents the just value minus exemptions.
https://floridarevenue.com/property/Pages/DataPortal.aspx
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– Millage rate at the county level by function and jurisdiction (County, School,
Special Districts, Municipal and others)
– County-wide levy (total and by jurisdiction / function)
• Computed variables: County-wide totals are already available in the raw data
• Years: Data collected from 1999-2019. Data for a year is based on assessments made
on January 1st. Tax collection is determined mid-year, and taxes are collected the
following year. The state tax year runs June-June but local tax years follow calendar
years.
• Property Classification: Florida does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
B.4.11 Georgia
• Source of data: Information on mill rates, levies and taxable values is available on
the Georgia’s Department of Revenue Website
• Data available
– Mill rate at the jurisdiction level
– Levy at the jurisdiction level
– Assessed value and taxable value at the jurisdiction level for different property
classes.
• Computed variables: we use the net taxable value reported at the county level
(schools net taxable value is reported as well, the two differ slightly due to different
exemptions), and compute the sum of all levies of jurisdictions within the county. We
compute the average county level mill rate using the total levy and taxable value.
• Years: We use data from 1994-2018. Local policymakers determine the millage rate
around July, and they do so based on an estimated assessed value based on the
previous year’s value.




• Other: In Georgia property is required to be assessed at 40% of the fair market value
unless otherwise specified by law.
B.4.12 Hawaii
No data is available for Hawaii
B.4.13 Idaho
• Source of data: Assessed values, levies, and millage rates can be accessed through
the Idaho State Tax Commission’s website
• Data available:
– Taxable value by property type at the county level
– Levy by property type at the county level
– Average property tax rate in urban and rural areas within the county, and over-
all.
• Computed variables: Years 2001 and 2003 only report separate urban and rural data
for tax rates. For these years, we get the mill rate as the avg between urban and rural
times the ratio between the true average and calculated (urban and rural) average for
years 2002 and 2004. We compute the total levy by summing the levies on different
types of property. The total value at the county level is already provided in the data.
• Years: Data for levies collected for 2004-2012 (2010 missing), data for values col-
lected from 2004-2020, data for mill rate collected from 2001-2017.
• Property Classification: Idaho does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: In FY 2007, a change was implemented in the funding of schools. Thus,




• Source of data: Data available on the Illinois Department of Revenue’s Website
• Data available
– Equalized assessed value at the county level. The equalized assessed value is
computed multiplying the assessed value of property times the state equaliza-
tion factor and subtracting exemptions.
– Taxes levied at the county level
• Computed variables: the average mill rate at the county level is computed using the
equalized assessed value and the total levy.
• Years: data collected from 1990-2018.
• Property Classification: Illinois does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: The equalization is required so that counties have a median level of assess-
ment at 33% of fair market value. This is necessary since some counties assess prop-
erty at different ratios of market value.
B.4.15 Indiana
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute.
• Data available:
– Gross millage rates by municipalities and property type. The gross tax rate is
applied to the net taxable value of a property. After that, properties may receive
a credit, to which a homestead credit may be added.
• Computed variables: the tax rates available are gross tax rates. We take the average
at the county level of tax rates imposed within the county.
• Years: data collected for years 1999-2016.




• Other: In 2002, there was a change in the assessment method, from a formula based
one to a market value-in-use assessment practice. This change was accompanies by
increased deductions for homeowners. This explains a sharp decrease in effective tax
rates between 2001 and 2002: due to the new rules on assessment, the gross value
of real property grew at a faster rate than levies.
B.4.16 Iowa
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute
• Data available
– Taxable value by jurisdiction
– Levy by jurisdiction and function
• Computed variables: We compute the levy at the jurisdiction level using jurisdiction
level taxable value and mill rate. We then use total levy and total taxable value at
the county level, and compute the average mill rate at the county level.
• Years: Data collected for 2000 to 2017. In the reported data, the tax rate applied
for a fiscal year is based on the taxable value of the previous year. For example, the
assessed value as of January 2011 is used to calculate the tax liability in summer
2012. Taxes are due in September 30th and March 30th. In our data, year 2011
refers to the fiscal year 2011-2012. The fiscal year for the state starts on July 1st and
ends on the following June 30th.
• Property Classification: Iowa has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.17 Kansas
• Source of data: Annual reports from the Kansas Department of Revenue’s website
• Data available
– Average mill rate by county
– Property taxes levied by county
https://www.ksrevenue.org/prannualreport.html
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• Computed variables: we compute the net assessed value from the mill rate and the
levy.
• Years: We have data from 2004-2018.
• Property Classification: Kansas has a statewide classification of real property
• Other
B.4.18 Kentucky
• Source of data: Kentucky Department of Revenue for Property values, Lincoln Insti-
tute for mill rates
• Data available
– Mill rates by jurisdiction and type of property
– Full value of property subject to local taxes
• Computed variables: We compute the average county level mill rate by summing the
county level rate to the average city rate. In this case, we exclude school district rates
because the data is incomplete. In Kentucky, the average mill rate for counties is 2.5
times as large as for school districts, and the average city mill rate is 2 times as large
as school districts.
• Years: Assessment data collected from 2007-2020. Data on mill rates collected from
1999-2018.
• Property Classification: Kentucky has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.19 Louisiana
• Source of data: Louisiana Tax Commission
• Data available




– Levy by function/jurisdiction (parish levy, road levy, school levy, levee levy,
drainage levy, other levy)
– Millage rate by function/jurisdiction
• Computed variables: The millage rate is equivalent to the rate obtained by dividing
the total levy collected within the jurisdiction and the total assessed value exclusive
of Homestead Exemption within the parish.
• Years: Data for assessments and levies collected for 2004-2017. Data for millage
rates collected for 2002-2017.
• Property Classification: Louisiana has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In Louisiana, assessed value is supposed to be 10% of the market value for
land and residential property, 15% for commercial and movable personal property,
and 25% for public service property.
B.4.20 Maine
• Source of data: State of Maine Department of Administrative and Financial Services
• Data available
– Mill rates derived by dividing the levy at the municipal level by the state equal-
ized valuation of property (excluding homestead adjustments and exemptions).
– State equalized valuation of municipal assessments: the state certifies the full
equalized value of property reported by municipalities.
• Computed variables: We compute the levy at the county level by multiplying the mill
rate times the net assessed value.
• Years: Data on millage rates collected from 2001-2016, and data on state equalized
value from 1986-2017. The state valuation lags the values assessed by municipalities
by almost two years.






• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and Maryland Department of Assessment and Taxa-
tion
• Data available:
– Tax rates by jurisdiction and by type of property
• Computed variables: we compute the mill rate by first computing the sum of county
and municipality/district rate imposed in jurisdictions within the county on real prop-
erty, and then taking the average at the county level.
• Years: Data for mill rates collected for 2002-2017. Data for every year refers to mill
rates imposed on July 1st. For example, data for 2002 refers to mill rates imposed
on July 1st.
• Property Classification: Maryland does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
• Other:In Maryland, all property is assessed at the fair market value. The assessments
are done by the state and not by the county and reevaluated every three years.
B.4.22 Massachusetts
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and Massachusets Department of Revenue Division
of Local Services
• Data available:
– Mill rates by municipality and type of property
– Tax levy by municipality and type of property





• Computed variables: We compute the average mill rate by county by dividing the
levy from the total assessed value. We compute the total assessed value and levy at
the county level by summing assessed values and levies of the jurisdictions within
the municipality
• Years: Data collected from 2003-2019 for tax levies and assessed values, and from
1981-2017 for tax rates. The data is presented for fiscal years. Fiscal years in Mas-
sachusetts the fiscal year runs from July 1st to June 30th.
• Property Classification: Massachusetts does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
B.4.23 Michigan
• Source of data: Michigan Department of Treasury
• Data available
– County level total taxable valuation
– Total taxes levied in the county
– average tax rage within the county
• Computed variables: All variables provided in the raw data
• Years: 2002-2018. The information is reported for tax years.
• Property Classification: Michigan does not have a statewide classification of real
property
• Other: The information is based on all classes of property (real and personal). Michi-
gan relies on an equalization process.
B.4.24 Minnesota
• Source of data: Minnesota Department of Revenue
https://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-4353543925− 540359−−, 00.html
https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/2011-11/ptbulletin01.pdfandhttps :
//www.revenue.state.mn.us/property − tax− history − data
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• Data available:
– Estimated market value
– Tax exemptions
– Taxable market value
– Net tax capacity
– Tax levies
– Tax credits
– Net tax payable.
• Computed variables: We use net tax payable for levy, which includes property taxes
paid for jurisdictions within the county excluding credits, and taxable market value,
which is defined as the assessed value of the property minus exemptions. We com-
pute the average tax rate at the county level by dividing the total levy over the net
assessed value.
• Years: We have data from 2001 to 2018. The year indicated in the reports is the
year in which property taxes are paid. Property taxes paid in the current year use
property valuations (assessments) from January 1 of the previous year. For example,
property taxes paid in 2018 are based on the assessment from January 1, 2017. In
our dataset, we use the year for which property was assessed and taxes levied (the
previous year).
• Property Classification: Minnesota has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In Minnesota, there is a referendum market value (RMV), which is applied
to property tax levied through referendum. It is similar to the taxable market value
minus agricultural land. Although RMV may be different than TMV, we combine
all levies (including referendum levies) when calculating payable taxes. We then
compute the effective mill rate by dividing the net tax payable by the taxable market
value. In Minnesota, the assessment ratio varies across counties, which implies the
effective rate on property will differ across jurisdictions.
B.4.25 Mississippi





– Total assessment by county and type of property
– Mill rate by county and function (schools, colleges, roads, fire and police and
other county level operations). The county mill rate does not include city level
mill rates.
• Computed variables: We estimate the county levy using the data on assessed value
and millage rates at the county level.
• Years: We have data from 1995-2018. The fiscal year runs from July to July in
Mississippi. Data are given for fiscal years. E.g. we define data for fiscal year 2004-
2005 as data for year 2004, since mill rates and assessed values are determined based
on 2004 data.
• Property Classification: Mississippi has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.26 Missouri
• Source of data: The office of Missouri State Auditor
• Data available
– Assessed value by jurisdiction and function
– Mill rate ceiling
– Mill rate actually levied
• Computed variables: Using the jurisdiction level assessed value and mill rate, we
compute the levy for each jurisdiction. Since assessed values are reported multiple
times within a county for different taxes (e.g. General Revenue, Fire, Debt Service),
we use the assessed value used by the county for General Revenues. We calculate the
effective average mill rate by dividing the total aggregate levy at the county level by
the total county level assessed value.
• Years: We have data from 2000-2018. The fiscal year in Missouri runs from June
to June. Property tax bills are sent out in November each year and are to be paid
by the end of the year. The data covers years based on regular calendar year, which
corresponds to the year when property taxes were decided and levied.
https://auditor.mo.gov/AuditReport/Reports?SearchLocalState=31
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• Property Classification: Missouri has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.27 Montana
• Source of data: Annual reports retrieved from the Lincoln Institute
• Data available
– Mill rate by jurisdiction at the county level (state, county, schools, other dis-
tricts)
– Levy by jurisdiction at the county level (state, county, schools, other districts)
• Computed variables: Taxable value computed at county level using the given mill
rates and levies’ values. Average mill rate at the county level computed using total
county level assessed value and levy.
• Years: The data is available from 1999-2016. The fiscal year in Montana runs from
July to July. The year defined in the data is the base in the fiscal year, e.g. for
FY2003-2004 we indicate 2004.
• Property Classification: Montana has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: Properties are assessed at the state level in Montana.
B.4.28 Nebraska
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and Nebraska Department of Revenue
• Data available
– Total taxable value by county
– Total property taxes levied by county
– Average tax rate at the county level
• Computed variables: Variables reported as in the raw data
• Years: Data collected for 1997-2020
https://revenue.nebraska.gov/PAD/research-statistical-reports/average-tax-rates-county
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• Property Classification: Nebraska has a statewide classification of real property
• Other: In Nebraska the assessed value is computed differently for agricultural prop-
erty and other property. It is assessed at full market value by all counties for non
agricultural property, and 75% of market value for agricultural property.
B.4.29 Nevada
• Source of data: State of Nevada Department of Taxation
• Data available
– Total assessed value by county
– Levies by taxing jurisdictions within county (schools, county, cities, towns, spe-
cial districts, state)
– Average county wide tax rate
• Computed variables: All variables are already available in the raw data
• Years: Data collected from 2000-2017. Data is presented in fiscal years, we attribute
data to the second part of the fiscal year, so data for fiscal year 2016-2017 is at-
tributed to year 2017. The fiscal year in Nevada runs from July 1 through June
30.
• Property Classification: Nevada does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: In Nevada property is assessed at 35% of the taxable value. Taxable value
is not equal to market value, but follows different determination rules for real and
personal property.
B.4.30 New Hampshire





– Municipality level valuation
– Municipality level rates by function / jurisdiction (Town, Local Education, State
Education, County)
– Total tax commitment / levy
• Computed variables: We compute the total valuation and levy at the county level by
summing municipality-level valuation and levy. We compute the average mill rate at
the county level using the computed total valuation and levy.
• Years: Data is available for years 2000-2017.
• Property Classification: New Hampshire does not have a statewide classification of
real property.
• Other: The tax rates presented represent the estimated tax rate for a municipality if
all the taxable property was assessed at 100%.
B.4.31 New Jersey
• Source of data: New Jersey Division of Taxation
• Data available
– Net Valuation Taxable
– Net valuation on which county taxes are apportioned (or net equalized valua-
tion)
– Total tax levy on which tax rate is computed
• Computed variables: Using the total net taxable value and the total levy at the county
level we compute the average mill rate at the county level
• Years: Data collected from 1995-2015. Data is reported following the timing on the
annual reports, which assigns data for (for example) the fiscal year ending on June
30 1996 to 1995. The New Jersey fiscal year begins on July 1st and ends on June
30th.





• Source of data: Property tax facts reports of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue
Department, sourced from the Lincoln Institute and New Mexico Department of Fi-
nance and Administration
• Data available
– Net taxable value at the county level by type of property (residential vs nonres-
idential)
– Property tax obligations at the county level by type of property (residential vs
nonresidential)
• Computed variables: Using the county level net taxable values and property tax
levies, we are able to compute the average tax rate at the county level.
• Years: Data collected from 2003-2020. The fiscal year runs from July to July in New
Mexico. The data reported for fiscal year 2020, e.g. refers to fiscal year 2019-2020.
As such, we define the year as 2019 for data from fiscal year 2020.
• Property Classification: New Mexico has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.33 New York
• Source of data: New York State
• Data available
– Tax levy by jurisdiction
– Rate by jurisdiction (for years until 2011, not equalized)






• Computed variables: Using the equalization rates, we compute full tax rates (mean-
ing tax rates that apply to the full value of the property, not to the assessed value
which is computed differently in different jurisdictions in New York) for all years.
Using full tax rates and levies at the jurisdiction level, we compute taxable values.
Using the computed taxable values and the levies, we obtain average municipality
rates and average school district rates per county. We compute the average rate im-
posed at the county level as the sum of the average county, municipality and school
district rates imposed within a county.
• Years: The data collected for 2003-2018. We use the roll year, which is identified as
the year in which taxes are levied.
• Property Classification: New York does not have a statewide classification of real
property/
• Other: In New York, different jurisdictions may determine different levels of assess-
ment. Therefore, in order for rates to be comparable within the state, there is an
equalization rate which allows to compare the rates on the full values of properties,
rather than on the assessed value.
B.4.34 North Carolina
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and North Carolina Department of Revenue
• Data available
– County and Municipality millage rates (not equalized) by county and munici-
pality
• Computed variables: We compute the average rate at the county level by first com-
puting the mean rates by county and municipality at the county level, and then
summing them.
• Years: We use data from 1999 to 2017. The data for a year refers to the fiscal year
starting in that year, e.g. data for fiscal year 2009-2010 is attributed to 2009. The
fiscal year in North Carolina starts on July 1st and runs until June 30th.
• Property Classification: North Carolina has a statewide classification of real property.
https://www.ncdor.gov/news/reports-and-statistics/county-and-municipal-effective-tax-rates
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• Other: In North Carolina, property is assessed at the county level. In addition, prop-
erty has to be reappraised at least once every eight years.
B.4.35 North Dakota
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute
• Data available
– Taxes raised at the county level (Ad Valorem Taxes)
– Taxable value at the county level
– Average mill rate at the county level
• Computed variables: The variables are used as presented in the raw data
• Years: Data is available from 2000-2017. The fiscal year in North Dakota runs from
July to July. Property taxes are mailed to individuals in December of the calendar
year and are then payable the following January. Property tax reports are published
in June and report taxes from the previous year. We compute the year as published
in the reports since it matches when property taxes are decided and levied.
• Property Classification: North Dakota has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In North Dakota, the assessed value is 50% of the market value, and then
each class of property has a different assessment ratio. The assessment ratio is mul-
tiplied by the assessed value to obtain the taxable value. In 2009, North Dakota used
revenues from oil taxes to reduce school district mill levies. This resulted in a sharp
drop in average rates from 2008 to 2009.
B.4.36 Ohio
• Source of data: Ohio Department of Taxation
• Data available




– Gross taxes levied by type of property and county
– Net taxes charged by type of property and county
• Computed variables: We compute the average county rate using the total net taxes
levied at the county level and the total taxable value at the county level.
• Years: The data is available between 1990 and 2019. The data is presented by the
calendar year in which taxes are levied (they are collected in the following calendar
year).
• Property Classification: Ohio does not have a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: In Ohio, most real property has a common assessment ratio of 35%.
B.4.37 Oklahoma
No data is available for Oklahoma.
B.4.38 Oregon
• Source of data: Oregon Department of Revenue
• Data available
– Real Market Value of Property by county
– Net Assessed Value of Property by county
– Property Tax Imposed by county
– Average tax rate (computed with net assessed value and levy)
• Computed variables: The variables used are as presented in the raw data
• Years: Data collected for 2001-2016. Data reported for fiscal years, and attributed to
the base year (e.g. data for fiscal year 2011-2012 recorded as data for 2011.





• Source of data: Pennsylvania Department of Community Economic Development
• Data available
– Tax rates by municipality, county, and function
• Computed variables: We compute the average tax rate at the county level by first
computing the average real estate tax rate of municipalities within a county, and
then summing the the average municipality real estate tax and the county real estate
tax.
• Years: Data collected from 1988-2018. The data is attributed to the year reported in
the raw data.
• Property Classification: Pennsylvania does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
• Other: In Pennsylvania the assessment ratio may vary at the county level.
B.4.40 Rhode Island
• Source of data: State of Rhode Island Division of Municipal Finance
• Data available
– Municipality level property tax rates for different classes of property (residential
real estate, commercial real estate, personal property, motor vehicles)
• Computed variables: We use the municipal level property tax rate for residential real
estate to compute the average mill rate imposed in a county (note that this does not
include the fire districts rates).
• Years: Data available from 2000-2018. The data is presented by tax roll year.
• Property Classification: Rhode Island has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: All real property is assessed at 100 percent of full fair market value (with





We do not have data for South Carolina.
B.4.42 South Dakota
We do not have data for South Dakota.
B.4.43 Tennessee
• Source of data: Data from tax aggregate reports available from the Tennessee Comptroller
of the Treasury (older years obtained through direct contact via email)
• Data available
– County level and municipality level mill rates by counties and municipalities
– Assessed values by counties and municipalities by type of property (not includ-
ing utilities).
• Computed variables: We take the average of the total rate imposed in municipalities
within the county to obtain the average rate imposed at the county level. Using the
total county assessed value and the county-level average rate, we estimate the total
tax levied.
• Years: Data collected for 2000-2017.
• Property Classification: Tennessee has a statewide classification of real property.
• Other: Property is divided in 6 classes in Tennessee, each with different assessment
rules (public and personal 55%, industrial and commercial real 40%, industrial and
commercial personal 30%, residential at 25%, farm 25%, other personal 5%. In
Tennessee the assessment is performed at the county level except for “utilities” such
as railroads, buses, where it is done centrally.
B.4.44 Texas





– Market Value by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special dis-
tricts)
– Taxable value by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special dis-
tricts)
– Total rate by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special districts)
– Levy by jurisdiction (cities, counties, school districts, and special districts)
• Computed variables: We compute the total levy by county by summing the taxes
levied in all taxing jurisdictions within a county. We then use the total assessed value
at the county level and the total levy computed to get a measure of the average mill
rate imposed within a county. Note that the county taxable value of a certain county
and the sum of the school districts taxable values within the same county may vary
slightly due to potential differences in exemptions / boundaries differences.
• Years: Data is available from 1999-2017. The year refers to when taxes are levied,
not collected.
• Property Classification: Texas does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: Assessed value in Texas is based on Market value. However the market as-
sessed value has some limitations on how it can increase year to year. Second, there
are exemptions that lower the taxable value.
B.4.45 Utah
• Source of data: Utah property tax division
• Data available
– Total taxable value of all property by county (excludes total motor vehicle prop-
erty)




– Total property tax charged by county (excluding fee for motor vehicles)
• Computed variables: All variables used are already available in the raw data
• Years: The data is available from 2000-2019. The data is attributed to the year
reported, which is the tax year.
• Property Classification: Utah has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.46 Vermont
• Source of data: Vermont Agency of Administration Department of Taxes and Lincoln
Institute.
• Data available
– Tax rate by municipality and use (state education tax rate, local share tax rate,
municipal rate). From 2004 also by homestead vs non-residential.
– Levies by municipality and use (state education tax rate, local share tax rate,
municipal rate), only for 2001-2012
• Computed variables: We compute the net assessed value using the levies and rates
available year by year for years 2001-2012. Specifically, when the homestead and
non-residential categorization is present, we compute net assessed value as the av-
erage between the net assessed value obtained with municipal share rate and levy,
and the total net assessed value from education taxes and rates (homestead plus non
residential).
• Years: Data is available from 2001-2016 for mill rates, and from 2001-2012 for tax
levies.





• Source of data: Virginia Department of Taxation
• Data available:
– Property tax rates for every taxing jurisdiction, by type of property (real estate,
tangible personal property, machinery and tools, merchants’ capital).
– Real Estate Fair Market Value, Fair Market Value, Taxable Fair Market Value and
Levy by county
• Computed variables: In order to compute the total average mill rate imposed at the
county level, we first take the average of the rates imposed on real estate by mu-
nicipalities at the county level, then sum the county real estate rate and the average
municipality rate. We use the fair market taxable value and total levy as presented
by county in the raw data.
• Years: Data is available from 1998-2017. The data refers to the tax year (e.g. data
for 2018 is data for the tax year 2018, fiscal year 2019) as presented in the reports.
• Property Classification: Virginia does not have a statewide classification of real prop-
erty.
• Other: Cities are independent in Virginia, meaning they are not part of a county.
Thus, cities’ rates are not part of the computed county average rate.
B.4.48 Washington
• Source of data: Washington State Department of Revenue
• Data available:
– Total assessed value of all taxable property by county
– Average millage rates by county
– Property tax levies by county
• Computed variables: All variables are available in the raw data
• Years: Data is available from 2000-2018.
https://www.tax.virginia.gov/local-tax-rates and https://www.tax.virginia.gov/annual-reports
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• Property Classification: Washington does not have a statewide classification of real
property.
B.4.49 West Virginia
• Source of data: Lincoln Institute and West Virginia State Auditor’s Office.
• Data available:
– Mill rates by property class and municipality level
• Computed variables: In order to compute the average total rate imposed at the
county level, we take the average of the total rates imposed at the municipality level
for all residential property.
• Years: Data is available from 2003-2015.
• Property Classification: West Virginia has a statewide classification of real property.
B.4.50 Wisconsin
• Source of data: State of Wisconsin Department of Revenue’s website and direct con-
tact via email
• Data available:
– Total levy by county
– Total equalized assessed value by county
– Average total tax rate by county
– Total tax credit by county
• Computed variables: We obtain the total levy by subtracting the credit from the levy.
• Years: The data is available from 1989-2018. Data for 1989-1990 attributed to 1989.
• Property Classification: Wisconsin has a statewide classification of real property.
https://www.revenue.wi.gov/Pages/Report/home.aspx
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• The school credit is distributed to municipalities and reduces the individual property
tax collected.
B.4.51 Wyoming
• Source of data: Wyoming Department of Revenue’s website
• Data available
– Property tax levies by jurisdiction / function (county levies, municipal levies,
special district levies, education levies) at the county level
– County level mill rate
• Computed variables: Using the county level mill rate and the total of taxes levied at
the county level, we estimate the net assessed value.
• Years: We have data from 1996-2016.
• Property Classification: Wyoming has a statewide classification of real property.
https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/wy-dor/dor-annual-reports
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B.5 Property Tax Reforms and Tax Limits
We present results for different definitions of rate and levy limits. The majority of our
results is obtained using a definition of rate and levy limits that encompasses any limit
imposed. Following this definition, a locality is marked as having a rate limit if it has any
type of rate limit (for example a limit on individual property, a limit on some of the taxing
jurisdictions, a limit specified with a formula). Similarly, a locality is marked as having a
levy limit if any type of levy limit is present. We obtain data for the definitions above from
Paquin (2015)2. Paquin(2015) documents the limits enacted and repealed through 2013.
We record for every year in our sample the active limits and use the limits as of 2007 in
our analysis. It is worth mentioning that, during the period between 2007 and 2013, very
few changes to limits are enacted.
In addition, we also present results for rate limits at the jurisdiction level, aggregate
levy limits, and levy limits on individual properties. We complement the data from Paquin
(2015) with data from the Lincoln Institute of Public Policy3. The Lincoln review presents
the main features of states’ limits as well as the relevant history. We record a locality as
having rate limits at the jurisdiction level when most taxing jurisdictions within the county
are subject to a rate limit. In rare cases (e.g. South Dakota), rate limits exist but are
deemed not constraining (Lincoln Institute), and thus we record them as not present. We
classify a rate limit on an individual property as a limit which constrains the rate to which
a specific property is subject. We record a locality as having an aggregate levy limit when
taxing jurisdictions within the county are subject to limits on how much the levy can grow.
We also record whether there is a levy limit on individual properties, which however is far
less common.
Overall, jurisdiction-rate limits set in terms of maximum rates applicable and aggregate
levy limits set in terms of maximum growth rate for levies are the most common. Some
states however employ different formulas to set limits, which in some cases may depend
on other factors (e.g. inflation), or may combine several limits through a set process.
One particular process is the “truth-in-taxation” requirement, which usually requires that
higher assessed values do not automatically result in a tax increase, subjecting the increase
to specific obligations such as advertising changes and notifying taxpayers. Tennessee and
2Paquin, B.P., 2015. Chronicle of the 161-year history of state-imposed property tax limitations. Cam-
bridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
3State-by-State Property Tax at a Glance. https://www.lincolninst.edu/research-data/data-
toolkits/significant-features-property-tax/state-state-property-tax-glance. Significant Features of the
Property Tax. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and George Washington Institute of Public Policy. (Property
Tax at a Glance; accessed: 10/31/2017 4:41:21 PM)
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Utah for example both have this type of requirement, which we categorize as an aggregate
levy limit.
While our preferred categorization system using “any rate limit” and “any levy limit” or
“aggregate levy limit” is relatively straightforward to interpret and implement, it does not
allow us to differentiate between localities with stricter and looser limits.
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APPENDIX C
Chapter III Supporting Material
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C.1 Additional Figures
Figure C.1: Change in exposure to import Competition from China in $1000 per worker -
1990-2007
This figure displays the commuting zone exposure to the shift-share instrument for Chinese imports based
on Chinese imports in several European countries between 1990 and 2007.
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C.2 Additional Tables
Table C.1: Effect of shocks on wages, employment and housing market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log avg. wage Log private emp. ratio Med. home price Home Price Index
R̂obots ∆10year -2.21c -2.09c -0.53c -0.63c -9.14c -8.80b -6.49c -7.23c
(0.37) (0.43) (0.09) (0.13) (2.71) (3.38) (1.59) (1.98)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR -0.15 0.12 -0.40 0.90
(0.31) (0.09) (2.13) (1.28)
Dem. controls X X X X X X X X
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.62 0.62 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.59
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,223 1,223
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table reports findings from equation 3.3, but focusing on log weekly wage, employment to population
ratio, and local home prices (Median home price and a home price index). All controls from table 3.3 are
included except for the fraction of revenues for local governments. All regressions are weighted by the
national share of the population in 1990.
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Table C.2: Effect of shocks on wages, employment and housing market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log average weekly wage Log private employment ratio
R̂obots ∆10year -1.93c -2.44c -2.03c -0.47c -0.53c -0.43c
(0.32) (0.38) (0.37) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09)
ÎPW ∆10year -0.53c -0.33 -0.23c -0.18c
(0.12) (0.23) (0.03) (0.05)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR -0.46 -0.05
(0.59) (0.11)
R̂obots ∆10year × Lim 1.31b 0.05
(0.56) (0.20)
ÎPW ∆10year ×HR 0.04 0.00
(0.24) (0.05)
Demographic & base controls X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.62 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.48
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Median home price Home Price Index
R̂obots ∆10year -8.17c -9.62c -7.48c -5.84c -6.15c -5.66c
(1.85) (3.43) (2.37) (1.17) (1.80) (1.41)
ÎPW ∆10year -3.22b -2.32 -2.09c -1.34
(1.53) (1.57) (0.64) (1.04)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR 0.03 -0.36
(2.91) (2.00)
R̂obots ∆10year × Lim 4.06 -1.04
(5.16) (3.15)
ÎPW ∆10year ×HR 0.07 -0.07
(1.63) (1.00)
Demographic & base controls X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.60
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,223 1,223 1,223 1,223
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table is similar to table C.1 but including import competition from China as an additional shock, and






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.5: Effect of shocks on local revenues and expenditures - w/ China shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
R̂obots ∆10year -3.52c -5.17c -5.02b -2.21
(0.91) (1.57) (2.06) (1.50)
ÎPW∆10year -0.85b -1.24c -1.02c -1.59c -1.01b -1.54c 0.39 0.15
(0.38) (0.40) (0.32) (0.34) (0.48) (0.49) (0.45) (0.51)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.20
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
R̂obots∆10year -2.75c -1.18 -2.21a -3.21
(0.87) (1.12) (1.27) (3.23)
ÎPW∆10year -0.37 -0.68a -0.52a -0.65a 0.16 -0.08 -3.51c -3.87c
(0.38) (0.40) (0.30) (0.35) (0.49) (0.50) (0.99) (0.98)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.09
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
This table presents the results from table 3.3 including exposure to import competition from China as an
additional shock (IPW). See table 3.3 for controls and details about estimation.
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Table C.6: Effect of shocks on local revenues: with local autonomy measure - Unweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
R̂obots ∆10year -1.85b -2.10c -4.70c -2.31b -5.58b -2.56 0.82 -1.40
(0.79) (0.76) (1.74) (1.13) (2.58) (1.62) (1.44) (1.40)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR 0.06 2.34 1.84 -1.47
(0.71) (1.46) (2.23) (1.53)
R̂obots ∆10year × Lim 0.43 -0.96 -2.40 1.63
(0.89) (1.60) (2.18) (1.62)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.21
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
R̂obots ∆10year -2.34b -2.67c -1.69 -1.76 -0.36 -0.96 -9.83c -9.07c
(1.11) (0.72) (1.08) (1.28) (1.54) (1.33) (3.62) (2.75)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HR 0.73 0.61 -0.04 5.07a
(1.02) (1.09) (1.28) (2.84)
R̂obots ∆10year × Lim 1.26 0.75 0.82 4.32
(0.99) (1.22) (1.85) (3.19)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.08 0.08
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table shows the unweighted results from table 3.4.
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Table C.7: Effect of shocks on local revenues: with local autonomy measure - China shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
ÎPW∆10year -1.53a -1.22b -2.49b -0.82a -2.50b -0.27 0.90 -0.33
(0.79) (0.59) (0.94) (0.46) (1.23) (0.74) (0.95) (0.65)
ÎPW∆10year ×HR 0.40 1.21 1.30 -1.01
(0.70) (1.04) (1.44) (0.91)
ÎPW∆10year × Lim -0.02 -1.55 -2.59a 0.96
(0.67) (1.07) (1.48) (0.73)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.20
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
ÎPW∆10year -1.28a -0.48 -1.28a -0.70 0.40 0.17 -7.03c -3.01b
(0.75) (0.57) (0.74) (0.45) (0.77) (0.57) (1.90) (1.14)
ÎPW∆10year ×HR 0.80 0.85 -0.65 4.26b
(0.65) (0.76) (0.78) (1.82)
ÎPW∆10year × Lim -0.39 0.10 -0.50 -1.74
(0.65) (0.64) (0.61) (2.00)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.11 0.11 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.10 0.09
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table presents the population weighted results from table 3.4 using exposure to import competition
from China as the shock (IPW). See table 3.4 for controls and details about estimation.
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Table C.8: Effect of shocks on local revenues: IV estimation 1993-2007 - Unweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
Robots∆17year -0.27 -0.11 -2.39c -3.20c -3.27c -3.24c 1.96b 2.80b
(0.58) (0.53) (0.88) (1.10) (0.83) (0.98) (0.90) (1.09)
Robots∆17year ×HR -0.35 1.74 -0.06 -1.81
(0.70) (1.23) (1.35) (1.49)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.15 0.15 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.16 0.16
CZ-by-year 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
Robots∆17year -0.37 -0.41 0.61 0.22 1.25 0.91 -0.30 -2.39
(0.60) (0.62) (0.64) (0.70) (1.30) (1.27) (1.96) (2.16)
Robots∆17year ×HR 0.08 0.82 0.73 4.43a
(0.82) (0.82) (1.30) (2.31)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.28 0.28 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.45 0.23 0.23
CZ-by-year 704 704 704 704 704 704 704 704
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table evaluates the long-run IV model as in table 3.5 but unweighted. See table 3.5 for more details
about variables and estimation.
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Table C.9: Effect of shocks on local revenues: IV estimation 1993-2007 - China shock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
IPW∆17year 0.51 1.01 1.04 0.43 1.10 1.74 0.05 1.67
(0.38) (0.65) (0.81) (0.91) (0.89) (1.09) (0.74) (1.13)
IPW∆17year ×HR -0.67 0.75 -0.85 -2.10b
(0.52) (0.72) (1.03) (0.89)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X X
2 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.37
CZ-by-year 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
IPW∆17year 0.45 0.67 0.39 -0.02 2.09c 2.74c -0.89 -2.56
(0.39) (0.71) (0.42) (0.70) (0.51) (0.76) (1.17) (1.83)
IPW∆17year ×HR -0.31 0.48 -0.84 2.15
(0.58) (0.67) (0.74) (1.47)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.29 0.29 0.46 0.49 0.44 0.44 0.23 0.24
CZ-by-year 722 722 722 722 722 722 722 722
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table evaluates the long-run model IV model as in table 3.5 with import competition from China as the
structural shock (IPW). See table 3.5 for more details about variables and estimation.
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Table C.10: Effect of shocks on local revenues: different local autonomy measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total revenues Total taxes Property taxes Total transfers
R̂obots ∆10year -3.95b -4.42c -7.50c -4.43c -8.49b -3.42b -0.68 -5.29b
(1.50) (1.38) (2.39) (1.26) (3.19) (1.63) (1.95) (2.12)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HRcity -0.00 2.34 3.85 -1.67
(1.00) (1.48) (2.32) (1.79)
R̂obots ∆10year × Limlevy 0.58 -1.61 -2.62 4.16b
(1.22) (1.66) (2.48) (1.76)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
2 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.22
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total expenditures Education Safety Capital Outlays
R̂obots ∆10year -2.93b -3.96c -2.21 -3.37b -0.92 -2.40a -7.94 -8.91c
(1.44) (1.16) (1.55) (1.26) (1.47) (1.40) (5.22) (2.70)
R̂obots ∆10year ×HRcity -0.02 0.96 -1.50 3.62
(1.02) (1.37) (1.18) (3.35)
R̂obots ∆10year × Limlevy 1.26 2.35a 0.33 4.80
(1.29) (1.27) (1.44) (3.52)
Dem. & base controls X X X X X X X X
Fractions rev. X X X X X X X X
77-87 trend X X X X X X X X
Division & period FE X X X X X X X X
R2 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.08 0.08
CZ-by-year 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402 1,402
State clustered standard errors in parentheses
a p < 0.10, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.01
This table evaluates our second model (table 3.4), using interactions with whether a state allows functional
home rule to cities only (as opposed to cities or counties). We also interact exposure to robotization with
whether a state has some levy limit, as opposed to both levy and rate limits. For details on controls and
variables, refer to table 1.5. All results are weighted by the national share of population in the commuting
zone.
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C.3 Chinese import competition shock
Exposure to Chinese competition has become a heavily discussed topic in recent years,
especially since the seminal work by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013a). In this paper,
they use a shift-share instrument, based on the local exposure to import competition from
China, where the shock is defined as the change in import from China by industry at the
national level. The shock is computed by interaction the local share of employment in
industry j - Ljct−1
Ljt−1
, with the national change in import from China in industry j, re-scaled
by the total employment in that industry at the national level - ∆Mujt
Lct−1
. Because of potential
endogeneity between national changes in imports and local labor market conditions, Autor,
Dorn and Hanson use imports from China in other rich countries as an instrument for










C.4 Shift-share instrument and policy - bias derivation
We will now derive analytically the intuition discussed previously. We assume that
determining local policy is a function of previous policy, local economic conditions, and
other local variables, such as preferences, ideology, etc.
κst = ακst−1 + γf(yst) + g(Xst)
′Λ + est
For exposition, let’s assume that the function capturing economic conditions - f(yst) - is a
linear function of the share of employed individuals in the state, i.e. f(yst) = βyst. We can
then derive the change in local policy κ.




∆κst−2 + γ∆yst−1 + ∆g(Xst−1)
′Λ + ∆est−1
)
+ γ∆yst + ∆g(Xst)
′Λ + ∆est












The change in policy can be interpreted as a weighted sum of all the previous shocks
and factors that lead to policy changes. Let’s define β1 as the vector of coefficients for
the included variables, and β2 as the coefficients vector for the omitted variable in the
”correct” regression: Y = X1β1 +X2β2 + ε. We know that the expected value of coefficient
β1 from the regression Y = X1β1 + ε can be written as




We can now derive the bias coming from the effect of policy on the outcome variable of
interest. For convenience, let’s assume that we are only regressing the outcome of interest
on the economic shock, so we can rewrite the bias term as




For exposition, we also simplify the policy function as only a function of previous policy,
and economic shocks, i.e. κst = ακst−1 + γf(yst) + est, with yst = Shockst. For exposition
purposes, we have X1 = ∆Shock, the shock, X2 = ∆κ, the change in policy. The expected
coefficient is
238















































Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. 2017. “Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US
Labor Markets.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23285.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. 2018. “The Race between Man and Machine:
Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares, and Employment.” American Eco-
nomic Review, 108(6): 1488–1542.
Acemoglu, Daron, Ufuk Akcigit, Harun Alp, Nicholas Bloom, and William Kerr. 2018.
“Innovation , Reallocation , and Growth.” 108(11): 3450–3491.
Adão, Rodrigo, Michal Kolesár, and Eduardo Morales. 2018. “Shift-Share Designs: The-
ory and Inference.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24944.
Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. 1999. “Public goods and ethnic divi-
sions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): 1243–1284.
Alm, James, Robert D Buschman, and David L Sjoquist. 2011. “Rethinking Local
Government Reliance on the Property Tax.” Regional science and urban economics,
41(4): 320–331.
Amiel, Lindsay, Steven Deller, and Judith Stallmann. 2009. “The Construction of a Tax
and Expenditure Limitation Index for the U.S.” University of Wisconsin - Madison Staff
Paper Series No. 536.
Anderson, Nathan B. 2006. “Property Tax Limitations: An Interpretative Review.” Na-
tional Tax Journal, 685–694.
Augustine, Nancy Y. 2009. Erosion of the Property Tax Base: Trends, Causes, and Conse-
quences. Lincoln Inst of Land Policy.
Autor, David H, David Dorn, and Gordon H Hanson. 2013a. “The China syndrome: Local
labor market effects of import competition in the United States.” American Economic
Review, 103(6): 2121–68.
Autor, David H, David Dorn, and Gordon H Hanson. 2013b. “The China syndrome: Local
labor market effects of import competition in the United States.” American Economic
Review, 103(6): 2121–68.
Avenancio-León, Carlos, and Troup Howard. 2019. “The Assessment Gap: Racial In-
equalities in Property Taxation.” Available at SSRN 3465010.
240
Bacher, Hans Ulrich, and Marius Brülhart. 2013. “Progressive taxes and firm births.”
International Tax and Public Finance, 20(1): 129–168.
Baicker, Katherine. 2004. “The Budgetary Repercussions Of Capital Convictions.” The B.E.
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 4(1): 1–28.
Bartik, Timothy. 1991. Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Bartik, Timothy J. 1985. “Business Location Decisions in the United States : Estimates of
the Effects of Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States.” 3(1): 14–22.
Basu, Susanto, and John G. Fernald. 1997. “Returns to scale in U.S. production: Esti-
mates and implications.” Journal of Political Economy, 105(2): 249–283.
Berry, Christopher R. 2021. “Reassessing the Property Tax.” Available at SSRN 3800536.
Borusyak, Kirill, and Xavier Jaravel. 2021. “Revisiting Event Study Designs.” Working
Paper.
Borusyak, Kirill, Peter Hull, and Xavier Jaravel. 2018. “Quasi-Experimental Shift-Share
Research Designs.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24997.
Brollo, Fernanda, and Tommaso Nannicini. 2012. “Tying your enemy’s hands in close
races: the politics of federal transfers in Brazil.” American Political Science Review,
106(4): 742–761.
Caliendo, Marco, Frank Fossen, and Alexander Kritikos. 2010. “The impact of risk at-
titudes on entrepreneurial survival.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,
76(1): 45–63.
Cameron, A. Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. 2011. “Robust Inference
With Multiway Clustering.” Journal of Business Economic Statistics, 29(2): 238–249.
Card, David, and Alan B. Krueger. 2000. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case
Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply.” The American
Economic Review, 90(5): 1397–1420.
Carlton, Dennis W. 1983. “The Location and Employment Choices of New Firms: An
Econometric Model with Discrete and Continuous Endogenous Variables.” The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 65(3): 440–449.
Chetty, Raj, Adam Guren, Day Manoli, and Andrea Weber. 2011. “Are Micro and Macro
Labor Supply Elasticities Consistent? A Review of Evidence on the Intensive and Exten-
sive Margins.” The American Economic Review, 101(3): 471–475.
Clementi, Gian Luca. 2019. “Comment on “Reviving American entrepreneurship? Tax re-
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Suárez Serrato, Juan Carlos, and Owen Zidar. 2018. “The Structure of State Corporate
Taxation and its Impact on State Tax Revenues and Economic Activity.” Journal of Public
Economics, 167: 158–176.
Vereshchagina, Galina, and Hugo A. Hopenhayn. 2009. “Risk taking by entrepreneurs.”
American Economic Review, 99(5): 1808–1830.
Wettstein, Gal, Matthew S Rutledge, and Wenliang Hou. 2018. “How Have Automa-
tion and Trade Affected the Taxable Share of Covered Earnings?” Center for Retirement
Research at Boston College, CRR WP, 10.
Winters, John V. 2008. Property Tax Limitations. Fiscal Research Center of the Andrew
Young School of Policy Studies.
Wolman, Harold. 1983. “Understanding Local Government Responses to Fiscal Pressure:
A Cross National Analysis.” Journal of Public Policy, 245–263.
247
